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My thesis elaborates a philosophy of poetry in two interrelated ways: a 
philosophical study of poetry and an exploration of the impacts of poetry on 
philosophical investigations. Whereas poetry was considered as one of the 
highest arts in the 18th and 19th century aesthetics, 20th century analytic 
aesthetics has left poetry aside, focusing much more on visual arts or music. 
The so-called ‘analytic-continental divide’ which has shaped the 
philosophical landscape in the 20th century provides an element of an answer 
to explain this disappearance: following the ‘linguistic turn,’ the dominant 
conception of language in the analytic tradition is the representational 
conception of language which fails to give an account of what happens in 
poetry. On the continental side, on the contrary, some philosophers such as 
Heidegger have gone as far as to consider philosophy as poetry. These two 
extremes map out two questions that a philosophy of poetry must answer: 
What conception of language can give an account of poetry? And how does 
poetry affect philosophical investigations, especially regarding the question 
of style? Nietzsche and Wittgenstein both offer interesting insights to answer 
these questions and bringing them together lead to reconsidering the 
analytic-continental divide and the ‘quarrel between philosophy and 
poetry.’ I approach poetry by transposing Wittgenstein’s notion of ’seeing-
as’ to ‘reading-as,’ and bring this notion in relation to Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism. Following these ideas, I consider poetry as a way creating 
perspectives and elaborate the notion of ‘perspectival poetics’ in the 
etymological sense of poiesis, creation or making. Philosophy’s encounter 
with the language of poetry does not only entail a change in conception of 
language, but also a change in philosophy’s own use of language. 
Philosophy’s encounter with poetry brings the question of style to the fore 
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Poetry and the Question of Truth 
Like a painter, [the imitative poet] produces work that is 
inferior with respect to truth and that appeals to a part of 
the soul that is similarly inferior rather than to the  best 
part. So we were right not to admit him into a city that is 
to be well-governed, for he arouses, nourishes, and 
strengthens this part of the soul and so destroys the 
rational one, in just the way that someone destroys the 
better sort of citizens when he strengthens the vicious 
ones and surrenders the city to them.  
Plato, The Republic, 605a-c 
When Plato banishes poets from his ideal city because they tell lies which 
corrupt the minds even of good citizens and thus evaluates poetry 
negatively, he opposes the poet’s task to the philosopher’s search for truth 
and, insofar as a city should not surrender itself to the vicious citizens, 
philosophy should not surrender itself to poetry. His banishing poetry from 
the ideal city can thus be understood as a metaphor for what he calls ‘an 
ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry:’ the city is philosophy and 
poetry should not be admitted in it. Despite the modifications and evolutions 
of both the notions of poetry and of philosophy, Plato’s setting of poetry as 
philosophy’s ‘other’ seems to maintain an effectiveness for many 
philosophers in various periods in history and the latest development of this 
‘ancient quarrel’ could be seen in the analytic-continental divide. In a 
schematic way, analytic philosophy would in this sense pursue Plato’s ideal 
of removing poetry from the philosophical realm whereas continental 
philosophy would work against this removal by embracing poetry as a 
means to knowledge and by including poetic elements. We will see that this 
picture is far too schematic but the rejection of poetry has also and above all 
had an impact on the field of analytic aesthetics. Poetry is, as John Gibson 
suggests in his introduction to The Philosophy of Poetry, ‘the last great 
unexplored frontier in contemporary aesthetics.’1 By ‘contemporary 
                                                     
1 Gibson (2015), p. 1. 
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aesthetics,’ one must understand here ‘analytic aesthetics’ as many 
continental philosophers of art have given a prime role to poetry, thus 
following the long tradition in which philosophers granted poetry the status 
of the highest art such as Kant or Hegel. 
The relations between philosophy and poetry are not only one-sided: 
philosophy does not only observe and study poetry from an external point 
of view but is also affected by poetry in return. Paradoxically, Plato himself, 
by staging his philosophy in dialogues uses a poetic device to express his 
philosophy. This might already suggest that philosophy cannot escape the 
question of its own presentation, the question of style, and this question is 
closely linked to philosophy’s relation to poetry. Against analytic 
philosophy’s turn to science and logic, continental philosophy could thus be 
seen as embracing poetry, and Plato’s distinction between the rationality of 
philosophy and the irrationality of poetry could therefore be transposed in 
terms of the logicism of analytic philosophy and the anti-logicism of 
continental philosophy. This picture is however quite misleading and the 
distinctions cannot be so easily pinned down. As I will argue, some bridges 
can be built between analytic and continental philosophers, especially 
between two of their important figures: Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. 
Nietzsche is among the philosophers who reply to Plato’s banishing of 
poetry by embracing it and, to that extent, he considers his philosophy to be 
an inverted Platonism: ‘My philosophy is an inverted Platonism: the further 
something is from true being, the purer, the more beautiful, the better it is. 
Living in illusion as the goal.’ (NF-1870-1871, 7[156] / KSA 7.199) This 
inversion therefore brings Nietzsche to adopt an attitude towards poetry 
fundamentally opposed to Plato’s: rather than criticising the poet’s distance 
from the truth, Nietzsche praises it because the whole idea of the ‘Truth’ is 
misleading according to him. His poem ‘Only fool, only poet!’ responds to 
Plato’s banishing of poetry from the realm of truth and explores precisely 
this question of truth and poetry: 
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‘Der Wahrheit Freier—du?’ so höhnten 
sie 
‘nein! nur ein Dichter!’ 
ein Thier, ein listiges, raubendes, 
schleichendes, 
das lügen muss, 
das wissentlich, willentlich lügen 
muss, 
nach Beute lüstern, 
bunt verlarvt, 
sich selbst zur Larve, 
sich selbst zur Beute 
das—der Wahrheit Freier?… 
Nur Narr! Nur Dichter! 
Nur Buntes redend, 
aus Narrenlarven bunt herausredend, 
herumsteigend auf lügnerischen 
Wortbrücken, 
auf Lügen-Regenbogen 
zwischen falschen Himmeln 
herumschweifend, herumschleichend 
— 
nur Narr! nur Dichter!… 
‘The free truth—you?’ 
They scoffed 
‘No! Only a poet!’ 
A nasty, robbing, and 
crawling animal, 
Who must lie, 
Must wisely, willingly lie, 
Lusting for booty, 
Colorfully disguised, 
Who is the masque, 
Who is the booty himself, 
Is that—the free truth?... 
Only fool! Only poet! 
Only colorful speaking, 
From a colourful larval 
fool, 
Climbing upon false 
broken 
Words and false rainbows 
Between false heavens 
Crawling and creeping – 
Only fool! Only poet!... 
(DD, ‘Only Fool!’ / KSA 
6.377-378) 
Nietzsche’s poem stages the poet as a fool, therefore restating Plato’s 
conception of the poet as irrational. The poet is a fool to think that she has 
something to do with truth. The translation of ‘der Wahrheit Freier’ as ‘the 
free truth’ is problematic but interesting. It is problematic because ‘Freier’ 
does not mean free and is not an adjective. This translation therefore inverts 
the syntactical relation between ‘Wahrheit’ and ‘Freier.’ Other translations 
suggest ‘the suitor of truth’ or ‘the lover of truth’ which maintain the correct 
grammatical relation between ‘Wahrheit’ and ‘Freier’ and present the poet 
as aiming towards the same goal as the philosopher. Although linguistically 
incorrect, the notion of freedom is however interesting as it could suggest 
that the poet is free from this idea of truth whereas the philosopher is still 
bound to it. Following these notions of love and freedom, the poet would 
therefore be the one who loves truth and who also frees others from it. The 
others however only reply ‘Only fool! Only Poet!’ and do not take her 
seriously. Two criticisms are made to poets here: first they are liars, and this 
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follows Plato’s idea that the poet moves away from the truth, and second 
their words are only colourful speaking, not serious speaking. We could find 
an anticipation of Austin’s rejection of poetic uses of language in the category 
of the ‘non-serious’ in this critique of colourful language, and the difficulties 
philosophy of language encounters in attempting to account for poetic uses 
of language originate here. 
Nietzsche often uses the image of the poet as a liar, for instance in 
Zarathustra, where he considers that the poets lie too much, which causes 
great problems to Zarathustra’s disciple: 
‘So what did Zarathustra once say to you? That the poets lie too 
much?—But Zarathustra too is a poet.’ 
‘Now do you believe that he was telling the truth here? Why do you 
believe that?’ 
The disciple answered: ‘I believe in Zarathustra.’ But Zarathustra 
shook his head and smiled. 
‘Belief does not make me blessed,’ he said, ‘least of all belief in me.’ 
(Z II ‘Poets’ / KSA 4.163-4) 
Zarathustra’s disciple struggles with what could be seen as a self-
contradictory statement: Zarathustra claims that ‘poets lie too much’ while 
considering himself a poet. This suggests that Zarathustra’s discourse 
should not be taken at face value, not as a statement or a doctrine but as an 
allegorical speech in which the truth to be discovered does not follow the 
rules of ‘scientific’ or ‘logical’ truth. 
By distancing herself from this logical truth, by knowingly lying, the poet 
might get closer to another kind of truth as Nietzsche suggests in developing 
the abovementioned image of the poet-liar: 
Der Dichter, der lügen kann 
wissentlich, willentlich, 
der kann allein Wahrheit reden. 
The poet, who can 
willingly and knowingly lie, 
can alone tell the truth. 
(NF-1884, 28[20] / KSA 11.306)  
This problem of truth in poetry and poetic language is an important concern 
in Nietzsche’s works, and perhaps even more so as he considers himself as a 
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poet. The statement concerning Zarathustra’s discourse could therefore be 
transposed onto Nietzsche’s. 
The two criticisms mentioned above—distance from truth and colourful 
speech—represent two rather common ideas which are still strong in 
philosophy and theory of poetry nowadays. If poetry is distant from truth as 
commonly understood, then another kind of truth must be at play in poetry, 
a poetic or a metaphorical truth; second, poetic language is a colourful 
language, that is a language somehow deviant and distant from ordinary 
language. These ideas have been fought by some, embraced by others, but 
they show that the question of truth in poetry is related to the question of 
language. Proponents of the truth of poetry consider poetic language as 
central to language tout court, even sometimes as the birthplace of language, 
whereas opponents to the truth of poetry consider poetic language as a 
deviance. We will see that these two types of response can be used to look at 
the analytic-continental divide. Nietzsche explores this distinction and 
develops the opposition between truth and untruth, rationality and 
irrationality, in terms of day and night or light and darkness: 
Bei abgehellter Luft, 
wenn schon des Monds Sichel 
grün zwischen Pupurröthen 
und neidisch hinschleicht, 
— dem Tage feind, 
mit jedem Schritte heimlich 
an Rosen-Hängematten 
hinsichelnd, bis sie sinken, 
nachtabwärts blass hinabsinken: 
so sank ich selber einstmals, 
aus meinem Wahrheits-Wahnsinne, 
aus meinen Tages-Sehnsüchten, 
des Tages müde, krank vom Lichte, 
— sank abwärts, abendwärts, 
schattenwärts, 
von Einer Wahrheit 
verbrannt und durstig 
— gedenkst du noch, gedenkst du, 
heisses Herz, 
wie da du durstetest? — 
Near an opaque sky, 
The crescent moon 
Crawls across crimson 
And creeps enviously 
- the enemy of Day, 
With each secret step toward 
The hanging rose gardens 
Hobbling, until it sinks 
With the death of the night: 
So I myself once sank 
From my truth and delusion, 
From my Day-searching 
Tired of day, sick of light, 
I sank down, deepen into the shadows, 
Burned and thirsty 
from every truth 
- Do you still remember, remember, hot heart, 
How you once thirsted there? 
I was banished 
from all Truth! 
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dass ich verbannt sei  
von aller Wahrheit! 
Nur Narr! Nur Dichter!… 
 
Only fool! Only poet!... 
(DD, ‘Only Fool!’ / KSA 6.380) 
 
Nietzsche’s poet remembers the Platonic days when she was banished from 
the realm of truth. This image represents the poet as going down or sinking 
in Plato’s cave, far away from the sun which represents the truth in Plato’s 
allegory but also, interestingly, stages the poet as making this move on her 
own, although the term sinking is ambiguous in that regard. This could 
parallel Zarathustra’s journey: at the beginning of the book he decides to go 
down from his mountain into the ‘human’ world and thus begins 
Zarathustra’s ‘Untergang,’ usually translated as ‘going under’ but which 
also means sinking or decline.  
What is at play in taking poetry seriously from a philosophical point of view 
is therefore that truth cannot be taken in a Platonic way, i.e. as an eternal, 
absolute, and context-independent truth, and that language cannot be 
construed in terms of representing these metaphysical truths. Taking poetry 
seriously breaks down the metaphysics edifice Plato and many philosophers 
after him have built because poetry shows that language outgrows the limits 
of representing eternal truths. In her song called ‘The Truth,’ poet-rapper 
Kate Tempest brings these elements together in a poetic way and stages the 
relativeness of truth. The song begins with the line ‘It’s all relative, right?’ 
and this brings her to what I think to be a good introduction to Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism: 
Is there a truth that exists 
Outside of perception? 
This is the question. 
It’s true if you believe it. 
The world is the world 
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But it’s all how you see it.2 
If truths cannot be considered as eternal and absolute, they must be relative 
to something and Tempest suggests they are relative to perception. As we 
will see, Nietzsche’s focus on perspective suggests a similar line of thought 
which modifies the hierarchies in philosophy: it does not only invert the 
rationalist move of considering reason over the senses (and therefore over 
perception), but also places aesthetics—in the etymological sense of aisthesis, 
that is sensation or perception—at the centre of philosophical concerns over 
metaphysics. This goes back to the original use of the word ‘aesthetic’ by 
Alexander Baumgarten who considers it as the science of sensations (in 
contrast to reason). As Tempest suggests, the last and only meaningful 
metaphysical statement is a tautology: ‘The world is the world.’ This notion 
of tautology reminds us of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus in which true statements 
are tautological and metaphysical statements meaningless. The important 
aspect in Tempest’s song, however, is what comes after the metaphysical 
statement: ‘but it’s all how you see it.’ This suggests a replacement of 
metaphysics by aesthetics: as the only meaningful metaphysical statement is 
a tautology which says nothing about the world, the focus must shift from 
the ‘objective’ world to the way of seeing it. What Tempest suggests with this 
shift from metaphysics to aesthetics is, I argue, precisely the move Nietzsche 
makes in advocating for his perspectivism. Another important element is 
that the question of truth is translated in terms of beliefs: ‘It’s true if you 
believe it.’ The question is no longer: ‘what is true?’ but ‘what do you believe 
in?’ This comes back to Zarathustra’s disciple taking Zarathustra’s 
statements for true because she believes in him. Following Nietzsche’s 
thought, this can be understood as the shift from the question of truth to that 
of the value of truth. More precisely, Nietzsche questions the value of our 
usual conception of truth as correspondence between a statement and a fact. 
This is not the only way of understanding truth and Nietzsche suggests that 
it might not always be the best way. What is in question is therefore not truth 
                                                     
2 Kate Tempest, ‘The Truth.’ 
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itself, or to that extent knowledge, reason, etc., but the value we give them, 
the belief we put into them. 
Perspectivism suggests that one should not remain enclosed within one 
single perspective, but rather shift from one perspective to another in order 
to reach, in the long run, a better picture or, in Wittgenstein’s terms, a 
‘surveyable representation [übersichtliche Darstellung].’ (PI 122) In a 
metaphorical way, Nietzsche suggests in another poem that one should not 
stand too long on one leg: 
einer Tänzerin gleich, die, wie, mir 
scheinen will, 
zu lange schon, gefährlich lange 
immer, immer nur auf einem 
Beinchen stand? 
- da vergass sie darob, wie mir 
scheinen will, 
das andre Beinchen? 
Is she like a dancer who for 
too long 
Already, dangerously long, 
stands 
Always, always only upon one 
leg? 
- she forgotten 
about the other leg? 
(DD, ‘Daughters’ / KSA 6.385) 
 
The shift in perspective is like changing leg. This might be required in 
dancing, but also in philosophising, as Wittgenstein suggests with the 
surprisingly same image: ‘In philosophizing it is important for me to keep 
changing my position, not to stand too long on one leg, so as not to get stiff.’ 
(CV, p. 32) Not staying too long on one leg does not suggest that one should 
stand on both legs, but rather change from one leg to the other. Like a dancer, 
and Nietzsche often uses dance as a metaphor for thought, the philosopher 
should not forget the other leg, the other perspective. This metaphor should 
however not lead us into thinking that two perspectives suffice. On the 
contrary, Nietzsche argues that there are many perspectives and that one 
must learn to move from one to another, like the dancer moves from one leg 
to the other. To do so, the philosopher should always question herself and 
especially the grounds on which she founds her thought. Nietzsche’s texts 
also suggest this by presenting many questions, without necessarily 
answering them: the questions aim at opening perspectives. In that sense, 
and as Wittgenstein suggests, the poet is similar to the philosopher: ‘The poet 
19 
 
too must always be asking himself: “is what I am writing really true then?”—
which does not necessarily mean: “is this how it happens in reality?”’ (CV, 
p. 46) According to Wittgenstein, the poet brings into question the notion of 
truth as correspondence and this, in turn, has an impact on the philosophical 
conception of truth. Wittgenstein’s questions bring to the fore the important 
metaphilosophical aspect of writing philosophy, the question of style. If 
truth must not necessarily be understood in terms of correspondence to 
reality, and this because reality itself is a problematic concept, the notion of 
truth in writing philosophy must be understood differently and this is where 
style comes into play. What poetry brings to philosophy, for good or bad, is 
that the ways of seeing and thinking are related to style (or ways of writing) 
and that the philosopher should avoid remaining in one way of seeing, 
should avoid standing too long, ‘dangerously long,’ on one leg. 
To explore these questions, my thesis is divided in two parts. The first part 
establishes the conceptual and historical background against which 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein can be compared and fruitfully brought 
together. Chapter One explores the so-called ‘analytic-continental divide’ in 
relation to the ‘linguistic turn’ as these notions have shaped the 20th century 
philosophical landscape, and therefore the reception and possibilities of 
linking Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s thoughts. For quite some time, 
Nietzsche was largely ignored in the analytic field and Wittgenstein in the 
continental one, although both can bring interesting insights to the other 
tradition. The absence of poetry in the analytic field of philosophising can be 
explained by the rejection of continental philosophy which has been in much 
closer contact to poetry, and is even considered as poetry by some analytic 
philosophers. Although some continental and analytic philosophers share 
similar concerns with the end of metaphysics and with language, the notion 
of poetry is central to understanding the limits of their conceptions of 
language. 
These considerations about language and metaphysics bring me, in Chapter 
Two, to explore an alternative way of conceptualising language as 
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expression and to show how this tradition, which includes Herder, Hamann 
and Humboldt among others, influenced both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein’s shift in his conception of language between the Tractatus and 
his later works can be seen as a shift in which influences are the most 
important, Frege and Russell or Herder and Hamann. Although it is difficult 
to know what Wittgenstein read of Nietzsche and the German tradition of 
philosophy of language before him, his acquaintance with Fritz Mauthner’s 
works can explain, as Janet Lungstrum argues,3 the connection to Nietzsche, 
the German Romantics and Herder, Hamann, and Humboldt, what Charles 
Taylor calls the ‘HHH view.’4 Against the representational conception of 
language which fails to account for poetry, this tradition elaborates a 
conception of language as expression which anticipates some aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s later works. This chapter shows that Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein are not so distant from one another but can be said to belong to 
a similar tradition in their conceptions of language. 
Chapter Three explores in details Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s views on 
language, and how they can be fruitfully brought together. They both 
criticise metaphysics and a certain metaphysical conception of language, 
according to which language represents the world. Language is full of 
metaphysical prejudices and a critique of metaphysics cannot forego a 
critique of language and these embedded prejudices. Nietzsche criticises the 
notion of concept as ‘equating the unequal’ and therefore establishing some 
kind of ideal or metaphysical ‘true world’ behind the apparent one. To 
overcome this issue, Wittgenstein elaborates the notion of ‘family 
resemblance concepts’ which avoids the traps and downfalls of a 
metaphysical understanding of concepts. If concepts are no longer self-
evident, this opens the door to a form of relativism. Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein answer this charge of relativism by bringing the notions of 
interpretation and values into play. More specifically, they bring the social 
                                                     
3 See Lungstrum (1995) 
4 Taylor (1985), p. 269. 
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aspect of language to the fore and Wittgenstein’s notions of ‘language-
games’ and ‘forms of life’ are central to understanding how interpretation 
and values come to the centre of the concerns with language. 
Part Two shifts to the poetic dimension of language and philosophy. Chapter 
Four and Five focus on approaching poetry from a Nietzschean and 
Wittgensteinian perspective, exploring what is at play in poetry. In Chapter 
Four, Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘seeing-as’ is applied to poetry in order to 
elaborate a ‘reading-as’ which accounts for poetic uses of language without 
positing them as ontologically distinct from ordinary uses. This conception 
brings to the fore the importance of aesthetics in philosophy, the importance 
of how we see and perceive the world over the metaphysical question of 
what the world is. 
Chapter Five shifts from aesthetics to poetics, etymologically poiesis, creation 
or making. Poetry is not only a matter of seeing the world, but also of 
creating it by creating new perspectives. The chapter explores in more details 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism and argues that once taken on aesthetic grounds, 
this notion does not encounter the self-refuting problem, namely that if all is 
interpretation, would perspectivism not just be an interpretation. 
Chapter Six is a case study in poetics, focusing on the notion of metaphor, as 
many consider it to be an important dimension of poetic language. Metaphor 
is not only understood as a rhetorical trope, but also and above all as a way 
of changing perspective, as presenting a new way of seeing. Metaphor is 
therefore a poetic tool insofar as it invites readers to see and understand the 
world anew through its bringing together seemingly very distant terms. 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by turning to the metaphilosophical 
impacts of this notion of poetics. Poetics does not only affect how we see the 
world, but also how philosophy is written. The question of style is central 
both for Nietzsche and Wittgenstein and the notion of ‘perspectival poetics’ 
leads to questioning the ‘poetics of philosophy,’ that is not only how 
philosophy can create perspectives, but also how philosophy has a poetic 
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dimension which is laid in its style. In the concluding chapter, I combine 











Crossing the Analytic-Continental Divide: Metaphysics, 
Language, and Poetry 
This has given me the greatest trouble and still does: to 
realize that what things are called is incomparably more 
important than what they are.  
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §58 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein do not appear often as a pair, especially in 
aesthetics, and one of the main reasons for their separation can be found in 
a salient feature of the 20th century philosophical landscape: the so-called 
analytic-continental divide. Even though, as we will see in this chapter, this 
divide makes only little sense once looked at carefully, one of its concrete 
impacts was to separate the spheres of influence of Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein. In order to bring them back closer to one another and build a 
philosophical discourse based on both of them, it is thus necessary to 
understand how and why this divide can be overcome. There are points of 
contact between philosophers on both sides and focusing on Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein will outline some of them, especially regarding metaphysics 
and language. It might be objected that Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are not 
the most representative philosophers for the continental and the analytic 
sides, but as Cavell argues concerning Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein: ‘while 
[they] may be untypical representatives of the philosophies for which I am 
making them stand, they are hardly peripheral to them. Any general 
comparison which could not accommodate these figures would also, if 
differently, risk irrelevance.’5 Their belonging to the traditional picture of 
continental and analytic philosophy is further attested by their rejection from 
the opposite side: Carnap for instance considers Nietzsche as a poet more 
than a philosopher and Deleuze considers Wittgenstein as ‘an assassin of 
philosophy.’ Wittgenstein’s shift of style and concerns between his early and 
                                                     
5 Cavell (1964), pp. 946-947.  
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later works however makes the picture more complex and his position 
within the history of philosophy is not so easy to pin down. If the Tractatus 
is considered as playing a foundational role in analytic philosophy, things 
become less clear with his later works. To the question ‘Is Wittgenstein an 
analytic philosopher?,’ Anat Biletzki for instance answers: ‘Yes, the early 
Wittgenstein was an analytic philosopher; no, the later was not.’6 But if one 
were to ask: ‘Is Wittgenstein a continental philosopher?,’ very few, I guess, 
would answer yes, disregarding early or late, and Deleuze’s criticism of 
Wittgenstein suggests he would not want to be associated with him. 
However, as Hans-Johann Glock argues, looking at the history of philosophy 
makes Wittgenstein’s position easier to place: ‘when we look at the historical 
criterion, Wittgenstein’s membership in the analytic tradition becomes clear. 
He was mainly influenced by analytic philosophers (Frege, Russell, Moore), 
and he in turn mainly influenced analytic philosophers (Russell, Moore, 
logical positivism, conceptual analysis). This is not to deny that he was also 
influenced by (Schopenhauer, James, Spengler) and influenced 
(hermeneutics, postmodernism) non-analytic philosophers.’7 Similarly, 
Nietzsche’s influence on many 20th century continental philosophers 
(Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida) makes him an important figure in continental 
philosophy. Wittgenstein’s complex position can however be positively seen 
as it reveals his possible role as point of contact between two traditions 
which now seem far from each other, but which arise, as we will see, from 
similar concerns. Once we look at this analytic-continental divide more 
closely, it appears to be more a misunderstanding than a clear-cut opposition 
between two well-defined sides. 
Although we will see that the analytic-continental divide which has shaped 
the description of philosophy in the 20th century is slowly starting to lose its 
strength, it is still quite strong in aesthetics where ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ 
concerns seem quite far from one another. This comes from a different 
                                                     
6 Biletzki and Matar (eds.) (1998), p. 197. 
7 Glock (2008), pp. 226-227. 
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understanding of what role aesthetics plays in philosophy, and in order to 
elaborate a philosophy of poetry, one needs to understand how the field is 
set. As Roger Pouivet describes it: 
Anglo-American aesthetics thus appears as a branch of other subjects 
and, especially, of analytic metaphysics. This has sometimes led 
‘continental’ thinkers to find that it does not focus enough on the 
works themselves, that it is too far from their real history, from the 
sociological conditions of their appearance, from the critical 
judgments one can make about them. […] This criticism seems also 
to rely on a contradiction concerning the general project of Anglo-
American aesthetics. This project does not aim so much at reaching a 
global interpretation of the phenomenon of art—what one sometimes 
understands as ‘metaphysics of art’—but at evaluating the various 
argumentations at play on delineated concerns.8 
The scope of analytic aesthetics is thus, according to Pouivet, to approach 
and solve specific problems related to art whereas continental aesthetics 
would be a more generalised attempt to understand what art is. Such a 
description however inherits the same problems as those of the global 
‘analytic-continental divide’ and some work can be done to overcome this 
distance. This difference in aims and scope of aesthetics has also prevented 
philosophers from connecting analytic and continental philosophers matters 
in aesthetics and, in this context, from connecting Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein. 
Despite the distance between them, Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s 
influences sometimes fuse and the most representative analytic aesthetician 
to inherit from both influences is Arthur Danto whose aesthetics is explicitly 
                                                     
8 Pouivet (2000), p. 47, my translation: L'esthétique anglo-américaine apparaît ainsi 
comme une branche d'autres disciplines et, particulièrement, de la métaphysique 
analytique. Cela conduit parfois les ‘continentaux’ à trouver qu'elle se préoccupe 
trop peu de œuvres elles-mêmes, qu'elle est trop éloignée de leur histoire réelle, des 
conditions sociologiques de leur apparition, des jugement critiques qu'on peut 
porter sur elles. […] Cette critique me semble aussi reposer sur un contresens 
concernant le projet général de l'esthétique telle qu'elle se pratique dans le monde 
anglo-américain. Ce projet n'est pas tant de parvenir à une interprétation globale du 
phénomène de l'art—ce qu'on entend parfois par ‘métaphysique de l'art’—que celui 




influenced by Wittgenstein and whose book on Nietzsche was influential in 
giving a place to Nietzsche in the analytic realm. His notion of 
‘transfiguration of the commonplace’9 calls on both Nietzschean and 
Wittgensteinian ideas. Although he does not discuss poetry in that context, 
we will see in Chapter Four that a philosophy of poetry based on Nietzsche 
and Wittgenstein shares some aspects with Danto’s philosophy of art. The 
same can be said of continental philosophers who accept and take 
Wittgenstein’s influence, most notably Jean-François Lyotard whose 
aesthetics relies heavily on Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games. This 
Wittgensteinian influence is one of the reasons Richard Kearney and David 
Rasmussen give to justify their inclusion of Wittgenstein in their anthology 
Continental Aesthetics: Romanticism to Postmodernism: ‘[Wittgenstein’s] 
linguistic approach to art was of course to prove of seminal importance for 
the entire ‘analytic’ tradition of modern aesthetics, but its impact on a 
number of important ‘continental’ thinkers—notably Ricoeur, Habermas, 
and Lyotard—cannot be overestimated.’10 Following Kearny and 
Rasmussen, Wittgenstein could also be said to be a continental aesthetician. 
This blurring of the frontiers and this mutual influence is one way of 
overcoming the analytic-continental divide and aesthetics can profit from it.  
Within philosophy of poetry or literature, the separation in influence is quite 
strong, and this has something to do with the relation to language. As Peter 
Kivy argues, the turn to language in philosophy has not been helpful to 
aesthetics, quite to the contrary: 
Nor was the newly emerging school of linguistic analysis, in its 
various forms, the savior of aesthetics. To the contrary, if anything, it 
passed an even harsher judgment on the discipline than did the 
positivists. For whereas the positivists were more or less content to 
give it a dismissive shrug in the direction of the “emotive,” the 
language analysts took special pains to exclude aesthetics, not with a 
whimper but with a bang.11 
                                                     
9 See Danto (1981). 
10 Kearny and Rasmussen (2001), p. 163. 
11 Kivy (2004), p. 2. 
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Despite the linguistic analysts’ negative attitude towards aesthetics, some 
philosophers considered as analytic have turned their attention to art and 
literature. Most analytic philosophers of literature have inherited from this 
‘linguistic turn’ and therefore consider literature from the point of view of 
language, focusing on aspects such as the relation between truth and fiction 
or the specificities of literary language. On the contrary, continental 
aesthetics did not focus on such linguistic problems and understood poetry 
as something more general, as describing a way of relating to the world 
rather than as being a subfield of philosophy of art. One philosopher to 
fruitfully overcome the divide is Stanley Cavell who, while approaching 
specific problems in philosophy of literature, also has a broader spectrum in 
mind. Moreover, taking a step back and looking at the broader picture of 
what a philosophy of poetry can be, one must take into account the double 
directionality of the genitive and give an account of the impacts of poetry on 
philosophy. As Cavell asks in the famous closing question to his Claim of 
Reason: ‘Can philosophy become literature and still know itself?’12 
In this chapter, I first give a brief characterisation of analytic and continental 
philosophy in order to show the limits of this terminology. I then focus 
specifically on Nietzsche and Wittgenstein and look on what grounds they 
have usually been compared. Two aspects arise from the comparison: a 
critique of metaphysics and a turn to language. In the third part, I explore 
how these aspects reveal a connection between philosophers from both sides 
and sketch a story of connections and oppositions. Although many 
philosophers seem to agree in saying that language is fundamental to 
philosophical investigations, we will see that in this brief story that the 
conceptions of language they rely on and offer are radically different. What 
this story shows moreover is the importance of poetic language in the so-
called divide and why it is necessary for a philosophy of language to give an 
account of poetic phenomena. In that story, the philosophers categorised as 
                                                     
12 Cavell (1979), p. 496. 
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analytic seem to give little attention to poetry whereas philosophers 
categorised as continental take poetry as a starting point. As I will argue in 
further chapters, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, although they do not 
necessarily take poetic language as their starting point (this is certainly the 
case for Wittgenstein, it is debatable for Nietzsche), elaborate conceptions of 
language which encompass poetic uses. Two steps are necessary before 
connecting Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s views on language: first, in this 
chapter, breaking the myth of the so-called analytic-continental divide by 
showing that both sides share similar concerns and cannot be defined as 
traditions, second, in Chapter Two, showing how Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein belong to a similar tradition which considers language not only 
as representational but also as expressive. 
1. The Terms of the Debate: Analytic and Continental Philosophies 
It is now rather common in philosophy to distinguish between analytic and 
continental, and some philosophers might even use these terms to describe 
themselves. However, when one looks closer at this classification, it does not 
seem to make much sense and neither analytic nor continental philosophy 
seems to be a united and well-defined front. This is not to say that the picture 
of analytic versus continental philosophy has no effect in the philosophical 
world, but rather that these effects are based on a weak understanding of 
what philosophers on both sides try to do. The difficulties one encounters in 
attempting to define either analytic or continental philosophy further 
suggests that such a distinction might not be an adequate description of the 
philosophical world. Many attempts at definition fail, either because too 
broad or too narrow. For instance, Michael Dummett defines analytic 
philosophy as follows: 
What distinguishes analytic philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, 
from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of 
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thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, 
and secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained.13 
According to Dummett, the specificity of analytic philosophy is that it 
considers philosophical problems to be accounted for by language and 
language only. This definition, although it describes some strands of analytic 
philosophy, does not really account for many of the more contemporary 
trends in analytic philosophy. Moreover, some continental philosophers 
such as Heidegger or Derrida could, to some extent, satisfy this condition 
whereas they clearly stand opposite analytic philosophy according to the 
standard picture. The shift to language is not an analytic-only move but, as 
we will see, the attempt of philosophy to overcome metaphysics. 
Against Dummett’s account of analytic philosophy and other closed 
definitions of it, Glock’s account of analytic philosophy attempts to take into 
consideration both historical and systematic dimensions. He thus takes into 
account the different historical developments of analytic philosophy and 
shows how the various definitions that have been given do not really cover 
them all. The choice of Frege as a starting point to analytic philosophy seems 
however quite a widely accepted claim. Most authors consider Frege and 
Russell as the founders of analytic philosophy, even though Russell’s role is 
sometimes diminished. Despite their differences, Frege and Russell share the 
same tendency towards logicism; as Peter Hylton suggests: ‘Each argued for, 
and tried to prove, logicism, the thesis that arithmetic can be reduced to 
logic, and is thus no more than logic in disguise.’14 The main contribution of 
Frege and Russell is thus not that of turning philosophy towards language 
but of turning language towards logic. Glock summarises the situation of the 
origins of analytic philosophy: 
Analytic philosophy achieved lift-off only when the logicist 
programme and the Frege-Russell revolution of formal logic 
combined with attempts to solve problems concerning propositions, 
                                                     
13 Dummett (1996), p. 4. 




concepts and facts that Moore and Russell faced in their fight against 
idealism. And it took a linguistic turn when the Tractatus linked these 
problems to the nature of philosophy and of logical necessity, and 
tried to resolve the lot by reference to linguistic representation.15 
Glock notes three elements at the origins of analytic philosophy: the turn to 
logic, the fight against idealism, and the turn to language. Among these three 
elements, it is mainly around the first one that the analytic-continental divide 
revolves. Indeed, as Glock notes twice in What Is Analytic Philosophy?, some 
aspects of analytic philosophy are closer to Nietzsche than one might think 
at first glance.16 And even though the divide is still quite strong for many 
authors, on the analytic and on the continental sides, there is a continuity—
analytic philosophy does not spring out of nowhere but is inscribed in a clear 
intellectual context—and there are points of contact. 
Some philosophers have attempted to redefine the divide in order to 
overcome it, but these attempts still maintain a difference between two kinds 
of philosophy and inherit from the same difficulties and problems as those 
encountered in defining analytic and continental philosophy. Richard Rorty 
suggests renaming continental philosophy as conversational philosophy. 
According to him, conversational philosophers converse with other 
philosophers, without having in mind the goal of ‘getting it right’ or, rather, 
having abandoned the idea that it is possible of ‘getting it right’ because ‘the 
term “getting it right,” I would argue, is appropriate only when everybody 
interested in the topics draws pretty much the same inferences from the same 
assertions. That happens when there is consensus about the aim of inquiry 
in the area, and when a problem can be pinned down in such a way that 
                                                     
15 Glock (2008), p. 226. 
16 Glock (2008), p. 118: ‘The positivists’ answer to this question is equally striking, 
and it owes more than a passing debt to Nietszche’s Lebensphilosophie and his critique 
of metaphysics.’ And p. 133: ‘Mulligan sounds a note of caution. Comparisons 
between the analytic and continental turns to language are ‘empty,’ he maintains, 
since they disregard the fact that the latter are embedded in various forms of 
(transcendental) idealism. In my view Nietzsche and Gadamer are clear exceptions 




everybody concerned is clear about what it would take to solve it.’17 As such 
a consensus is often not reached within philosophy, what is left to do is to 
converse about the differences. Rorty’s replacement of the term continental 
with conversational might get rid of some of the connotations continental 
philosophy has but maintains a strong metaphilosophical distinction 
between two sides which are not better defined than analytic and 
continental. Although it emphases an important aspect of philosophy, and 
one especially important for Rorty, it does not solve the problem of the 
divide. 
Similarly, the distinction between rationalism and romanticism Anat Matar 
develops as a replacement for the analytic-continental one reveals that 
analytical minds are ready to take into consideration some of the ‘romantic 
themes’ as long as they ‘find their home within a rationalist framework, 
admitting the meaningfulness of philosophy and the inevitability of 
generality. I can think of no better candidate for developing such a vision 
than analytic philosophy.’18 It is safe to say that Matar takes side with 
analytic philosophy against continental and tries to assimilate continental 
philosophy to what is, in her mind, an analytic framework. Such a view 
poses many problems and derives from the identification of analytic 
philosophy with logic. The distinction Matar suggests replaces the terms but 
still thinks them within the framework of the analytic-continental divide as 
traditionally construed and does not overcome it, quite to the contrary. In 
order to really attempt to bridge across the divide, it is necessary to work on 
the common grounds, critique of metaphysics and turn to language for 
instance, rather than on the differences such as logic. We will see in the next 
section that these aspects are central to connecting Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein.  
                                                     
17 Rorty (2007), p. 124. 
18 Biletzki and Matar (eds.) (1998), p. 86. 
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If analytic philosophy proves rather difficult to define as a united front of 
thinkers and appears much more to be a family resemblance concept in 
which some philosophers (e.g. Wittgenstein, Russell, Frege) are more 
influent than others (e.g. Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger), defining continental 
philosophy proves to raise as many difficulties. As Simon Critchley argues, 
the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy ‘is essentially a 
professional self-description, that is a way that departments of philosophy seek 
to organize their curricula and course offerings as well as signalling their 
broad intellectual allegiances.’19 These self-descriptions however hide, 
Critchley argues, broader cultural oppositions which suggest two conflictual 
understandings and definitions of philosophy. A wide range of oppositions 
can be established, and the most common ones include logicism vs. anti-
logicism, scienticism vs. anti-scienticism, problems vs. proper names, 
ahistorical vs. historical, etc. However, even though these broad strokes 
paint somehow a picture of the opposition between analytic and continental 
philosophies, they do not precisely outline what each is. Continental 
philosophy contains so many different schools of thought that it might be 
argued that the name ‘continental’ only unites them in a negative way, i.e. as 
everything that is not analytic philosophy. When better departments of 
philosophy with an analytic perspective categorise and subdivide 
philosophy into subjects such as metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of 
mind, etc., continental philosophy becomes a category in which to place 
everything that does not enter these subdivisions. 
Following a similar argumentation, Simon Glendinning considers that there 
is no continental tradition except as analytic philosophy positing its Other:  
So taking our bearings from the discussion to this point, what then is 
Continental philosophy? Not, I would suggest, a style or method of 
philosophy, nor even a set of such styles or methods, but, first of all, 
the Other of analytic philosophy: not a tradition of philosophy that 
one might profitably contrast with analytic philosophy, not a 
distinctive way of going on in philosophy, but a free-floating 
                                                     
19 Critchley (1997), p. 348. 
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construction which gives analytic philosophy the illusory assurance 
that it has methodologically secured itself from ‘sophistry and 
illusion’ […] And it is true: the primary texts of Continental 
philosophy are not works of analytic philosophy. They are something 
other than analytic philosophy. However, they are other to analytic 
philosophy without being reducible to its own Other.20 
That continental philosophy is the other of analytic philosophy does not 
mean that there are no differences between them, but rather that it is 
impossible to explore these differences as differences between two well-
established traditions of thought. As seen with Glock, there is a multiplicity 
of trends in analytic philosophy and so could be said of continental 
philosophy. Moreover, some philosophers occupy some kind of middle 
ground, accepting and taking the influence from both sides. The divide 
between analytic and continental is therefore not the result of philosophical 
differences as there is no united front on each side, but a reification of 
professional self-descriptions which ultimately led to making these 
categories effective. 
In his study of the encounters between analytic and continental philosophy, 
Andrea Vrahimis also argues that the reason for the divide is to be found in 
‘extra-philosophical factors’ rather than philosophical ones: 
In all of these encounters, it is not some irreconcilable clash between 
philosophical movements which is to be found; rather, extra-
philosophical factors cause such misinterpretations. […] This series 
of mistakes and omissions are caused by a drive towards picturing 
twentieth century philosophy as split in two, and have been 
instrumental in painting the haunting image of such a split. 
Philosophers have committed these mistakes because they were 
seeking some justification for this image of itself that philosophy had 
conjured. In the attempts to shout across the gulf, one might have 
expected to find an explanation for the prevailing silence. But 
perhaps such efforts precluded looking closely enough in order to see 
the flawed nature of the object of their enquiry. Thus, it is not without 
at least some small element of surprise or disbelief that one may 
discover proximity between thinkers who had been imagined to lie 
so far apart.21 
                                                     
20 Glendinning (2006), p. 84. 
21 Vrahimis (2013), p. 182. 
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Behind the 20th century depiction of philosophy as divided in two distinct 
traditions which conflict with one another lies a series of misunderstandings, 
often extra-philosophical. When one looks closer at philosophers 
themselves, the divide looks much thinner and both sides share much more 
than the word ‘divide’ suggests. More and more work is being done in 
connecting analytic and continental philosophers and some philosophers 
such as Rorty or Cavell seem to occupy a quite uncomfortable middle 
ground as they often seem too analytic for continental philosopher and too 
continental for analytic ones.22 
If analytic and continental turn out to be empty categories, as Glock, 
Glendinning, and Vrahimis seem to consider, the traditional divide should 
not be seen as an obstacle to connecting philosophers from both sides. On 
the contrary, as we will further explore, they share many more concerns than 
one might think at first glance and bringing philosophers from both sides 
into dialogue opens new possibilities for philosophy. In this framework, 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein do not appear as radically opposed anymore, 
but as sharing some concerns regarding metaphysics and language.  
2. Metaphysics and Language: Connecting Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein 
In the opening quotation, Nietzsche suggests a shift in focus from ‘what 
things are’ to ‘what things are called.’ This shift prefigures the ‘linguistic 
turn’ of 20th century philosophy. More than that, Nietzsche connects this turn 
to language to the end of metaphysics, to the end of questioning the essence 
of things because language reveals the way people relate to things. Nietzsche 
                                                     
22 Philosophers have explored various paths to overcome this divide. Braver (2007) 
for instance considers the analytic-continental divide to be analogous to the split 
between empiricism and rationalism and suggests that dialogue is the only way to 
overcome the divide. Reynolds et al. (2010) explore various ways in which analytic 
and continental philosophy can overcome this divide, coining the terms postanalytic 
and metacontinental as replacements and which are not as opposed to one another 
as the traditional analytic and continental. Vrahimis (2013), whom I have already 
mentioned, considers the whole analytic-continental divide to be a 
misunderstanding and a misrepresentation. 
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shifts his attention from metaphysics, from what a thing is, to how things are 
usually considered through language, and this within a historical 
framework. What a thing is depends not only on how I consider something 
now, but also on how it has been considered throughout its history. Names 
and words evolve through time and this evolution reflects a change in 
perception. This view on the genealogy and history of words and concepts 
must also be applied to metaphysics and understanding what metaphysics 
is cannot be done outside of a historical framework.  
Correlatively, the ‘end of metaphysics’ can take various forms which, as 
Jürgen Habermas argues, all represent a break with the philosophical 
tradition.23 Moreover, the role metaphysics plays within philosophy also 
changes: as we will see, ‘philosophy is metaphysics’24 for Heidegger whereas 
Ayer argues the opposite and considers that philosophy has nothing to do 
with metaphysics.25 In attempting to account for metaphysics with a broad 
scope, thus encompassing both Heidegger and Ayer, Adrian Moore suggests 
the following definition: ‘Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make 
sense of things.’26 Although this definition is efficient to show connections 
among philosophers, and especially across the analytic-continental divide, 
the broadness of the idiom ‘making sense of things’ can cause some concerns, 
especially regarding the 20th century phenomenon of ‘end of metaphysics.’ If 
metaphysics is indeed a matter of ‘making sense of things,’ then 
philosophers should never depart from it and the ‘end of metaphysics’ 
would appear more as a cataclysm than as something one should strive for. 
This broad definition also downplays the role of the ‘linguistic turn’ in 
bringing metaphysics to an end since ‘making sense of things’ is already a 
very linguistic matter. Moore’s definition might thus seem too broad to 
account specifically for the undertakings of various philosophers but is 
                                                     
23 Habermas (1990), p. 52. 
24 Heidegger (1977), p. 374 
25 Ayer (1975), p. 75. 
26 Moore (2012), p.1. 
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helpful as it retrospectively connects philosophers which would seem to 
have at first glance little to do with one another and thus suggests a possible 
bridge across the analytic-continental divide. According to Moore, even 
critics of metaphysics as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, or Derrida still 
take part in the same game of ‘making sense of things.’ Even though Moore 
might be quite right that even these critics still play the game of metaphysics, 
I will rely on a more specific definition of metaphysics as the search for the 
essence of things. This is mainly because Nietzsche and Wittgenstein both 
use the term metaphysics in such a way and because it helps clarifying the 
sketch of the 20th century philosophical landscape I will give in the next 
section. Searching for the essence of things is one way of ‘making sense’ by 
finding and defining what things really are. In this framework, one 
fundamental belief is the idea that things have an essence, that things can be 
defined in an absolute, that is context-independent, way. 
Against this idea, proponents of the end of metaphysics consider, in a very 
schematic way, that this belief is unfounded. What is at play here for 
Nietzsche is a shift from considering things as determinate to considering 
them as ever-changing. Nietzsche suggests such a shift as one from 
metaphysical to historical philosophy in the opening sections of Human, All 
Too Human: ‘But everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as there 
are no absolute truths. Consequently what is needed from now on is historical 
philosophizing, and with it the virtue of modesty.’ (HH 2 / KSA 2.25) More 
than that, Nietzsche considers that the changes are embedded in how things 
are called, in their names. A name is not only a signifier, but also bears many 
prejudices and evaluations which evolve through time. The turn to language 
is one way to oppose the project of metaphysics and Nietzsche takes this turn 
from the perspective of history (or genealogy in the later works): as 
meanings evolve through time and as this evolution must be taken into 
account as belonging to the meaning of the words, there can be no absolute, 
context-independent, meaning. As we will see in the following chapters, 
Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘meaning as use’ suggests a similar idea: there 
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is no ‘meaning’ outside of the use we make of the words and this use is, for 
Nietzsche, defined historically and contextually. These two aspects: end of 
metaphysics and turn to language have been at the centre of philosophical 
attempts to connect Nietzsche to Wittgenstein. Most of these attempts 
revolve around the notion of language and its use in philosophical inquiry. 
Janet Lungstrum for instance focuses on the agonal dimension of Nietzsche’s 
and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language. They both criticise the 
metaphysical view of language and try to offer an alternative. According to 
her, Wittgenstein must have been influenced by Nietzsche through Fritz 
Mauthner readings of Nietzsche’s remarks on language, and I will explore 
this connection with Mauthner in the next chapter. The main difference 
between Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s views on language according to 
Lungstrum concerns the notion of rule: Nietzsche seeks ‘a cyclical destruction 
and re-creation of the rules [whereas] Wittgenstein’s program is to survey 
theoretical possibilities of the twists and turns of the already sayable by an 
ostensibly less ambitious, new “Ordnen” of “was schon offen zutage liegt.”’27 
Marco Brusotti also focuses on language and especially the ‘Sprachkritik’ 
dimension of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which also brings Mauthner back into 
the picture.28 Glen Martin compares Nietzsche to Wittgenstein not directly 
on the grounds of language, but through the notion of nihilism, that is the 
state to which the traditional philosophy leads and considers them to share 
the similar task of overcoming this nihilism: ‘Both are ultimately looking, or 
hoping, for a transformation of human existence which will lead us out of 
the suicidal problems in which the modern world is entangled.’29 
Alain Badiou suggests another interesting connection between Nietzsche 
and Wittgenstein and specifies three aspects: first, they both criticise 
metaphysics, Nietzsche through nihilism and Wittgenstein through 
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nonsense; second, the hidden philosophical act is for both the ‘properly 
unchained exercise of a language delivered over to the dream of not being 
interrupted by any rule, nor limited by any difference;’30 third, the 
announced act (by opposition to the hidden one) is archipolitical for 
Nietzsche and archiaesthetic for Wittgenstein. These aspects, and especially 
the first two, are present in the main lines of inquiry I will follow, namely 
the end of metaphysics and the turn to language. Badiou considers Nietzsche 
and Wittgenstein to be both ‘antiphilosophers,’ a term which contains three 
main elements: antiphilosophy calls for a critique of language and truth; 
antiphilosophy is an act rather than a statement; antiphilosophy attempts to 
affirmatively overcome the philosophical act, that is to offer an alternative to 
philosophy which does not only criticise philosophy but offers a positive 
answer. These various aspects show interesting connections between 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, especially in what they consider to be the 
philosopher’s task. 
Erich Heller considers that both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein take part in a 
critique of traditional philosophy and that this is the main point of contact:  
The two philosophers could hardly be more different in the scope and 
object, the approach and humor, the key and tempo of their thought; 
and yet they have in common something which is of the greatest 
importance: the creative distrust of all those categorical certainties 
that, as if they were an inherited anatomy, have been allowed to 
determine the body of traditional thought. Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein share a genius for directing doubt into the most 
unsuspected hiding places of error and fallacy.31  
What Heller points out is the radical attack on traditional philosophy that 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein launch and this is an aspect all commentators 
mention. What is specific to Heller is that his comparison is mainly an 
‘existential rapport between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein,’32 as Lungstrum 
notes. He sees Nietzsche and Wittgenstein as two philosophers who adopt a 
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similar attitude in their philosophising. This philosophising turns to 
language as a central matter, and this brings Heller to consider another 
aspect of the relation between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, one that the later 
commentators do not discuss so much as language or the critique of 
traditional philosophy, namely the relation between philosophy and poetry. 
A concern with language leads, at some point or another, to a questioning of 
poetry. Nietzsche’s interest in and struggle with poetry is well known and 
acknowledged by him throughout his works. Wittgenstein’s relation to 
poetry is however less obvious and Heller points out an interesting link 
between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and poetry itself. 
Be this as it may, Wittgenstein was not a poet but a philosopher. And 
philosophy enters with Wittgenstein the stage which has been 
reached by many another creative activity of the human mind—by 
poetry, for instance, or by painting: the stage where every act of 
creation is inseparable from the critique of its medium, and every 
work, intensely reflecting upon itself, looks like the embodied doubt 
of its own possibility. It is a predicament which Nietzsche uncannily 
anticipated in a sketch entitled ‘A Fragment from the History of 
Posterity.’33 
For Heller, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is poetry-like, that is, it reflects upon 
its own medium and its own conditions of possibility. As we will see in the 
next chapter, this is a concern he shares with the German Romantics and 
Nietzsche. In other words, philosophy turns towards metaphilosophy in 
order not to know how to say something true, but how to say something 
altogether. The possibilities of saying become a central concern and are at the 
basis of a new conception of language in which speaking and understanding 
play a central role.34 This social dimension of language is central to the 
expressive tradition I will outline in the next chapter. This auto-reflexive 
dimension is what links philosophy to poetry; the characteristics of poetry 
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enter philosophy proper and Wittgenstein surprisingly represents this turn 
for Heller. To put it in another way, as Ray Monk suggests: ‘Wittgenstein’s 
lecturing style, and indeed his writing style, was curiously at odds with its 
subject-matter, as though a poet had somehow strayed into the analysis of 
the foundations of mathematics and the Theory of Meaning.’35 
This short overview shows that connecting Nietzsche to Wittgenstein 
requires understanding the critique or end of metaphysics, the turn to 
language, and by extension the relation between philosophy and poetry. 
Before looking into the historical background against which Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s philosophies arise as well as the details of Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s critiques of language and metaphysics in the following 
chapters, it is first necessary to understand how these aspects—end of 
metaphysics, turn to language, and poetry—play an important role in 
shaping a picture of the analytic-continental divide. To look at this divide 
through the lens of the critique of metaphysics helps to reveal that, rather 
than there being oppositions between two well-defined traditions, there are 
oppositions as to what metaphysics is, how it is done, and whether 
philosophy should engage in it or not. There are no set positions as to how 
to answer these questions and we will see that oppositions arise among 
philosophers supposedly belonging to the same tradition as well as between 
traditions. 
3. Metaphysics, Language, and Poetry: A Short Story in 20th Century 
Philosophy 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are not the only philosophers to turn to language 
at the end of metaphysics and we have seen that they both do so in their own 
specific ways. Many philosophers in the 20th century operate such a move 
and disagree with one another as to how language should be construed. One 
point of contention is poetic language which is often considered either as the 
origin of language or as a deviance from the norm. In this section, I explore 
                                                     
35 Monk (1991), p. 291. 
43 
 
two important encounters between analytic and continental philosophers 
which have somehow shaped the divide. As said above, these encounters 
created more misunderstandings than connections, but they nevertheless 
reveal important points of disagreement. It is on these points of 
disagreement that one must work in order to overcome the divide and I will 
focus specifically on the relations between philosophy, metaphysics, and 
poetry. In another way, these oppositions can be seen as oppositions 
between the spheres of influence of Nietzsche and of Wittgenstein. Despite 
the similarities we have mentioned above, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein have 
had their own spheres of influence which are often opposed to one another. 
This comparison in negative terms, i.e. in oppositional terms, aims at 
revealing the points of disagreement which need to be overcome. 
The story of the critique of metaphysics in the 20th century that I will paint in 
this section can schematically be understood as follows: each philosopher 
claims to bring metaphysics to an end better than their predecessors. I follow 
this thread in telling the story: Heidegger criticises Nietzsche, Carnap 
criticises Heidegger, ordinary language philosophers such as Austin criticise 
Carnap and the logical positivists, Derrida criticises Austin and ordinary 
language philosophers, and so on. This thread also follows two of the most 
famous confrontations between analytic and continental philosophy: 
Carnap’s critique of Heidegger and Derrida’s critique of Austin. In a positive 
way, each critique of metaphysics can be understood as adding a layer and 
therefore enriching this critique. On another level, these oppositions also 
reveal the problematic relations between philosophy and poetry as some 
philosophers seem to embrace poetry (Heidegger or Derrida for instance) 
whereas others reject it (Carnap and Austin for instance). This brings to the 
fore one aspect of the critique of metaphysics which we have not yet 
discussed: the metaphilosophical question of style. The concern with 
metaphysics, and more specifically its end, is a background on which many 
philosophical questions arise in the 20th century, especially the question of 
(or the shift to) language as represented for instance by the linguistic turn. 
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As mentioned above, Habermas considers that these different conceptions of 
the end of metaphysics all reveal a break with the tradition and relates this 
to the notion of ‘form’ of philosophical thought:  
To be sure, the destruction or overcoming of metaphysics by 
Nietzsche and Heidegger meant something other than the sublation 
[Aufhebung] of metaphysics, and the farewell to philosophy by 
Wittgenstein and Adorno meant something other than the realization 
of philosophy. And yet these attitudes point back to the break with 
tradition (Karl Löwith) that occurred when the spirit of the age 
gained ascendancy over philosophy, when the modern 
consciousness of time exploded the form of philosophical thought.36 
The many forms of critique of metaphysics all lead to a reconfiguration of 
philosophy which has an impact on the form of philosophical thought. This 
question of the form or style of philosophical thought is one of the 
metaphilosophical questions which Nietzsche and Wittgenstein raise and to 
which we will turn in Chapter Seven. The concern with form is philosophy’s 
concern with its own language and possibilities. It is in this 
metaphilosophical reflection on its own language that philosophy 
encounters poetry and literature. But the question of style only gains in 
importance when philosophy turns to language. The notion of style is of 
great interest to shape the distinction between analytic and continental 
traditions as in both traditions, though in radically opposite ways, style plays 
a central role. Gottfried Gabriel for instance considers the analytic-
continental divide (and more specifically the opposition between Carnap 
and Heidegger) to be explicable in terms of style or forms: ‘Carnap and 
Heidegger, as well as the philosophical traditions founded by the two, have 
a common point of departure, but proceed from there in opposite directions 
and thus arrive at diametrically contrary forms of philosophy.’37 The 
distinction between analytic and continental is, for Gabriel, a matter of style, 
tending either towards logic or towards poetry.38 Michael Friedman holds a 
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similar view in opposing Carnap and Heidegger: ‘We can either, with 
Carnap, hold fast to formal logic as the ideal of universal validity and confine 
ourselves, accordingly, to the philosophy of the mathematical exact sciences, 
or we can, with Heidegger, cut ourselves from logic and “exact thinking” 
generally, with the result that we ultimately renounce the ideal of truly 
universal validity itself.’39 It is obviously too restrictive to consider analytic 
philosophy as confined to exact sciences but Friedman’s account brings to 
the fore the central issue of logic. 
Although this opposition might seem valid regarding Heidegger and 
Carnap, we have seen that analytic and continental philosophy are not 
reducible to any philosopher and the matter is much more complex. The 
distinction in styles might seem quite obvious if we take Carnap and 
Heidegger, but things become more complicated when looking at 
Wittgenstein’s works, early and late. If the Tractatus can be seen as a 
paradigm of logical writing as the numbers of the propositions indicate the 
relations between them, some authors have perceived an artistic form in the 
Tractatus and David Rozema even considers it as a poem.40 The later works 
and their aphoristic nature seem to go against the grain of logic, or at least 
against the grain of an exposition following the rules of logic. 
Gabriel’s and Friedman’s views however suggest that the questions of logic 
and poetry are important to approach the analytic-continental divide. In a 
more general way, we could say that there is an opposition between a 
tendency towards sciences and a tendency towards art. It is the same 
presupposition that underlies Matar’s distinction between rationalism and 
romanticism. This divide however needs to be overcome because 
philosophical practices enrich themselves only by entering into a dialogue 
with others. And inasmuch as continental philosophy is analytic 
philosophy’s ‘other’ (and vice versa), there is much more to learn from their 
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dialogue than their mutual rejection. In a sense, each tradition reveals some 
of the shortcomings of the other. Analytic philosophy of language for 
instance fails at accounting for poetic or literary uses of language, continental 
philosophy seems too poetic. Each tradition considers the other to get too 
close to art or to science. 
a. Heidegger 
Heidegger considers that philosophy is metaphysics and that its end brings 
philosophers to rethink their task. For him, ‘Metaphysics thinks beings as a 
whole—the world, man, God—with respect to Being, with respect to the 
belonging together of beings in Being.’41 Many aspects are at play in such a 
definition and I will point out two: 1) metaphysics is a globalising or 
totalising approach, it is an attempt at thinking the whole and the parts as 
parts of this whole; 2) such an approach refers to a unified principle. 
Metaphysics could thus be defined as an understanding of the whole under 
a unified principle (such as Platonic Ideas or the Hegelian ‘Absolute Spirit’). 
This definition is not unrelated to Moore’s definition we have discussed 
above: ‘Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.’42 
However, unlike Moore, Heidegger considers that metaphysics has reached 
its end and this is because a fundamental dimension of philosophy opened 
by the Greeks has reached its completion: ‘the development of sciences’ 
which ‘is at the same time their separation from philosophy and the 
establishment of their independence.’43 The development of sciences and 
their total independence from philosophy has led metaphysics to its 
completion. In other words, if philosophy as metaphysics is an attempt at 
defining or determining what the world is, science is better at achieving such 
a task. Although at first one and the same, science is now separated from 
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philosophy and this split marks the end of metaphysics: if philosophy is not 
science anymore, what is its task? 
Nietzsche also brings this question to the fore, noticing the importance 
science takes over philosophy: 
Running the risk that moralizing, even my own, will prove to be what 
it always has been (an unabashed montrer ses plaies, according to 
Balzac), I would like to try to argue against an unseemly and harmful 
hierarchical shift between science and philosophy that is now 
threatening to develop quite unnoticed and, it seems, in good 
conscience. […] Science is abloom these days, its good conscience 
shining from its face, while recent philosophy has gradually sunk to 
its dregs, awakening distrust and despondence if not scorn and pity. 
Philosophy reduced to a ‘theory of cognition,’ really no more than a 
shy epochism and doctrine of renunciation; a philosophy that doesn't 
even get beyond the threshold, scrupulously refusing itself the right 
to enter: this is philosophy at its last gasp, an end, an agony, 
something to evoke pity. How could a philosophy like that—be the 
master! (BGE 204 / KSA 5.131-2) 
With the rise of science, philosophy must reinvent itself. It cannot do 
metaphysics anymore, and should not, according to Nietzsche, follow what 
science does. Like Heidegger, Nietzsche considers the necessity for 
philosophy to find its task at the end of metaphysics and this task should not 
look towards science. This brings us to a question Heidegger raises in 
discussing the end of metaphysics: ‘What task is reserved for thinking at the 
end of philosophy?’44 
Heidegger uses the word thinking to characterise this non-metaphysical 
philosophy.45 What task remains for thinking? ‘A thinking which can be 
neither metaphysics nor science?’46 The task of thinking and the reflection on 
the task of thinking becomes one of Heidegger’s main concerns. The subtitle 
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to his Introduction to Philosophy: Thinking and Poetizing reveals this shift in 
philosophical thought. Once philosophy is distinguished from metaphysics 
and from the natural sciences, because science is better at doing metaphysics, 
the task of philosophy or thinking changes. One of Heidegger’s insights in 
this change will be to turn towards the poetic because of the linguistic nature 
of philosophy. One of the central elements in his reshaped philosophy is 
language and this will lead him to the question of poetry. Heidegger 
operates here a linguistic turn, which leads to a poetic turn. 
Heidegger considers poetry as the original language, as the place where all 
language is created and thereby follows Nietzsche and the romantic tradition 
as we will see in the next chapter. This consideration of poetry as original 
language appears for instance at the end of his lectures on Logic as the 
Question Concerning the Essence of Language.47 In these lectures, he considers 
the study of logic (in the etymological sense of logos) as being essentially a 
study of language. More specifically, the study of logic leads to a questioning 
of the essence of language as ‘philosophizing is nothing else than the 
constant being underway in the fore-field of the fore-questions.’48 According 
to Heidegger, logic is a science that sprang out of philosophy, like the other 
sciences. The question of logic is a philosophical question and not a scientific 
one as ‘philosophy is other than science.’49 A questioning of logic leads to a 
philosophical questioning of language, which must be distinguished from a 
scientific questioning of it because following the ways of natural sciences 
does not let us out of logic itself. 
Finally, the moment we attempt to ask about language, following the 
way of natural science, we run against the dictionary and grammar–
in order, then, to ascertain that all of grammar derives itself from the 
Greek logic, which determines the fundamental concepts and rules of 
speaking and saying. We get in the strange position that we, on the 
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one hand, free ourselves from logic only to arrive, on the other hand, 
again in the fetters of logic.50 
The way of natural science in questioning language only brings us back to 
our starting point, logic. On the contrary, a philosophical inquiry leads us to 
a questioning of the essence of language. In the course of his lectures, the 
questioning of logic leads in turn to language, human being, history and 
poetry. From the question of logic, and because of his definition of it, 
Heidegger moves to the question of poetry. As we will see, this definition of 
logic is quite the opposite of Carnap’s and, despite a common concern, their 
rejections of metaphysics are radically different. 
In one of his other works on language, On the Essence of Language, which 
discusses Herder’s Treatise on the Origin of Language, Heidegger agrees with 
Herder on turning away from logic. But according to Heidegger, although 
he turns away from logic, Herder misses the turning away from the 
metaphysics of language: ‘The turning away from “logic” is certainly correct, 
and yet he remains stuck in the logos of reason, of the formation of marks, 
and supplements everything only from the economy of nature.’51 In order to 
move away from this metaphysical conception of language (in which words 
refer to things and truth can be thought in terms of correspondence), 
Heidegger turns towards poetry as ‘The poem has no “content.”’52 This lack 
of content calls for a rethinking of language, in other terms than metaphysics 
or science as Heidegger argues in On the Way to Language: ‘But scientific and 
philosophical information about language is one thing; an experience we 
undergo with language is another.’53 This experience has something to do 
with poetry and through his thinking about language, Heidegger rethinks 
the relation between philosophy and poetry, bringing them close to one 
another. This opposition between scientific language and linguistic 
experience reflects the opposition between ‘ideal language’ and ‘ordinary 
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language’ in analytic philosophy which I will develop in the further sections. 
In that framework, Heidegger would rather belong to ordinary language 
philosophers as he opposes scientific conceptions of language. However, a 
crucial difference remains between Heidegger and ordinary language 
philosophers which can be seen in their relation to poetry. Heidegger and 
ordinary language philosophers take radically opposing stances with regard 
to poetic language: Heidegger considers poetic language to be the origin of 
language and ordinary language to be only the settling down of poetic 
language whereas ordinary language philosophers consider poetic language 
as a deviance. 
According to Heidegger, the common ground between philosophy and 
poetry is language (‘Sprache’) and both say (‘Sagen’) what there is. ‘Sinnen’ 
and ‘Sagen’ are the two characteristics shared by both domains. In his notes 
towards writing ‘Denken und Dichten’ Heidegger formulates this link more 
clearly: ‘Thinking and poetizing—each time a meditation [Sinnen], each time a 
saying: the reflective word. The thinkers and the poets, the ones who 
reflectively speak and the ones who verbally reflect.’54 Heidegger plays with 
the word ‘Sinnen,’ translated here as ‘mediation,’ that shares root with ‘Sinn,’ 
‘sense’ or ‘meaning,’ also with a connotation of ‘direction.’ In his foreword 
to his translation, Phillip Jacques Braunstein explains the meaning of 
‘Sinnen’ as a ‘thought that pursues a certain path.’55 Poets and philosophers 
alike make sense and say it. The difference between them is a matter of focus: 
on ‘Sinnen’ for philosophers and on ‘Sagen’ for poets. But the core matter is 
the same for philosophy and poetry: language. This is the reason why 
Heidegger considers philosophy to be closer to poetry than to any other art: 
‘Yet thinking and poetizing reveal an even closer relation [Verwandtschaft] 
than thinking and painting. Thinking and poetizing exist exclusively in the 
realm of language. Their works and only theirs are of a linguistic “nature.”’56 
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Because of this common ‘linguistic nature,’ philosophy and poetry are are 
two neighbouring domains which define (or in a milder way reflect about) 
themselves through the other. Thinking needs poetry as much as poetry 
needs thinking. Philosophy and poetry relate to one another and, in this 
relation, modify their views. The borders between these two domains are 
never fixed, they are always changing as they affect each other and their 
definitions are dialectically constructed through their relations. The aim of 
thinking, or in a non-Heideggerian word philosophising, is close to that of 
poetry as they both bring our attention to saying and by doing so to making 
sense (‘Sinnen’). Heidegger follows the path of the poetic experience with 
language against the scientific study of language. This concern with art and 
poetry as core matters for philosophy contrasts sharply with philosophers 
who focus on science and logic such as the logical positivists. They offer 
another perspective on the relation between language and the end of 
metaphysics, and how metaphysics should be brought to an end. 
b. Carnap and the Logical Positivists 
In a very schematic way, we could say that Heidegger’s turn to language 
operates on grounds of art, whereas the logical positivists’ linguistic turn 
operates on grounds of science. A good example of such a turn is Carnap 
who adopts a very critical stance against metaphysics and claims that 
philosophy is a matter of logical analysis of language in his essay ‘The 
Elimination of Metaphysics Through Analysis of Language.’ In this article, 
Carnap criticises Heidegger (and with him a whole tradition of 
metaphysicians). This can seem surprising as Heidegger considers himself 
to be done with metaphysics. However, we could say that Carnap operates 
against Heidegger the same move Heidegger operates against Nietzsche. In 
a sense, the previous critique of metaphysics is always criticised as being still 
too metaphysical. The reason Carnap considers Heidegger as a 
metaphysician is his own definition of metaphysics: ‘This term 
[metaphysics] is used in this paper as usually in Europe, for the field of 
alleged knowledge of the essence of things which transcends the realm of 
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empirically founded, inductive science. Metaphysics in this sense includes 
systems like those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger. But it 
does not include endeavours towards a synthesis and generalization of the 
results of the various sciences.’57 The main characteristic of metaphysics is its 
non-empirical dimension. Metaphysics searches for the essence of things 
independently from empirical sciences and it that sense, Carnap has a 
starting point similar to Heidegger’s: philosophy should not be concerned 
with metaphysics because science does the job better. However, the answer 
Carnap gives is quite different. Carnap’s thesis is quite simple: ‘logical 
analysis yields the negative result that alleged statements in this domain are 
entirely meaningless. Therewith a radical elimination of metaphysics is 
attained, which was not yet possible from the earlier antimetaphysical 
standpoints.’58 Carnap claims that his critique is more radical than previous 
antimetaphysical attempts, like Heidegger claims to be more radical than 
Nietzsche. To some extent, Carnap’s statement can be read as a possible 
answer to Heidegger’s first question: what does it mean that philosophy has 
entered its final stage? Carnap’s answer: metaphysical statements are 
meaningless. However, the main difference between Heidegger and Carnap 
is not their rejection of metaphysics but their conception thereof. If for 
Heidegger all philosophy is metaphysics, for Carnap it is quite the opposite: 
philosophy must avoid metaphysics and has nothing to do with it. 
In Language, Truth, and Logic, Ayer, another logical positivist, also defends 
the thesis according to which metaphysical statements are meaningless: ‘Our 
charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the 
understanding in a field where it cannot profitably venture, but that he 
produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which 
alone a sentence can be literally significant.’59 More than considering 
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metaphysics as meaningless, Ayer considers that philosophy has nothing to 
do with metaphysics: ‘It is advisable to stress the point that philosophy, as 
we understand it, is wholly independent of metaphysics.’60 Philosophy 
should therefore turn to science and Ayer considers philosophy and science 
to be interdependent: ‘But if science may be said to be blind without 
philosophy, it is true also that philosophy is virtually empty without 
science.’61 Whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger attempt to deal with the 
separation between philosophy and science by distancing philosophy from 
science, Ayer and the logical positivists do the opposite and embrace science 
and scientific propositions as the only valid ones. To that extent, they are led 
to reject ethical and aesthetic propositions in the realm of what Wittgenstein 
calls the ‘mystical’ and these propositions should not be subject to 
philosophical inquiries: ‘It follows, as in ethics, that there is no sense in 
attributing objective validity to aesthetic judgements, and no possibility of 
arguing about questions of value in aesthetics, but only about questions of 
facts.’62 Ayer and the logical positivists therefore turn to science to save 
philosophy from its end. Heidegger’s second question still requires an 
answer: What is the task of philosophy at the end of metaphysics? 
As a transformation for philosophy, Carnap offers to replace metaphysics 
with logical analysis of language or ‘scientific philosophy.’ Because 
meaningful statements cannot be achieved in metaphysics but only in the 
sciences, ‘what remains [for philosophy] is not statements, nor a theory, nor 
a system, but only a method: the method of logical analysis.’63 The task of 
philosophy thus becomes one of a method: it is to apply the method of logical 
analysis to sort out and clarify statements according to the rules of logic.64 
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This ‘scientific philosophy’ is the opposite of metaphysics, which Carnap 
likens to poetry and art. Indeed, in the last section of his paper ‘Metaphysics 
as Expression of an Attitude toward Life,’ he states that the metaphysician 
‘has not asserted anything, but only expressed something, like an artist.’65 
Metaphysics is art in disguise; it is useful as an expression of life (and even 
considered as such it should better present itself as art) but hasn’t got any 
meaning. In a 1957 note to his article, Carnap specifies that metaphysical 
statements are meaningless in the sense that they haven’t got any cognitive 
meaning. They can, and they do, have an expressive meaning, of the kind 
produced by artworks. Metaphysics thus have an expressive meaning but 
Carnap reproaches metaphysics with hiding behind a pseudo-assertive 
form. Philosophy should focus only on the statements which have a 
cognitive meaning, that is scientific statements. In this sense, Carnap’s 
philosophy would be a philosophy which has fallen to the danger Nietzsche 
foresaw, becoming a mere ‘theory of cognition.’ We can therefore consider 
that if Carnap’s criticises Heidegger and other so-called continental 
philosophers, the latter would criticise him as falling into the traps of science, 
into a form of scientism. 
Interestingly, Carnap considers Nietzsche as a poet rather than a 
philosopher, and he praises him for that. From Carnap’s standpoint, 
Nietzsche avoids falling into a metaphysical error because ‘in Thus Spake 
Zarathustra, he does not choose the misleading theoretical form, but openly 
the form of art, of poetry.’66 According to Carl Sachs: ‘Carnap understands 
Nietzsche as a good Kantian: his work upholds the distinction between 
science and metaphysics—a distinction that Carnap reworks into the 
dichotomy between the assertional (science) and the metaphorical 
(poetry).’67 Sachs grounds his comparison of Nietzsche and Carnap in the 
post-Kantian context to which they both belong and argues that what saves 
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Nietzsche from Carnap’s criticism of metaphysics is that he does not hide his 
metaphysics under a veil of assertive content but under that of poetry, which 
is the appropriate form for metaphysics: revealing its expressive meaning as 
expressive meaning. This opposition between art and science can be seen as 
one lens through which one can look at the analytic-continental divide. 
Carnap’s point of view, and that will be the point of view of most analytic 
philosophers on that matter, is that philosophy should be scientific and 
avoid artful downfalls, whereas continental philosophers such as Nietzsche 
see science, and more specifically scientism, as a danger for philosophy. But 
this is not the end of the story as Carnap’s conception of language can also 
be criticised as retaining a metaphysical dimension. 
c. Ordinary Language Philosophy 
Inasmuch as Heidegger considers Nietzsche to be too metaphysical, and 
Carnap Heidegger still too metaphysical, ordinary language philosophers 
consider Carnap and the logical positivists to rely on a metaphysical 
conception of language. This can be seen for instance in Wittgenstein’s shift 
away from and his critique of the Tractatus in his later works. ‘A picture held 
us captive’ he says in the Philosophical Investigations, and that is a picture of a 
metaphysical use of language. On the contrary, Wittgenstein aims to bring 
words back from their metaphysical use to their ordinary one. This begins 
with a rejection of ideal language as the solution. One of the main problems 
of ideal language as defended by the logical positivists is, according to 
P. M. S. Hacker, that it gives primacy to truth in language: ‘In giving primacy 
to truth in their account of meaning, calculus theorists thereby also give 
primacy (i) to representation rather than to communication and linguistic 
intercourse in their account of language, and (ii) to description in their 
account of the function of the sentence in use.’68 I will focus on the problem 
of representation in the following chapter, but the move from ideal language 
philosophers to ordinary language philosophers can be seen as a move from 
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Saussure’s idea of langue to that of parole. Ideal language philosophers rely 
on an idea of language as a closed and constituted entity which works solely 
according to the rules of logic without looking at the actual language uses at 
all. On the contrary, ordinary language philosophers consider language in 
use to be the point of focus, the idea of an ideal language being a remnant of 
metaphysics. Samuel Wheeler considers such conceptions of language which 
rely on ideal essences as ‘magic’ language in the sense that according to such 
conceptions language is unequivocal and self-interpreting.69 
If there is no ideal language to be constructed and if philosophy should focus 
on actual uses of language, how does one elaborate a philosophy of 
language? One way to consider ordinary language philosophy is to see it as 
a form of pragmatism. At its basis, pragmatism is not fundamentally 
concerned with language but rather with social practices (in a wide 
spectrum). The focus on ordinary language is similar to the pragmatist move 
as it focuses on the social practice in which language is embedded rather 
than on an ideal language based on logic and truth-conditions. In that sense, 
it follows some of the insights from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. 
In this conception of language, meaning is not relative to truth-conditions 
but relative to its use. As it focuses on the social practices at the heart of the 
use of language, pragmatism draws attention to ordinary language, to 
language in its everyday use. Although Wittgenstein also shifts his focus to 
ordinary uses of language, he is usually not considered an ordinary language 
philosopher as Oswald Hanfling for instance argues: ‘The description of 
Austin as an ordinary language philosopher could hardly be contested; but 
is the same true of Wittgenstein? Some would hesitate to describe him so, 
perhaps because of a reluctance to associate him too closely with the Oxford 
philosophy to which the label “ordinary language” came to be attached, 
sometimes with derogatory connotations. In a way, however, Wittgenstein’s 
commitment to the method of “what we say” is more radical than Austin’s.’70 
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Wittgenstein and Austin are not necessarily related, but they share a 
common concern with ‘what we say’ and more precisely what we ordinarily 
say. 
If we follow our focus on poetry, ordinary language philosophers such as 
Austin do not regard it more sympathetically than logical positivists. As we 
will see in Derrida’s critique of Austin, the latter considers poetic or literary 
uses of language as non-serious: 
And I might mention that, quite differently again, we could be 
issuing any of these utterances, as we can issue an utterance of any 
kind whatsoever, in the course, for example, of acting a play or 
making a joke or writing a poem—in which case of course it would 
not be seriously meant and we shall not be able to say that we 
seriously performed the act concerned. If the poet says “Go and catch 
a falling star” or whatever it may be, he doesn't seriously issue order. 
Considerations of this kind apply to any utterance at all, not merely 
to performatives.71 
Austin considers that poetic utterances are not serious in the sense that an 
order in a poetic utterance does have the same force as an order in an 
ordinary context. Austin’s point is that to focus on language in use means 
focusing on the ‘ordinary’ use of language or, better, that to focus on 
language one must first focus on ordinary uses before turning to non-serious 
uses. He therefore establishes a distinction between ordinary uses and non-
ordinary uses. Poetic and literary utterances belong to the latter. A problem 
similar to that encountered by ideal language philosophers remains, namely 
that by separating non-ordinary uses from ordinary ones, the ‘ordinary 
language’ the philosophers look at is already somehow idealised. As Rorty 
argues in his introduction to The Linguistic Turn, ideal language and ordinary 
language philosophy are two perspectives which are not so different from 
one another: whereas ideal language philosophy attempts to clarify 
language (and thus to replace a faulty language with a perfect one), ordinary 
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language philosophy attempts to eliminate deviant uses of language from 
licit language uses (and thus ends up with having an ‘ordinary language’ 
which is void from any deviance).72 
The opposition between ordinary language and ideal language philosophers 
is quite strong but some attempts are made to reconcile both types of 
language philosophy. One of the main figures trying to do so is Robert 
Brandom with his attempt to elaborate an ‘Analytic Pragmatism.’73 He 
attempts to conceptualise the ‘meaning as use’ pragmatist’s theory within an 
analytic framework by showing what he calls PV and VP relations between 
vocabularies (V) and practices (P), between semantics and pragmatism. 
Brandom characterizes the ‘meaning as use’ conception as semantics 
mediated by practice. He thus aims to show that pragmatism plays a 
necessary role in language analysis. Pragmatism offers an interesting 
standpoint in the analytic-continental divide. As Hans-Johann Glock notes: 
‘With respect to the analytic/continental divide, pragmatism occupies an 
ambivalent role.’74 Pragmatism is indeed linked to analytic philosophy but 
also distinct from it and sometimes even presents ‘clear affinities with 
continental philosophy’75 according to Glock. Pragmatism could thus be seen 
as a step in the bridging over of the analytic-continental divide, for it blurs 
the borders between them. The continental view on ordinary language 
philosophy is however not always sympathetic. A famous debate occurred 
between Derrida and Searle when the former criticised Austin’s conception 
of language. 
d. Derrida Against Ordinary Language 
Derrida attempts to uncover the metaphysical prejudices of philosophical 
language (and this includes ordinary language philosophy). His notion of 
deconstruction aims precisely at revealing the metaphysical prejudices 
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which are laid in language. To expose some of his ideas, I will focus on the 
text ‘Signature, Event, Context’ which gave rise to the Derrida-Searle debate. 
This text is interesting because it is a continental point of view on an analytic 
philosopher and also an attempt at dialogue. This attempt however leads to 
a failure as Searle’s understanding of Derrida is just a way of, to take the title 
of Searle’s answer, ‘reiterating the differences.’ I will focus on a few elements 
of this text to show: the critique of metaphysics, the limit of ordinary 
language philosophy, and the possibility of dialogue. 
Derrida’s concerns with Austin’s theory of performative revolves around the 
ideas of context and intention: 
In order for a context to be exhaustively determinable, in the sense 
required by Austin, conscious intention would at the very least have 
to be totally present and immediately transparent to itself and to 
others, since it is a determining center of context. The concept of—or 
the search for—the context thus seems to suffer at this point from the 
same theoretical and “interested” uncertainty as the concept of the 
“ordinary,” from the same metaphysical origins: the ethical and 
teleological discourse of consciousness.76 
Austin’s notion of context relies, according to Derrida, on a metaphysical 
origin, namely the fact that conscious intention is transparent. To some 
extent, Derrida considers that Austin still relies on a ‘magic language’ in the 
sense that it could be transparent and self-interpreting, without doubts. 
Derrida wishes to get rid of metaphysics not by focusing on ordinary 
language, but by revealing the metaphysical construct which underlies even 
ordinary language. This is the task of deconstruction: 
Every concept, moreover, belongs to a systematic chain and 
constitutes in itself a system of predicates. There is no concept that is 
metaphysical in itself. There is labor—metaphysical or not—
performed on conceptual systems. Deconstruction does not consist in 
moving from one concept to another, but in reversing and displacing 
a conceptual order as well as the nonconceptual order with which it 
is articulated.77 
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What is interesting, and which reminds us of Wittgenstein, is the idea that 
there are some metaphysical uses of concepts, but that concepts are not as 
such metaphysical (for if they were, this would be a metaphysical conception 
of concepts). Metaphysics is a way of approaching, using, seeing, a 
systematic chain of concepts. The aim of deconstruction is to show that the 
order of this systematic chain is not absolute but can be reverted. In a sense, 
a metaphysical conception of language establishes hierarchies in the chains 
of concepts and deconstruction aims at disturbing these hierarchies by not 
taking them for granted.  
According to Derrida, ordinary language philosophy retains a metaphysical 
dimension as it relies on the established hierarchies. This is revealed in what 
Derrida considers to be Austin’s greatest problem, namely his rejection of 
the ‘non-serious:’ ‘Austin thus excludes, along with what he calls a “sea-
change,” the “non-serious,” “parasitism,” “etiolation,” “the non-ordinary” 
(along with the whole general theory which, if it succeeded in accounting for 
them, would no longer be governed by those oppositions), all of which he 
nevertheless recognizes as the possibility available to every act of 
utterance.’78 This category of ‘non-serious’ or ‘non-ordinary’ reveals that 
ordinary language is somehow a metaphysical category, and that ‘non-
serious’ statements are deviances from this norm. For Derrida, although 
ordinary language philosophers make the positive move from Saussure’s 
langue to his parole, their notion of parole retains a metaphysical dimension. 
Literary or poetic statements are, for instance, rejected from this field as 
deviances and therefore do not take part in the elaboration of what language 
is. This might be the case for Austin and Searle after him, but this does not 
mean that ordinary language philosophy is incapable of taking such 
‘deviances’ into account. As we will see in a further chapter, Wittgenstein’s 
insights into poetic uses of language open the possibility of avoiding what 
Derrida considers to be a metaphysical trap. 
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Derrida does not only criticise Austin, he also opens the possibility for 
dialogue, as he for instance considers that Austin is closer to Nietzsche than 
one might think at first: 
Austin was obliged to free the analysis of the performative from the 
authority of the truth value, from the true/false opposition, at least in 
its classical form, and to substitute for it at times the value of force, of 
difference of force (illocutionary or perlocutionary force). (In this line 
of thought, which is nothing less than Nietzschean, this in particular 
strikes me as moving in the direction of Nietzsche himself, who often 
acknowledged a certain affinity for a vein of English thought.)79 
By moving from the true/false opposition of statements in ideal language to 
values of force, Austin operates a move similar to Nietzsche when he 
attempts to analyse oppositions of values in terms of power. However, 
Derrida does not pursue this comparison further and the dialogue seems to 
fail, as the opening line of Searle’s reply suggests: ‘It would be a mistake, I 
think, to regard Derrida’s discussion of Austin as a confrontation between 
two prominent philosophical traditions.’80 
In this short overview of some considerations on metaphysics and language 
in the 20th century, we can see that the point of disagreement regards the 
place of poetic language within a theory of language. Some philosophers, 
mostly continental, consider poetic language to be the essence of language, 
whereas others, mostly analytic, consider logic as the core matter. As we will 
see in the next chapter, this opposition reflects a broader opposition in 
conceptions of language: between a representational conception of language 
and an expressive one. Each view has its own problems: a representational 
conception of language fails to account for poetic uses and an expressive 
conception of language seems to open the door to a radical relativism in 
which nothing is fixed. We will see that both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
inherit from the expressivist tradition and that they share many of their 
concerns with this tradition. 
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Representation and Expression: The ‘Linguistic Turn’ in 
German Philosophy from Herder to Wittgenstein 
Well, Socrates, I’ve often talked with Cratylus—and with 
lots of other people, for that matter—and no one is able to 
persuade me that the correctness of names is determined 
by anything besides convention and agreement. I believe 
that any name you give a thing is  its correct  name. If you 
change its name and give it another, the new one is as 
correct as the old. For example, when we give names to 
our domestic slaves, the new ones are as correct as the 
old. No name belongs to a particular thing by nature, but 
only because of the rules and usage of those who establish  
the usage and call it by that name. However, if I’m 
wrong about this, I’m ready to listen not just to Cratylus 
but to anyone, and to learn from him too.  
Plato, Cratylus, 384c-d 
In Cratylus, Hermogenes confronts two conceptions of language which have 
given birth to two traditions: one according to which names are determined 
by the nature of the thing (or a divine instance), the other according to which 
they are determined only by convention or agreement. Keeping in mind the 
development of philosophy of language, we can read this passage as 
confronting two conceptions of meaning and thereby two ways of 
considering the relation between word and world: on the one hand, to give 
a natural or divine origin to names and words is to emphasise the importance 
of reference in determining meaning, on the other, to focus on convention and 
agreement is to emphasise meaning as use. Although these two trends 
coexist, the former is much more widely spread and, as we will see, 
Wittgenstein’s shift between his earlier and later works can be interpreted as 
a move from one tradition to the other. These conceptions of meaning do not 
only have an impact on language, but also on the conception of truth. The 
basic conception of truth in a referential framework is that of 
correspondence: a statement is true if it corresponds to a fact. As Patricia 
Hanna and Bernard Harrison argue, such a theory relies on ‘the existence of 
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semantically mediated correlations between the members of some class of 
linguistic entities possessing assertoric force (in some versions of the 
Correspondence Theory propositions, in others sentences, or bodies of 
sentences), and the members of some class of extralinguistic entities: “states 
of affairs,” or “facts,” or bodies of truth-conditions, or of assertion-
warranting circumstances.’81 What determines the truth or falsity of a 
proposition or sentence is thus the correspondence to the ‘world,’ to a state 
of affair which, as Hanna and Harrison further argue, is determined by 
nature rather than thought. To that extent, ‘Truths—at least truths 
concerning the world given to us in experience—are discovered: they are not 
stipulated, or “constituted by convention,” or in any other way “the work of 
the mind.”’82 A correspondence theory of truth thus relies on a theory of 
language in which words refer to things in the world and sentences say 
something about the world. If Hermogenes is not convinced by Cratylus’s 
arguments that such a connection between word and world exists outside of 
convention, it is because such a conception has its limits and reference is not 
sufficient to determine the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of a sentence. 
Poetic or literary statements are for instance good examples of such 
problematic cases at least for two reasons: words in poetic statements might 
not have any referent—and we will see how fictional reference poses 
problems to representational conceptions of language in the first section of 
this chapter—and poetic statements might be patently false without being 
meaningless—for example Paul Eluard’s famous ‘la terre est bleue comme 
une orange.’ 
If we are not to reject these statements as deviances but to account for them 
and accept them within a conception of language, we must turn to another 
idea of truth. A tradition represented by Heidegger among others consider 
the notion of truth as disclosure: a statement reveals or discloses something 
of the world. This does not mean that correspondence disappears completely 
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but rather that it cannot be the only conception of truth in play. A 
metaphorical statement such as ‘Juliet is the sun’ therefore discloses 
something about Juliet, perhaps about the sun too, and moreover about the 
relation between word and world without saying that Juliet is indeed the 
sun. The first conception of language can be called representational and the 
second expressive. The representational conception of language relies on 
meaning as reference and truth as correspondence. It can therefore be 
considered as a metaphysical conception of language in which language is 
in direct connection to the essence of the world. We have seen that some 
philosophers such as Derrida criticise such conceptions by revealing their 
metaphysical character. Against this conception of language as mirroring the 
world, the expressive conception considers language and world to be 
interdependent. There is no longer the world on one side and language on 
the other with a direct connection between them, but language takes part in 
elaborating the world. Nietzsche and Wittgenstein inherit from these ideas 
which can be traced back to 18th century German philosophy of language. 
They both share influences and can be said to belong to a similar tradition in 
their conceptions of language, and this will establish the historical grounds 
on which they can be connected to one another. An important shared 
influence, and probably the first to come to mind, is Schopenhauer, who was 
very important not only to the young Nietzsche, but also to Wittgenstein. I 
will however not elaborate on this connection because the shared influence 
of Schopenhauer is not related to the expressive conception of language but 
rather on their relation to the will.83 Before turning to the shared historical 
background in the expressive tradition of language, I first focus on the 
representational conception of language, because Wittgenstein’s shift after 
the Tractatus can be read as a rejection of this conception of language.  
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1. ‘A Picture Held Us Captive:’ The Representational Conception of 
Language 
The sentence quoted in this section’s title is from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations and to understand it, it is necessary to look at the surrounding 
remarks:  
114. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4.5): ‘The general form of 
propositions is: This is how things are.’—This is the kind of 
proposition one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that 
one is tracing nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing 
round the frame through which we look at it. 
115. A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside of it, for 
it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us 
inexorably. 
116. When philosophers use a word—‘knowledge,’ ‘being,’ ‘object,’ 
‘I,’ ‘proposition/sentence,’ ‘name’—and try to grasp the essence of the 
thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in 
this way in the language in which it is at home?— 
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use. 
Even though I will focus more specifically on the later Wittgenstein’s 
conception of language in the following chapters, these remarks set the stage 
for criticising a representational conception of language on metaphysical 
grounds. Wittgenstein begins with criticising his former theory, that of the 
Tractatus and quotes proposition 4.5. This is not unremarkable because 
Wittgenstein hardly ever comments on the Tractatus (or any other 
philosophical work) and it focuses on one specific point (but also perhaps 
the most important) of his former theory, namely that propositions are about 
a state of fact, ‘This is how things are.’ Wittgenstein comments saying that 
we (or his former self in this case) believe that propositions are about the 
world (or nature) whereas it reveals much more of language itself and of our 
relation to the world than of the world itself. There is a picture of language 
which traps us into believing that there is a direct and unquestionable 
connection between word and world. Wittgenstein acknowledges the 
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difficulty of getting out of this trap, and the past tense suggests that he 
somehow has managed to get out of it. The difficulty lies in the fact that this 
picture is one of the most common prejudices about language and that to 
explore it requires using language. How can one, as it were, criticise 
language from the inside? How can there be a linguistic critique of language? 
The last remark quoted above considers this idea specifically in relation to 
the philosopher’s, and especially the metaphysician’s, use of language. The 
critique of representational language is justified as a critique of a 
metaphysical use of language. The philosophers believe that words denote 
not only things, but also and foremost the essence of things. As we will see in 
the following chapters, this is what Wittgenstein criticises as ‘a craving for 
generality.’ Wittgenstein suggests, and that is his way of escaping the trap 
or the picture that held him captive, that words should not be taken as 
essences but looked at in their uses. Another point to note in these remarks 
is the use of pronouns. In PI 114, Wittgenstein uses an impersonal form (‘one 
thinks,’ ‘one repeats’) while talking about his former theory. This impersonal 
use establishes a strong distance from his former theory. In PI 115, he shifts 
to ‘we.’ The question remains as to what ‘we’ refers to, but Wittgenstein 
includes himself (here his former self) in it. In PI 116, he begins with an 
impersonal form with the general category ‘philosophers’ and the 
impersonal pronoun ‘one.’ The question is opened as to whether he includes 
himself in the category ‘philosophers,’ but it is rather safe to say that he does 
not include his current self in it. The second part of the remark reintroduces 
the ‘we’ which refers here to Wittgenstein’s current self. The shifts from 
impersonal to personal forms suggest here the evolution Wittgenstein 
underwent as placing his earlier self at a distance. 
Before understanding on what grounds Wittgenstein’s later conception of 
language is based, it is necessary to understand the conception of language 
which he adopted in the Tractatus and rejected in his later works. This change 
in focus can be analysed as a shift in influence, and especially in the influence 
Fritz Mauthner had on Wittgenstein. The early Wittgenstein rejects 
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Mauthner’s criticism of language according to which, as we will see further 
in this chapter, language is so disconnected from the world that one cannot 
hope to reach any knowledge by means of language. If we consider language 
to be one of the principal means to knowledge, Mauthner’s position leads to 
a radical scepticism according to which one cannot reach knowledge at all. 
We will see further in the chapter that the later Wittgenstein can be seen as 
adopting a more Mauthnerian stance (and thus getting closer to another 
tradition of language), as Gershon Weiler for instance suggests: ‘the change 
that occurred in Wittgenstein’s mind between the Tractatus and the Blue Book 
was in a Mauthnerian direction. I mean, that he came to consider ordinary 
language as being all right, while discarding the idea of picturing.84’ In the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein opposes his project of critique of language to 
Mauthner’s ‘Sprachkritik:’ ‘All philosophy is a “critique of language” 
(though not in Mauthner’s sense).’ (T, 4.0031) Mauthner’s critique of 
language focuses on ordinary language and does not attempt to elaborate a 
metaphysical or ideal language. Wittgenstein’s conception in the Tractatus 
on the contrary attempts to establish such an ideal language in order to solve 
the problems of philosophy. To that extent, the Tractatus is indebted not to 
Mauthner but to Frege and Russell whom Wittgenstein mentions in the 
preface: ‘I will only mention that I am indebted to Frege’s great works and 
to the writings of my friend Mr Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation 
of my thoughts.’ (T, preface) The picture that held Wittgenstein captive was 
a picture built on these influences and we need to briefly turn to them in 
order to understand why such a shift in conception was necessary. 
Frege is an important figure in the analytic tradition as he is often considered 
to be one of its founders. Michael Dummett considers that one of the crucial 
steps for philosophy to take a linguistic turn was made by Frege’s Die 
                                                     




Grundlagen der Arithmetik.85 Hans-Johann Glock insists on the crucial role he 
plays in the development of formal logic which is to be an important aspect 
of the beginnings of analytic philosophy.86 This focus on logic leads Frege to 
distinguish between the ‘logical content’ of signs and their ‘colouring,’ 
dismissing the latter as irrelevant to meaning. As Dummett argues: ‘The 
sense is that part of the meaning of an expression which is relevant to the 
determination of the truth-value of a sentence in which the expression may 
occur; the colouring is that part of its meaning which is not (for instance, that 
which distinguishes “chap” from “guy” and from “man”).’87 From the outset, 
this distinction seems therefore to disdain poetic and literary uses of 
language which rely on such ‘colouring.’ However, another distinction Frege 
makes is much more famous, that between Sinn and Bedeutung. In his famous 
paper, ‘On Sinn and Bedeutung,’ Frege elaborates a conception of meaning in 
which he distinguishes sense from Bedeutung (which is sometimes translated 
as reference or meaning). The main idea is that ‘the regular connection 
between a sign, its sense and its Bedeutung is of such a kind that to the sign 
there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite Bedeutung, 
while to a given Bedeutung (an object) there does not belong only a single 
sign. The same sense has different expressions in different languages or even 
in the same language.’88 This distinction is required to account either for 
expressions without reference or different expressions having the same 
reference such as Frege’s famous example of the ‘morning star’ and the 
‘evening star’ which both refer to Venus. Frege considers that there is an 
importance difference between Sinn and Bedeutung in their relation to truth. 
As Glock summarises: ‘their meaning (Bedeutung), which is the object they 
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refer to, and their sense (Sinn), the ‘mode of presentation’ of that referent. 
[…] The meaning of a sentence is its truth-value; its sense is the ‘thought’ it 
expresses.’89 In an expression, the bearer of the truth-value is thus the 
Bedeutung and this is why Frege requires such a notion: ‘But now why do we 
want every proper name to have not only a sense, but also a Bedeutung? Why 
is the thought not enough for us? Because, and to the extent that, we are 
concerned with its truth-value. This is not always the case.’90 In attributing 
truth-value to Bedeutung, Frege prevents any expressions without referent, 
that is any fictional expression, to be either true or false, without making 
them meaningless. Indeed, one of the problems of too straightforward a 
conception of meaning as reference is that expressions without reference 
become meaningless, and literary statements cannot be said to be 
meaningless although they lack reference. However, although Frege’s theory 
allows poetic statements to have a Sinn, it prevents them from having any 
truth-value and his rejection of ‘colouring’ outside the realm of meaning cuts 
away something crucial to poetic statements. 
Following Frege, Betrand Russell is another important influence for 
Wittgenstein and he, too, tackles the problem of sentences without reference. 
A similar question thus arises, as Ayer quotes and comments on Russell: 
‘”How can a non-entity be the subject of a proposition?” Russell does not 
think that any of these difficulties can be met by having recourse to Frege’s 
well-known distinction between sense and reference.’91 To solve the 
problem, Russell elaborates a theory of descriptions, which attempts to give 
account of sentences without reference while remaining within a general 
conception of meaning based on reference. According to Russell’s theory, 
meaning can be replaced by definite descriptions, words are not names in 
the sense of proper names which have a direct connection to the object or 
person, but as it were abbreviations for descriptions. As William Lycan 
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summarises, Russell takes Frege in the opposite way: ‘Thus names do have 
what Frege thought of as “senses,” that can differ despite sameness of 
referent, but Russell gives an analysis of these rather than taking them as 
primitive items of some abstract sort.’92 Although meant to solve the 
problems of fictional referents, Russell’s theory still struggles with sentences 
such as the famous: ‘The present king of France is bald.’ How can a sentence 
have a truth-value if the object does not exist? Is the sentence about the king 
of France true or false? It is not a meaningless sentence for it is very 
understandable, but from a referential perspective, it is problematic. As it 
has no truth-value, it cannot have a meaning. Both Frege’s and Russell’s 
theories attempt to solve problems that a conception of language encounters 
when meaning is based on reference, and such problems are the most visible 
when confronting such a theory to a poetic or literary work. The literary 
aspects of language thus appear more as problems than insights to explore 
further and the early Wittgenstein shows equally little concern with literary 
uses of language in his Tractatus. 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus relies on the same presuppositions, namely that 
philosophy ought to clarify language, that language represents the world, 
and that sentences have meaning in relation to their truth-value. In the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein is perhaps even more radical than Frege and Russell 
as he comes to consider only the propositions of science as being meaningful, 
although having nothing to do with philosophy: ‘The correct method in 
philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be 
said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to 
do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say 
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a 
meaning to certain signs in his propositions.’ (T, 6.53) Only the propositions 
of science can be said, all the rest must be kept silent because it cannot 
meaningfully be put into words: ‘There are, indeed, things that cannot be put 
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into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical’ (T, 
6.522) More precisely, what cannot be put into words are ethics and 
aesthetics as Wittgenstein suggests: ‘Ethics and aesthetics are one and the 
same.’ (T, 6.421) This rejection of ethics and aesthetics into the ‘mystical’ is a 
way of explicitly rejecting ‘deviant’ uses of language outside of the realm of 
the meaningful. To that extent, Wittgenstein makes explicit Frege’s and 
Russell’s rejection of poetic uses from the realm of philosophy of language. 
These three conceptions of meaning rely on the same basic conception that 
language represents the world. To this presupposition is related the idea that 
sentences have a truth-value and that their meaning is dependent on this 
truth-value. Despite its failure to account for poetic or literary uses of 
language, this conception remains strong nowadays. Unlike Wittgenstein, 
who changes his conception to avoid rejecting most of the actual uses of 
language as mystical, many philosophers accept the rejection of ‘deviant’ 
uses of language from the basic theory. Poetic, literary, metaphorical 
sentences therefore reveal a weakness of representational conceptions of 
language. Frege denies any truth-value to such sentences, Russell elaborates 
a complex theory to distinguish these sentences from ‘normal’ sentences, and 
Wittgenstein rejects ethics and aesthetics as belonging to the ‘mystical.’ This 
failure or difficulty in accounting for such uses of language, which can be 
rather common in everyday usage as the use of metaphor is not limited to 
poetic works, is a hint that representational conceptions of language might 
not be the best suited to understand how language really works. They are 
conceptions of an ‘ideal language,’ which, like its name indicates, might 
never be encountered in the actual world. On positing the existence of such 
an ideal language, or in attempting to explicate the actual language through 
this ideal one, they operate a metaphysical move, similar to what Nietzsche 
describes in discussing Plato’s positing of a ‘true world’ behind the ‘apparent 
one.’ I will focus on this aspect of Nietzsche’s critique in the next chapter, but 
the metaphysical dimension of representational language is a strong 
argument against it. However, even some ordinary language philosophers 
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who focus on language in use reject such poetic uses and Austin for instance 
rejects the literary as non-serious and does not give an account of it.93 The 
later Wittgenstein is less negative towards poetic language and some of his 
remarks go in the direction of giving an account for such uses. I will elaborate 
on these in Chapter Four. 
We have seen that Fritz Mauthner plays an important role in understanding 
the shift from early to late Wittgenstein. He is important not only because, 
as said above, Wittgenstein moves in a Mauthnerian direction, but also and 
above all because in making such a move, Wittgenstein comes in contact with 
a tradition which has a conception of language different from that of Frege 
and Russell. As Nietzsche belongs to this tradition, Lungstrum suggest that 
Mauthner is ‘an important bridge between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein.’94 
Wittgenstein’s knowledge of Nietzsche’s philosophy thus owes a great deal 
to Mauthner’s works, especially his Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache. It is in 
the three volumes of this work that he elaborates his critique of language. In 
these volumes, Mauthner traces the history of various philosophers’ 
conceptions of language and discusses their views. The philosopher with 
whom he agrees most is Nietzsche and he is heavily influenced by 
Nietzsche’s short unpublished essay On Truth and Lie, as Jacques Le Rider 
notes: ‘We couldn’t insist too much on the importance of Nietzsche’s text On 
Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense for Fritz Mauthner.’95 Mauthner even argues 
that Nietzsche would have been able to undertake a critique of language 
such as his, had he not been so preoccupied by morality and the use of 
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language. Mauthner reproaches Nietzsche with being a poet. Because of his 
peculiar style and use of language, Nietzsche is no critic of language: 
’Nietzsche was too vain to forego the poetic expression in his aphorisms: 
thus he is no “Sprachkritiker.”’96 More than Nietzsche, Mauthner is a door to 
a whole tradition, and according to Forster, Wittgenstein’s knowledge of 
Mauthner’s work also explains ‘how Wittgenstein became acquainted with 
the Herder-Hamann tradition’s principles.’97 Allan Janik and Stephen 
Toulmin argue that Mauthner plays an important role in the context of 
Wittgenstein’s Vienna: ‘by the year 1900, the linked problems of 
communication, authenticity and symbolic expression had been faced in 
parallel in all the major fields of thought and art […] So the stage was set for 
a philosophical critique of language, given in completely general terms.’98 Fritz 
Mauthner is the first who expressed this ‘philosophical critique of language’ 
and although Wittgenstein disagreed with him in the Tractatus, his later 
works accept this influence. 
Mauthner’s critique of language is linked to his conception of the essence of 
language. When he asks himself at the beginning of his Beiträge ‘What is the 
essence of language?’ his answer is quite straightforward: 
The easiest answer would be: there is no such thing as ‘the language.’ 
The word is such a vague abstract thing that hardly anything concrete 
corresponds to it. And if human language were a reliable ‘tool’ for 
knowledge, if especially my mother tongue were a reliable tool too, I 
would need to give up this attempt at criticism because the object of 
the research is an abstract thing, an ineffective and ungraspable 
concept.99 
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Mauthner’s criticism of language as ‘abstract’ and disconnected from the 
world follows ideas that Nietzsche develops in On Truth and Lie and which 
he inherits, as we will see, from Herder among others. Nietzsche’s 
conception of language in On Truth and Lie considers that words and 
concepts are the results of various stages of equating unequal things through 
metaphors. To some extent, Mauthner pushes Nietzsche’s theory further, 
especially regarding the critique of knowledge related to his conception of 
language. According to Mauthner, we cannot learn anything from and with 
language as words are only words; they do not refer to anything else. And if 
the meanings of the words are changing, this prevents us from elaborating 
anything. This critique of knowledge is a radicalisation of Nietzsche’s theory 
and leads to a linguistic scepticism. There is no possibility to reach 
knowledge through language and it is ultimately impossible to reach 
knowledge altogether because language always stands in the way. This 
critique of language goes together with a critique of versions of metaphysics 
which rely on language because metaphysics relies on abstract concepts. In 
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein adopts a radically different position regarding 
language, as there can be, for him, a link between a statement and a fact. 
Wittgenstein’s ‘Sprachkritik’ in the Tractatus is the opposite to Mauthner’s. 
Indeed, Wittgenstein attempts to reform language in order to avoid 
philosophical problems whereas Mauthner keeps language as it is, for 
nothing can be done to make it better. The later Wittgenstein’s views are 
closer to Mauthner’s, as philosophy is no longer the search for an ideal 
language but a description of ordinary uses of language:  
It is wrong to say that in philosophy we consider an ideal language 
as opposed to our ordinary one. For this makes it appear as though 
we thought we could improve on ordinary language. But ordinary 
language is all right. Whenever we make up 'ideal languages' it is not 
in order to replace our ordinary language by them; but just to remove 
some trouble caused in someone's mind by thinking that he has got 
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hold of the exact use of a common word. That is also why our method 
is not merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but rather 
deliberately to invent new ones, some of them because of their absurd 
appearance. (BB, p. 28) 
The ideal language is useful to specify something by isolating it from 
ordinary language. It is therefore useful as a tool, and to that extent the 
conception of language of the Tractatus can be an interesting tool, but should 
not be confused with language itself. ‘Ordinary language is all right,’ (BB, p. 
28) it needs no improvement and no further conceptualisation. Wittgenstein 
already suggests something like this in the Tractatus: ‘In fact, all the 
propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect 
logical order.’ (T 5.5563) But whereas the Tractatus emphasises the logical 
order of language, the later works do not attempt to structure language on 
an ideal logical scheme. An ideal language usually relies on a 
representational conception of language but there is more to ordinary 
language. Some ordinary uses, such as the poetic or metaphorical ones we 
can find in everyday practice, outgrow the limits of a representational 
conception of language. In order to account for such uses, Mauthner’s 
‘Sprachkritik’ and the later Wittgenstein turn to a tradition which attempts 
to avoid the limitations of representational language. Let us now turn to this 
tradition which I take in two steps: first the shift to expression with Herder 
and Hamann among others and second the poetic turn with the German 
Romantics. 
2. A Shift to Expression: Herder, Hamann, Humboldt, and 
Lichtenberg 
As said above, the representational conception of language raises two major 
issues: first, it retains a metaphysical dimension, it considers language as 
‘magic’ to borrow Wheeler’s term, which both Wittgenstein and Nietzsche 
try to dismiss; second, it fails to account for poetic or literary uses of 
language. A way to avoid these issues is to turn to another conception of 
language, one which gains importance with what Charles Taylor calls the 
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‘HHH view’ of meaning, but which can be related to Hermogenes’s position 
in Plato’s Cratylus. The rejection of ‘magic language’ calls for a shift from a 
representation-based to an expression-based theory. Such a shift is at play 
both in continental and analytic traditions and takes root, as Taylor argues, 
in the 18th century German philosophy of language. Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s views of language inherit from this tradition and their views 
of language can find a historical point of contact in philosophers such as 
Hamann or Lichtenberg. If Taylor considers this shift from a continental 
perspective, some analytic philosophers operate a similar shift. Robert 
Brandom, for instance, coins the term ‘expressivism,’ ‘as a label not just for 
his own project, but for a whole philosophical tradition that encompasses 
thinkers as diverse as Kant, Hegel, the American pragmatists, Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein’100 according to Nicholas Smith. Although both conceptions of 
expression have little—if not nothing—in common, Smith argues that 
Taylor’s notion of expression brings to the fore aspects that Brandom’s 
expressivism hides. 
Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s concerns with criticising metaphysics and 
reshaping language can be traced back to 18th century German philosophy, 
with thinkers such as Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788), Johann Gottfried 
von Herder (1744-1803), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), and Georg 
Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-1799). Some scholars such as Michael Forster 
and Herman Cloeren have already argued that analytic philosophy of 
language and its linguistic turn is less of a radical shift and break with 
tradition than a development of ideas taking their roots in 18th century 
German philosophy. Forster’s aim for instance is to ‘fill a major lacuna in 
Anglophone philosophy of language’s knowledge of its own origins, and 
hence in its self-understanding.’101 Cloeren defends a similar thesis, but he 
insists on the dimension of critique of language in the 18th and 19th century 
German philosophy. According to him, looking back at German philosophy 
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of language prevents philosophy from falling into the same ideas as those of 
the logical positivists: ‘What is more, thinkers of this movement cautiously 
avoided the one-sided conclusions of the logical positivists, according to 
which linguistic analysis is the only task of philosophy, and all solvable 
problems are left to logicians and scientists. As I will show, the German 
philosophers discussed in this study wisely held onto the notion that 
philosophy has genuine tasks to carry out in the theory of knowledge, in the 
history of philosophy, and in an elaboration of the transcendental function 
of language.’102 It is necessary to briefly retrace the history of this critique of 
metaphysics and of language to establish the grounds for comparing 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein.  
In their own ways, Herder, Hamann, Humboldt, and Lichtenberg all argue 
against a metaphysical conception of language (a language in which 
meanings would have a fixed essence) and develop a conception of language 
as being historically constructed. Taylor considers the first three to form the 
‘HHH view’ of meaning in which representation does not play the primary 
role. As Forster argues, they consider that ‘meaning or concepts are […] 
usages of words.’103 If meanings are provided by usage, there is no need for a 
metaphysical conception of language as language is established in practice 
and not fixed by a divine authority. One of the main features of this critique 
of metaphysical language is the search for the origin of language (as we have 
noted in Chapter One concerning Heidegger) which should not be divine but 
human, in Hermogenes’s term, language is defined by convention and 
agreement.  As we will see in the next chapters, quite a few elements of this 
tradition will find their way into Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s 
philosophies, the most striking being found in what has been epitomised as 
Wittgenstein’s—and the ordinary language philosophers’—so-called 
‘meaning as use’ conception. Even though there is much more to ordinary 
language than this mere replacement of meaning by use, this shift in focus 
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from metaphysical object ‘language’ (whose characteristics can vary) to a 
practice (or a set of practices) is a central move. Such a conception leads not 
only to understanding language as a convention (the rules of usage) but also 
as a creation (language evolves and new language uses can be created). As 
we will see with the German Romantics, this opens the space for poetic 
language. Rather than being metaphysically fixed, language is considered as 
something dynamic, as an always-evolving practice. 
To understand how language is fixed and how it can evolve, 18th century 
German philosophers have looked at the origin of language. When looking 
back at this origin, Herder expresses critical views on the development of 
language: 
In all original languages remains of these natural sounds still resound—
only, to be sure, they are not the main threads of human language. 
They are not the actual roots, but the juices which enliven the roots 
of language.  
In a refined, late-invented metaphysical language, which is a 
degeneration, perhaps at the fourth degree, from the original savage 
mother [tongue] of the human species, and which after long millennia 
of degeneration has itself in turn for centuries of its life been refined, 
civilized, and humanized—such a language, the child of reason and 
society, can know little or nothing any more about the childhood of 
its first mother. But the old, the savage, languages, the nearer they are 
to the origin, the more of it they contain. I cannot here yet speak of 
the slightest human formation [Bildung] of language, but can only 
consider raw materials. There does not yet exist for me any word, but 
only sounds towards the word for a sensation.104 
As we will see, Nietzsche’s early (and even later) views on language are very 
close to those of Herder, even though he expresses some dissent with them. 
This idea of metaphysical language is seen as a degeneration from an original 
language, that of sounds. Language is metaphysical in the sense that it fixes 
an essence for the things it designates: when language evolves, there is no 
longer a link between the sound and the object but only a fixed convention 
(Nietzsche will call it a fixation of metaphors into concepts). Language in this 
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sense is a social construct and not the result of a natural development. Let us 
point out that, already at this time, the metaphysical conception of language 
is criticised and this critique is one of the central points of contact between 
analytic and continental philosophies. Even though analytic philosophers 
will not follow the view according to which language has a sensuous origin, 
‘ordinary language’ philosophers will strongly criticise the metaphysical 
character of language, just as Herder does. There is something unnatural 
about language that is deceitful, such is Herder’s claim. Nietzsche will follow 
it to some extent and analytic philosophers will adopt a similar stance but 
for other reasons. Indeed, for Wittgenstein among others, the problem does 
not reside in the unnaturalness of language but in its metaphysical character 
(these two being however quite closely related), in the fact that words are 
taken out of their ordinary use and employed in a metaphysical way (PI 116), 
that is using them as if they were able to give an account of the essence of 
things (whereas they are, as Herder says, refined at ‘the fourth degree,’ very 
far from the things themselves). Metaphysical language thus relies on the 
idea that language not only represents the world but also accounts for the 
essence of things. 
Alongside with Herder, Hamann was a founder of philosophy’s turn to 
language.105 He offers similar views to those of Herder and brings the origin 
and the nature of language into question, again in relation to a critique of 
metaphysics. As with Herder, Hamann believes language and thought to be 
closely linked;  he argues in his Essay on an Academic Question that language 
is defined as a way of communicating thoughts: ‘Since the concept of that 
which is understood by “language” is of such diverse meaning, it would be 
best to determine it according to its purpose as the means to communicate 
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our thoughts and to understand the thoughts of others.’106 Underlying such 
a conception of language is the dependence between thought and language; 
thoughts cannot be expressed with any other means than language. More 
than only the relation between thought and language, Hamann also brings 
to the fore the communicative nature of language. This does not entail a 
conception of language as a tool, in a functionalist fashion, but that language 
is essentially something shared and used to share thoughts, and this goes in 
the direction of rejecting a private language. We can find here a basic 
understanding of language as a social practice which will grow into an 
important conception of language in the later Wittgenstein and in ordinary 
language philosophy. 
This conception of language as a social practice entails a critique of 
metaphysical language. Indeed, as Hamann states in Aesthetic in Nuce: 
To speak is to translate—from an angelic language into a human 
language, that is, to translate thoughts into words,—things into 
names—images into signs, which can be poetic or curiological, 
historic or symbolic or hieroglyphic—– and philosophical or 
characteristic. This kind of translation (that is, speech) resembles 
more than anything else the wrong side of a tapestry.107 
According to Hamann, speech is a kind of translation which can occur at 
different levels (names, signs, etc.). To some extent, this view of levels of 
translation can be linked to Herder’s conception of a metaphysical language 
refined ‘at the fourth degree.’ The translation creates a distance between 
things and names. Whereas a metaphysical language considers the link 
between the name and the object to be a direct one, for Hamann a translation 
takes place in speech. Hamann criticises what Wheeler calls a ‘magic 
language,’ that is a self-interpreting language in which there is no need for 
interpretation or, in Hamann’s words, translation. In this sense, a ‘magic 
language’ is transparent: everything is crystal clear, meanings and 
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interpretation are given and do not need to be found.108 A ‘magic language’ 
relies on the prejudice that language is metaphysical and that there is 
therefore a direct link from word to thing, from meaning to essence. Hamann 
works against such a conception of language and the importance he gives to 
translation reveals the interpretative dimension of language. This translation 
can take different forms (poetic, historic, philosophical, etc.). This notion of 
translation, as Herder’s notion of refinement ‘at the fourth degree’ will be 
developed by Nietzsche’s notions of metaphor and concept in On Truth and 
Lie. I will discuss Nietzsche’s conception extensively in the next chapter, but 
it is already interesting to point out the relation between translation 
(Übersetzung) and metaphor (Metapher but also Übertragung). As much as in 
Hamann’s translation as in Nietzsche’s metaphor, language is perceived as 
operating a shift (a move) from perception to word (and later to the concept).  
This shift from words to concepts appears in Hamann’s later works where, 
even though his conception of language slightly changes, the main idea of 
translation remains. In the Metacritique of Pure Reason, he answers to Kant 
and argues: 
Words, therefore, have an aesthetic and logical faculty. As visible and 
audible objects they belong with their elements to the sensibility and 
intuition; however, by the spirit of their institution and meaning, they 
belong to the understanding and concepts. Consequently, words are 
pure and empirical intuitions as much as pure and empirical 
concepts. Empirical, because the sensation of vision or hearing is 
effected through them; pure, inasmuch as their meaning is 
determined by nothing that belongs to those sensations. Words as the 
undetermined objects of empirical intuitions are entitled, in the 
original text of pure reason, aesthetic appearances; therefore, 
according to the endlessly repeated antithetical parallelism, words as 
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83 
 
undetermined objects of empirical concepts are entitled critical 
appearances, specters, non-words or unwords, and become 
determinate objects for the understanding only through their 
institution and meaning in usage. This meaning and its 
determination arises, as everyone knows, from the combination of a 
word-sign, which is a priori arbitrary and indifferent and a posteriori 
necessary and indispensable, with the intuition of the word itself; 
through this reiterated bond the concept is communicated to, 
imprinted on, and incorporated in the understanding, by means of 
the word-sign as by the intuition itself.109 
Hamann characterises words as two-sided. On the one hand, they are 
translations from empirical intuitions, from one form of empirical intuition 
(the perception of a thing) to another (the sound of the word). This is why 
words have an aesthetic faculty; they are objects (or sounds) with a specific 
form. On the other hand, they are concepts; they have a meaning which is 
unrelated to the original empirical intuition (or only ‘at the fourth degree’ as 
Herder states). This is the logical faculty of the word. These two faculties are 
bound together in words: the intuition of the world and the arbitrary word-
sign that designates it. Here the idea is expressed that the meaning of a word 
is its usage, which the later Wittgenstein will extensively develop. Let us note 
as well the arbitrary character of the word-sign which will become one of the 
main theses of Ferdinand de Saussure.110 This arbitrariness of words and the 
lack of relation between the word-sign and the intuition lead Hamann to a 
critique of metaphysics: 
Metaphysics abuses the word-signs and figures of speech of our 
empirical knowledge by treating them as nothing but hieroglyphs 
and types of ideal relations. Through this learned troublemaking it 
works the honest decency of language into such a meaningless, 
rutting, unstable, indefinite something = X that nothing is left but a 
windy sough, a magic shadow play, at most, as the wise Helvétius 
says, the talisman and rosary of a transcendental superstitious belief 
in entia rationis, their empty sacks and slogans.111 
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Hamann’s critique of metaphysics is thus mainly focussed on the use (or 
abuse) of word-signs as concepts. The fixed and arbitrary meaning distances 
itself from the empirical intuitions and, in the end, detaches itself completely. 
Metaphysics considers word-signs as ‘hieroglyphs,’ as abstract ideas, and 
thus turn language into something meaningless. Behind the equation 
‘something = X’ lies nothing but abstract ideas. Hamann’s critique of 
metaphysics can be linked to Nietzsche’s critique of the ‘thing-in-itself,’ even 
though his relation to this notion is ambiguous: he uses it in his early works 
but is always suspicious of it. Things are clearer in his later works where he 
rejects the idea of the ‘thing-in-itself,’ such as in the Twilight of the Idols 
chapter ‘How the True World Finally Became a Fable.’ Critique of 
metaphysics and critique of language are linked together by Hamann. Word-
signs cannot give a faithful account of our ‘empirical knowledge’ and thus 
of the world. 
Like Herder and Hamann from whom he inherits, Humboldt attempts to 
escape the representational conception of language. As James Underhill 
argues, Humboldt does not consider language to be a mere vehicle for 
thought nor a mirror of the world.112 Following that, one of the main aspects 
of Humboldt’s view of language is he ‘conceptualised language not as a 
fixed, unchanging thing but as a living process.’113 To that extent, Humboldt 
pursues Herder’s and Hamann’s thoughts, but focuses and develops further 
the idea of language as an evolving process. Language is an activity which 
keeps evolving: 
Language, regarded in its real nature, is an enduring thing, and at 
every moment a transitory one. Even its maintenance by writing is 
always just an incomplete, mummy-like preservation, only needed 
again in attempting thereby to picture the living utterance. In itself it 
is no product (Ergon), but an activity (Energeia). Its true definition can 
therefore only be a genetic one.114 
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Like Herder and Hamann, Humboldt considers language as a practice. To 
that extent, he focuses on the notion of speech rather than writing (and this 
idea that writing is a mere recording of speech is, as Derrida argues in Of 
Grammatology, a striking feature of many conceptions of language). Whether 
speech is really a more fundamental mode or use of language than writing 
is not the main question here, and Nietzsche would certainly disagree with 
Humboldt on that matter. What is important is that language is an activity 
which is transitory. Language is meant to evolve and to change and is 
certainly not to be fixed as an eternal entity. Concepts are not ‘aeternae 
veritates,’ as Nietzsche for instance argues in Human, All Too Human. A 
definition of language ‘can therefore only be a genetic one’ or, following 
Nietzsche’s vocabulary a genealogical one: language must be grasped in its 
uses and in its history. 
The themes developed by Herder, Hamann, and Humboldt already reveal a 
possible historical background to link Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. As we 
have seen, some concerns shared by both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein appear 
in Herder’s, Hamann’s, and Humboldt’s writings. As we have seen and as 
Forster argues, Wittgenstein’s knowledge of Herder and Hamann could 
come from his reading of Fritz Mauthner (who was heavily influenced by 
the Herder-Hamann tradition as well as by Nietzsche), but there is some 
evidence that Wittgenstein read Hamann. 115 Although not discussing 
Hamann’s conception of language, Wittgenstein mentions his name in his 
notebooks.116 Lichtenberg, another 18th century German philosopher, is a 
figure whose influence on both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein is attested. 
Wittgenstein’s comments about his readings are often scarce, but, as Janik 
and Toulmin argue: ‘One of the few philosophical writers who impressed 
him from early on was Georg Christoph Lichtenberg.’117 As for Nietzsche, 
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Thomas Brobjer shows that ‘Georg Christoph Lichtenberg is one of the only 
two German philosophers and thinkers (the other being Lessing) toward 
whom Nietzsche had a positive attitude throughout his development.’118 
Lichtenberg too was a critic of metaphysics and considered language as the 
central matter of philosophy. More than just being a shared historical source 
for Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, Lichtenberg also raises some important 
metaphilosophical questions, especially those of the aim and scope of 
philosophy (summarised by Heidegger in Chapter One: ‘What task is 
reserved for thinking at the end of philosophy?’) and of the writing of 
philosophy itself, of philosophical style. 
Both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein have an interest in Lichtenberg’s writings 
and the relation between this concern and their philosophy of language is 
expressed at its best in one of Lichtenberg’s sentence from note 146, book H 
of his Waste Books: 
Our whole philosophy is rectification of colloquial linguistic usage, 
thus rectification of a philosophy, and indeed of the most universal 
and general119 
This sentence is important because we have evidence it was read by both 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Indeed, Nietzsche underlines ‘rectification of 
colloquial linguistic usage’ in his copy of the book and, as Martin Stingelin 
notes in his study of Nietzsche’s Lichtenberg reception, shares with 
Lichtenberg his understanding of critique of language as critique of 
concepts.120 As for Wittgenstein, he quotes this sentence in section 90 of the 
Big Typescript. We thus have evidence that this notion of rectification of 
language was noted both by Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. The understanding 
of philosophy as a way of correcting language is thus not the invention of 
linguistic analysis but is already explicitly present in Lichtenberg’s writings. 
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Lichtenberg’s focus on the use of language differs from the view held by 
Herder and Hamann. The question is no longer about the relation of 
meaning to linguistic usage, but about linguistic usage itself as being in need 
of rectification. Lichtenberg’s sentence shifts from a philosophical concern 
with language to a linguistic concern with philosophy. With Lichtenberg, the 
study of language takes a metaphilosophical turn: a concern with language 
leads to a concern with the nature of philosophical activity. Language is not 
only an object of philosophical inquiry but also the means by which this 
inquiry is carried out. As such, a reflection about language becomes a 
reflection about the linguistic nature of philosophy. This questioning about 
the nature of philosophical activity is obviously linked to a critique of 
metaphysics as traditionally conceived on the grounds of language, as 
Lichtenberg’s critique of the Cartesian ‘I think’ reveals. In the fragment K 76 
from The Waste Books, Lichtenberg considers Descartes presupposition of the 
‘I’ in ‘I think:’ ‘We know only the existence of our sensations, representations, 
and thoughts. It thinks, we should say, just as we say, it lightnings. To say 
cogito is already too much if we translate it as I think. To assume the I, to 
postulate it, is a practical necessity.’121 Before the existence of ourselves, 
Lichtenberg considers that we know our ‘sensations, representations, and 
thoughts.’ He operates an inversion of Descartes’s cogito which reconsiders 
the whole of Descartes’s metaphysics. John Campbell compares 
Lichtenberg’s critique of the cogito to Wittgenstein’s ‘reports of immediate 
experience’ and considers that Wittgenstein operates a similar move.122 
Nietzsche pursues a similar interpretation in Beyond Good and Evil and 
considers that the postulation of the ‘I’ is a ‘grammatical habit.’ (BGE 17 / 
KSA 5.31) Such a conception of philosophy and language requires rethinking 
how philosophy ought to be expressed. Lichtenberg is a perfect example of 
that: for him, philosophical writing involves writing as such. The ‘linguistic 
usage’ concerns Lichtenberg in two ways: in his analysis of language on the 
                                                     
121 Lichtenberg (2012), p. 152. 
122 Campbell (2012), p. 368. 
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one hand and on his use of language, that is his style, on the other hand. 
Through his thinking about language, Lichtenberg brings to the fore the 
metaphilosophical questions of the nature and expression of philosophy.   
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share this metaphilosophical concern with 
Lichtenberg. As I will argue in the following chapters, Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s ideas on language also bring metaphilosophical elements to 
the fore. And this shows in their specific ways of writing, in their styles, 
which share with Lichtenberg the aphoristic dimension. In his introduction 
to Lichtenberg’s Waste Books, R. J. Hollingdale argues that one should be 
cautious in taking this aphoristic connection as a means to compare 
Lichtenberg, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein as there are important stylistic 
differences among them.123 However, this use of the fragmentary form 
reveals a shared concern with the use of language and its impact on 
philosophy itself. The turn to language entails a turn to the language of 
philosophy. By questioning the nature of philosophy, they must take into 
consideration the form of philosophy and thus tackle the question ‘what 
form should philosophy take?’ One element of an answer comes from the 
consideration of art and more specifically poetry. We have seen that Carnap 
praised Nietzsche for exposing his metaphysics as poetry (thus 
acknowledging Nietzsche as a poet and denying Nietzsche as a philosopher) 
and Wittgenstein stated that ‘really one should write philosophy only as one 
writes a poem.’ (CV, p. 28) After Herder, Hamann, Humboldt, and 
Lichtenberg, the German Romantics tackled these questions about the nature 
of philosophy and its relation to poetry. 
                                                     
123 Lichtenberg (1990), pp. xii-xiii: ‘In the present century the fragmentary 
philosophy of Nietzsche’s notebooks and of the later Wittgenstein has encouraged 
the suspicion that Lichtenberg’s fragmentary philosophy is of a kind similar to that 
of Nietzsche or Wittgenstein. For my part I think that anyone who conscientiously 
seeks “Lichtenberg’s philosophy” in the Sudelbücher is not exactly wasting his time—
no one who reads Lichtenberg conscientiously is wasting his time—but is certainly 
expending ingenuity in the wrong place: the analogy with Nietzsche or Wittgenstein 
is misleading, inasmuch as their thinking is only expressed in fragmentary form 
whereas Lichtenberg’s really is fragmentary.’ 
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3. The Poetic View: Friedrich Schlegel and the German Romantics 
The German Romantics inherit from the ideas explored above and further 
develop the relation between language and poetry. In this section, I will 
focus especially on Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis as their ideas will be quite 
influential on Nietzsche. It is worth mentioning that Friedrich 
Schleiermacher develops similar ideas as well, exploring in particular the 
question of interpretation which plays a central role in his hermeneutics. The 
notion of interpretation will be central to my readings of Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein in further chapters, but I will focus for now on other aspects 
from the romantic tradition, especially their views on the relation between 
philosophy and poetry as this has an impact on the form of philosophy 
which will be the topic of Chapter Seven. In this regard, the German 
Romantics continue developing the notion of fragment which was already 
central to Lichtenberg’s ideas and which will have a strong influence on 
Nietzsche’s philosophical thought and style. 
The notion of fragment is however ambivalent as, although there is a 
tradition of short forms in philosophy, fragments are sometimes, as in 
Heraclitus’s case, more of a historical contingency than a conceptual 
necessity. However, the fact that short forms exist in philosophical 
expression or that some philosophical thoughts reach us only in a 
fragmentary form influences the understanding of this philosophy. The 
question of style is, as we will see in Chapter Seven, tightly related to the 
possibility of understanding. The notion of fragment can be interpreted in 
various ways, and Hollingdale argues for instance that Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s styles are only fragmentary in form whereas Lichtenberg’s ‘is 
really fragmentary.’124 Whether there is really a difference here or not, the 
fact is that both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein present their thoughts in a 
fragmentary form and that this style belongs to a tradition in which 
Lichtenberg has his place. The German Romantics pursue Lichtenberg’s 
                                                     
124 Lichtenberg (1990), p. xiii. 
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fragmentary style and develop an aesthetics of the fragment which has a 
complex relation to the systematic form in philosophy, and, as Elizabeth 
Millan-Zaibert argues, the Romantics’ concept of the fragment is a way of 
escaping an artificial system which would impose a structure upon a 
plurality of ideas.125 
To illustrate this complex relation, Schlegel holds a dual view on systems: he 
considers his method based on the life of thought to be a system (in the sense 
of an organic system) but not in the negative sense according to which 
‘systematic coherence is only external and specious.’126 He distinguishes 
between organic systems produced and determined by life and systems built 
by philosophers who impose an external force to hold the things together. 
Nietzsche takes up this rejection of systems and systematic philosophy and 
his attitude towards the system is summarised in Twilight of the Idols: ‘I 
mistrust all systematists and avoid them.’ (TI ‘Arrows’ 26 / KSA 6.63) The 
notion of mistrust suggests that systems often hide something, that their 
attempt to structure reality might only be an artifice. 
For both Nietzsche and Schlegel, the attack on the notion of system is related 
to their rejection of Hegel and the tradition of German Idealism, and 
especially of its systematic style. Schlegel’s writing in fragments and 
Nietzsche’s writing in aphorisms do reveal an attempt to write philosophy 
differently, in a radically different way from Hegel’s system (Nietzsche’s 
critique of Spinoza as a systematic writer also goes in this direction; he is 
against a philosophy which would not include poetry). This search for a 
different expression leads the German Romantics and Nietzsche to favour a 
                                                     
125 Millan-Zaibert (2007), p. 12: ‘Schlegel’s use of the fragment is largely the result of 
his ambivalent relation to creating a system for his ideas. In Athenäum Fragment 53 
he writes: ‘It is just as fatal for the spirit to have a system and not to have a system. 
Some way of combining the two must be reached.’ According to Eichner, the 
medium of such a combination is precisely the literary form that the early Romantics 
favored, the fragment. This form, because it is not necessarily systematic, provides 
the space necessary for the free play of irony and facilitates the possibility that a 
single idea be approached from a plurality of perspectives.’ 




literary form and, as Millan-Zaibert notes, ‘philosophers continue to 
underestimate the role of literary form in philosophy, which hinders an 
appreciation of the philosophical contributions of the early German 
Romantics.’127 The inclusion of poetry and literature in the realm of 
philosophy reconfigures the language of philosophy itself. In contrast to the 
systematic form that reveals an external coherence, the literary form used by 
the German Romantics as well as Nietzsche reveals an internal coherence, 
similar to that of an organic system.  
This reflection on system and the inclusion of poetry within the 
philosophical realm show Schlegel’s concern with language and its relation 
to the world. This concern also serves as ground for his questioning of the 
relation between philosophy, poetry, and truth—and to a larger extent the 
relation between art and science. His lecture ‘Philosophy of language’ 
focuses on the relation between language and life (and therefore art, as art is 
an integral part of life). His conception of language follows in part that of 
Herder and Hamann. Indeed, he too considers that ‘there is, then, an intrinsic 
connection between thought and speech, between language and 
consciousness.’128 Because of this connection, language plays an important 
role in different domains of human activity: ‘living thought and the science 
thereof, can not well or easily be separated from the philosophy of 
language.’129 We can already notice that this foundational role of language in 
another science (or another domain of philosophy) is a key element to the 
philosophical developments in the ‘linguistic turn.’ Following Herder and 
Hamann, Schlegel reinforces the place and role of language in philosophy. 
As we have seen with Lichtenberg, to place language back in philosophy 
entails rethinking the writing (or the style) of philosophy. Schlegel takes up 
this metaphilosophical concern and pushes it further. Denis Thouard goes as 
                                                     
127 Millán-Zaibert (2007), pp. 45-46. 
128 Schlegel (1855), p. 425. 




far as saying that ‘the reflection of the textuality of philosophy becomes a 
philosophical problem with Schlegel.’130 We might nuance this claim in 
regard to what we have said about Lichtenberg but Schlegel most certainly 
brings this reflection on philosophical style to the foreground. 
Novalis holds a similar view of the relation between language and world. 
He for instance states in the Logological Fragements: ‘Everything we 
experience is a communication. Thus the world is indeed a communication—a 
revelation of the spirit. The age has passed when the spirit of God could be 
understood. The meaning of the world is lost. We have stopped at the letter. 
As a result of the appearance we have lost that which is appearing. 
Formulary beings.’131 The importance given to communication and therefore 
to the understanding of this communication through the understanding of 
language brings to the fore the metaphilosophical dimension of 
philosophical reflection: ‘The history of philosophy up to now is nothing but 
a history of attempts to discover how to do philosophy.132’ This 
metareflective character also appears in Novalis’s conception of language. In 
the ‘Monologue,’ he argues the whole point of language is to be concerned 
with itself: ‘It is amazing, the absurd error people make of imagining they 
are speaking for the sake of things; no one knows the essential thing about 
language, that it is concerned only with itself.’133 Languages does not refer to 
things in the world, but only to itself. This conception however leads to an 
ironic comment from Novalis: ‘And though I believe that with these words I 
have delineated the nature and office of poetry as clearly as I can, all the same 
I know that no one can understand it, and what I have said is quite foolish 
because I wanted to say it, and that is no way for poetry to come about.’134 If 
language only refers to itself, poetry—understood as the mastery of 
                                                     
130 Thouard (2001), my translation: ‘la réflexion sur la textualité philosophique 
devient un problème philosophique avec lui.’ 
131 Novalis (1997), p. 81. 
132 Novalis (1997), p. 47. 
133 Bernstein (2003), p. 214. 
134 Bernstein (2003), p. 215. 
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language—can only express the nature of language, and to attempt to 
describe the nature of poetry is therefore to attempt to describe the nature of 
language, a task which runs in circle. 
The Romantics’ and Nietzsche’s distrust of systems and systematic writing 
comes from, among other things, Schlegel’s rejection of the correspondence 
theory of truth, which is a feature Nietzsche will extensively develop. This 
rejection is linked to their critique of metaphysics and their new conception 
of language. If language is not ‘magic,’ if meanings are not given but call for 
interpretation, language cannot be considered as the exact representation of 
the world anymore. Once the direct link between language and world is 
taken down, the whole theory of truth as correspondence collapses as well. 
Truth (and meaning) cannot be considered as a matter of correspondence 
between a statement and a fact because the statement enters in the 
constitution of the fact; language takes part in elaborating the world. As 
Forster rightfully notes, Schlegel here ‘anticipates aspects of Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism.’135 Andrew Bowie similarly suggests that German Romantics 
anticipate the Nietzschean question of truth: ‘The Romantic understanding 
of truth both prefigures Nietzsche’s question and implies that any 
determinate answer to it, for example, in terms of power as the ground of 
truth, fails to understand the real nature of truth.’136 Nietzsche’s questioning 
of the value we give to truth is based on his conception of language. A 
different conception of language (one tending towards literature and 
denying a ‘magic language’) calls for a rethinking of truth and how to 
express it, in a way that resembles literary expression. 
In such a context, philosophy and poetry become closer to one another and 
Schlegel even considers that ‘poetry and philosophy should be made one.’137 
This bringing together of poetry and philosophy (understood as science) is 
well expressed in Anathaeum Fragments 255: 
                                                     
135 Forster (2011), p. 30. 
136 Bowie (1997), p. 73. 
137 Bernstein (2003), p. 244. 
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The more poetry becomes science, the more it also becomes art. If 
poetry is to become art, if the artist is to have a thorough 
understanding and knowledge of his ends and means, his difficulties 
and his subjects, then the poet will have to philosophize about his art. 
If he is to be more than a mere contriver and artisan, if he is to be an 
expert in his field and understand his fellow citizens in the kingdom 
of art, then he will have to become a philologist as well.138 
For poetry to become art to its full extent, it must include a philosophical 
reflection on itself. Only through philosophy can poetry become fully 
conscious of itself, of its ends and means, of what it ought to do and be. 
This philosophical dimension is however not the only one needed: Schlegel 
also adds philology; not only must the poet be a philosopher, he must be a 
philologist as well. This notion of philology occupies the young Schlegel as 
his notes on Philosophy of Philology reveal. He attempts to rethink philology 
by adding a stronger critical and historical component. For Schlegel, poetry, 
philosophy and philology must work together and ‘One has to be born for 
philology just as for poetry and philosophy.’ This triad: poetry, philosophy, 
philology prefigures some of the Nietzschean developments. In Nietzsche’s 
works as well, poetry, philosophy and philology work together. Philology is 
important as the art of reading well (and to this extent interpreting). As he 
says at the end of the preface to Daybreak, to read well (as a philologist) is to 
read slowly or to ruminate as he names this activity in Genealogy of Morals. 
The importance of poetry (and to a wider extent art) appears throughout all 
of Nietzsche’s works and Thus Spoke Zarathustra even takes the form of a 
poem (for which Carnap, as we saw, praised Nietzsche). Poetry and 
philology thus affect Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy: poetry has an 
impact on his style and philology brings into focus the notion of 
interpretation. 
Novalis understands the relation between philosophy and poetry in a similar 
way: ‘Poetry is the hero of philosophy. Philosophy raises poetry to the status 
                                                     




of a principle. It teaches us to recognize the worth of poetry. Philosophy is 
the theory of poetry. It shows us what poetry is, that is one and all.’139 What 
poetry brings to the fore is the idea of creation which Nietzsche will 
extensively develop as we will see in Chapter Five. Novalis argues that 
‘Writing poetry is creating,’140 and this notion of creating brings to the fore 
the idea that poetry is not a closed category which, for instance, would refer 
to all versified texts (and Aristotle already suggests that Heredotus’s work 
put into verse would still be history141)—it is not a subcategory of literature—
but describes a more general dimension which encompasses all the arts. The 
use of the term ‘Poesie’ rather than ‘Dichtung’ goes back to the etymological 
roots of the word, the Greek ‘poiesis’ which means to make or to create. 
Rather than establishing a closed genre, the German Romantics open the 
notion of poetry to encompass all creative works. This notion of creation is 
central to Nietzsche’s philosophy and in romantic terms, Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is a poetic one insofar as it is a philosophy of creation. I will 
develop this in a later chapter but the Romantics’ efforts to put aesthetics and 
poetics at the centre of philosophical concerns is an important step not only 
to understand Nietzsche’s philosophy, but also to create a ground on which 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein can meet. As mentioned in Chapter One, and as 
Bowie argues, there is a ‘romantic connection’142 between analytic and 
continental philosophy and this connection can bring Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein closer to one another. Friedrich Schlegel and the early German 
Romantics bring to the fore reflections that Nietzsche will take up in his 
works. One of the central aspects of the romantic enterprise is the attempt to 
reconfigure the relation between philosophy and poetry (and to a wider 
extent between philosophy and art). The poetic and the aesthetic acquire a 
                                                     
139 Novalis (1997), p. 79. 
140 Novalis (1997), p. 55. 
141 Aristotle, Poetics, 1451b, p. 32: ‘For the historian and the poet differ not by 
speaking in metrical verse or without meter (for it would be possible to put the 
writings of Herodotus into meter, and they would be a history with meter no less 
than without it).   
142 See Bowie (2000). 
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central role and Nietzsche will pursue these lines of inquiry. Although 
Wittgenstein does not explicitly follow these ideas and although the notion 
of creation is more or less absent from his works, some of his remarks 
indicate similar concerns regarding the nature and style of philosophy. As I 
will suggest in Chapter Seven, he for instance considers that ‘really one 
should write philosophy only as one writes a poem’ (CV, p. 28) and that there 
is a ‘queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation […] and one 
in aesthetics.’ (CV, p. 29) Before turning to the aesthetics and the poetic in 
Part Three, let us now focus on Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions 




Connecting Nietzsche and Wittgenstein: The ‘End of 
Metaphysics,’ the ‘Linguistic Turn,’ and the Problem of 
Relativism 
Ist die Sprache der adäquate Ausdruck aller Realitäten? 
Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie, §1 
If the so-called analytic-continental divide is only a misrepresentation and 
insofar as neither side can be adequately defined, it should not be an obstacle 
to connecting Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Quite to the contrary as the 
confrontation of these two philosophers, like the confrontation between 
philosophers supposedly belonging to one and the other tradition usually 
does, opens new paths of reflection. Such a confrontation is particularly 
germane in aesthetics, as philosophy in this field seems to still conform to 
the misrepresentation of the divide.143 Before turning to aesthetic concerns—
and a concern in philosophy of poetry especially—and because poetry is 
essentially a linguistic matter, it is necessary to explore Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s views on language. As already seen in Chapter Two, 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein both inherit from a similar tradition which 
rejects the metaphysical conception of language as representation and 
explores the possibilities of an expressive conception of language, what 
Charles Taylor calls the ‘HHH view’ and which begins in 18th century 
German philosophy of language. Although the direct connections between 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are scarce—we know Wittgenstein has read 
some of Nietzsche’s works but it is difficult to say what he thought of him—
the expressive tradition of language represents an important common 
ground through which Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share similar concerns 
regarding the end of metaphysics and the role language plays in it. 
                                                     
143 See for instance Roholt (2017). 
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The question in the opening quotation summarises Nietzsche’s concerns 
with language and questions the capacity for a representational conception 
of language to give an account of the world. One of the key ideas in this quote 
lies in the use of the plural ‘realities’ rather than the singular ‘reality.’ Against 
a metaphysical view which posits the existence of ‘reality’ itself, Nietzsche 
considers reality to be plural. There is not one reality but many realities 
which are manifest, as we will later see, in many perspectives. To that extent, 
the metaphysical positing of language mirroring reality cannot be sustained 
anymore. The multiplicity of realities suggest that there might not be one 
language but a plurality of language uses. To take the end of metaphysics 
seriously, a reconception of language is necessary. We have seen that, with 
the end of metaphysics, some philosophers, both analytic and continental, 
turn their attention from metaphysical questions to linguistic ones or, as 
Nietzsche puts it, ‘realize that what things are called is incomparably more 
important than what they are.’ (GS 58 / KSA 3.422) If there is nothing to be 
found behind the world, if there is no metaphysical explanation, if in 
Nietzsche’s words ‘God is dead,’ philosophers must focus on our relations 
to the world and one of these relations occurs by means of language. 
However, what is meant by language is not clear and philosophers elaborate 
their own conception of language in order to tackle the questions raised by 
this linguistic turn. We have classified these conceptions in two broad 
categories: representation and expression. The problem of representational 
conceptions of language is that they rely on a metaphysical basis whereas 
expressive conceptions seem to open the door to some forms of relativism. 
As we have seen in Chapter One with Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics 
underlying language, and, in a sense, Nietzsche prefigures this Derridean 
move, with the end of metaphysics must come the end of a metaphysical 
conception of language which suggests that ‘through [words and concepts] 
we are grasping the essence of things.’ (WS 11 / KSA 2.547) Or at least, such 
referential conceptions of meaning cannot remain so straightforward, and 
we have seen that Frege and Russell, for instance, attempt to nuance the 
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notion of reference in order to keep a representational conception of 
language valid. More than that, metaphysical conceptions of language are 
‘magic’ in the sense Samuel Wheeler suggests, that is they see language as 
self-interpreting. A metaphysical conception of language considers the 
meaning of words to be unequivocal and explained through the relation 
between word and world. A critique of representational language is a 
critique of metaphysics, insofar as it criticises the foundations on which 
metaphysics is built. As already mentioned in Chapter Two, such referential 
conceptions of language often rely on a theory of truth as correspondence: a 
statement is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact. Huw Price compares 
representational theories of language to a child’s matching game and 
considers that: ‘Matching true statements to the world seems a lot like 
matching stickers to the picture; and many problems in philosophy seem 
much like the problems the child faces when some of the stickers are hard to 
place.144’ One domain in which ‘stickers’ are especially hard to place is poetry 
and one of the main problems of a representational conception of language 
is its failure to account for literary or metaphorical statements: such 
statements are either patently false, the sticker does not match the picture 
like in Magritte’s famous ‘ceci n’est pas une pipe,’ or meaningless as they 
refer to nothing. 
Nietzsche and the later Wittgenstein oppose such representational 
conceptions of language and base their critique of metaphysics on this 
opposition. They inherit from the ‘HHH view’ which defends an ‘expressive’ 
conception of language which, as Taylor puts it, ‘shows us language as the 
locus of different kinds of disclosure. It makes us aware of the expressive 
dimension and its importance. And it allows us to identify a constitutive 
dimension, a way in which language does not only represent, but enters into 
some of the realities it is “about.”’145 An expressive conception of language 
cannot take truth to be a matter of correspondence because language no 
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longer only mirrors the world, but also takes part in elaborating it. Truth 
therefore becomes a matter of disclosure: a statement is considered true not 
if it matches some kind of ‘reality,’ but if it reveals or discloses something of 
the world. In other words, a true expressive statement must not necessarily 
correspond to a fact (a metaphorical statement might be for instance factually 
false and we will see in a further chapter that Donald Davidson146 argues that 
metaphorical statements need to be either patently false or trivially true), but 
rather reveal something which will enrich one’s understanding. 
The opposition between expressive and representational conceptions of 
language—like the common view on the analytic-continental divide 
described in Chapter One—can be translated in terms of the opposition 
between art and science. As Tzvetan Todorov argues, while describing what 
happens within literature with the Romantics: 
Art and poetry relate to truth, but this truth does not have the same 
nature as that towards which science tends. […] Science states 
propositions of which we discover whether they are true or false by 
confronting them to the facts they try to describe. […] It is a truth of 
correspondence. On the contrary when Baudelaire says that ‘The poet 
resembles this prince of cloud and sky,’ i.e. the albatross, it is 
impossible to proceed to a verification; and however, Baudelaire does 
not talk rubbish, he tries to reveal the identity of the poet: he aspires 
to a truth of disclosure, he attempts to reveal the nature of a being, a 
situation, a world. In both cases there is a link between words and the 
world, but the two truths do not fuse. […] We can conclude that art 
does not only lead to knowledge of the world, but that it reveals at 
the same time the existence of this truth whose nature is different. In 
reality, this truth does not belong exclusively to art as it constitutes 
the horizon of the other interpretative discourses: history, human 
sciences, philosophy.147 
                                                     
146 Davidson (2001), p. 259. 
147 Todorov (2007), pp. 59-61, my translation: ‘L’art et la poésie ont bien trait à la 
vérité, mais cette vérité n’est pas de même nature que celle à laquelle aspire la 
science. […] La science énonce des propositions dont on découvre qu’elles sont 
vraies ou fausses en les confrontant aux faits qu’elles cherchent à décrire. […] Il s’agit 
là d’une vérité de correspondance ou d’adéquation. Lorsqu’en revanche Baudelaire 
dit que “le Poète est semblable au prince des nuées”, c’est-à-dire à l’albatros, il est 




Truth as correspondence would be the tool of science, whereas truth as 
disclosure belongs to the realms of poetry and the other arts. These truths 
are each linked to a specific conception of language, representational or 
expressive, and these conceptions of language could therefore be classified 
in the same way: representational conceptions of language belong to the 
realm of science and expressive ones to that of art. These distinctions should 
however not be considered as definite, but only indicate a general direction. 
It is important to note that, for Todorov at least, one truth is not better than 
the other: both say something of the world and are therefore important. 
What is therefore at play in Nietzsche’s question quoted in the opening lines 
of this chapter is that language should no longer be considered as mirroring 
a metaphysically posited ‘reality’ but as shaping the world we live in. This 
shift from ‘what things are’ to ‘what things are called’ requires a critique of 
metaphysics and of language insofar as language is the underlying basis of 
metaphysics. 
This chapter therefore focuses on relating Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s 
critique of metaphysics to their critique of language and explores some of 
the consequences the end of metaphysics entail, especially regarding the 
question of relativism. In the first part of the chapter, I address three 
problems of Nietzschean and Wittgensteinian scholarship regarding the 
periodisation of their works, the lack of theory in their works, and the use of 
posthumous texts. In the second part, I focus on Nietzsche’s critique of 
metaphysics and relate it to his conception of language in On Truth and Lie. 
In the third part I turn to Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy’s craving for 
generality and how his views of language attempt to escape this craving. In 
                                                     
n’importe quoi, il cherche à nous révéler l’identité du poète; cette fois-ci, il aspire à 
une vérité de dévoilement, il tente de mettre en évidence la nature d’un être, d’une 
situation, d’un monde. A chaque fois, un rapport s’établit entre mots et monde, 
pourtant les deux vérités ne se confondent pas. […] On peut conclure que non 
seulement l’art conduit à la connaissance du monde, mais il révèle en même temps 
l’existence de cette vérité dont la nature est différente. En réalité, celle-ci ne lui 
appartient pas exclusivement, puisqu’elle constitue l’horizon des autres discours 
interprétatifs: histoire, sciences humaines, philosophie.’ 
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the fourh and final part, I explore the consequences of such views concerning 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism and Wittgenstein’s relativism. 
1. Three Problems of a Nietzschean and Wittgensteinian Philosophy 
of Language 
Before looking at their works in more details, it is necessary to briefly 
mention three aspects of Nietzschean and Wittgensteinian scholarships as 
they frame our ways of thinking about their works: the division of their 
works into periods, the lack of theory in their works, and the status of 
unpublished texts. Nietzsche’s works are usually divided in three periods: 
the early works from the Birth of Tragedy to the Untimely Meditations, the 
middle works including Human, All Too Human, Dawn, and The Gay Science, 
and the late works from Zarathustra to his death.148 Although this 
periodisation seems to suggest that Nietzsche’s ideas underwent radical 
changes, most commentators acknowledge that there is a continuity and that 
each period is not as homogeneous as the periodisation suggests.149 
Similarly, Wittgenstein’s works are usually divided in two parts: the early 
works centred around the Tractatus and the later works from his return to 
Cambridge in 1929 to his death.150 Although both Nietzsche and 
                                                     
148 See for instance Paul van Tongeren’s presentation of Nietzsche in the first chapter 
of his introduction to Nietzsche, Reinterpretating Modern Culture. 
149 Lou Salomé was the first to suggest such a periodisation and she already 
acknowledges that some ideas traverse different periods. The periodisation thus is 
more of a scholarly tool than a suggestion that there are more than one Nietzsche, as 
Ruth Abbey argues in her study of Nietzsche’s middle period: ‘Thus it is possible to 
employ this schema while acknowledging that the boundaries between Nietzsche's 
phases are not rigid, that some of the thoughts elaborated in one period were 
adumbrated in the previous one, that there are differences within any single phase 
and that some concerns pervade his oeuvre.’ Abbey (2000), p. xii. 
150 Although Wittgenstein acknowledges that some of his earlier views were 
mistaken, commentators from the New Wittgenstein consider that there is a 
continuity between the early and the later works, especially regarding the 
therapeutic aspects of his philosophy: ‘Nevertheless, without regard to the period 
(or periods) of his work with which they are concerned, they agree in suggesting 
that Wittgenstein’s primary aim in philosophy is—to use a word he himself employs 
in characterizing his later philosophical procedures—a therapeutic one.’ Crary and 




Wittgenstein cause problems of periodisation, they do not cause the same 
problems. Regarding Nietzsche, even though one can see an evolution in 
concerns, the periodisation is much more a way of grouping works together 
rather than establishing clear categories. The early and the late works are not 
opposed to one another in a strong way, but the periodisation rather shows 
that Nietzsche’s concerns evolve without rejecting the earlier views. Quite 
the contrary as his 1886 prefaces to his earlier works attempt to show 
continuity within the whole corpus. Regarding Wittgenstein, the issue is 
rather different as he considers himself that his earlier work was mistaken 
and does not try, unlike Nietzsche’s prefaces, to create a continuity. Readers 
of the Tractatus are often concerned with questions which are much different 
from readers of the Philosophical Investigations. However, as the New 
Wittgensteinians suggest, there is a continuity in Wittgenstein’s idea that 
philosophy is a therapeutic activity rather than the establishment of 
doctrines. As we will see, Wittgenstein’s criticism of the Tractatus in his later 
works corresponds to a broadening of his concerns rather than a radical 
rejection. The theory of language in the Tractatus becomes one language-
game among many others in the later works. More than revealing 
contradictions or problems in Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s works, these 
problems of periodisation show that it is not easy to pin down a position, 
even in a given work, because Nietzsche and Wittgenstein precisely do not 
write in a way for their positions to be pinned down. 
This difficulty in pinning down their views is further increased by 
Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s ways of thinking and writing. They do not 
offer a philosophy of language in the sense of a clearly exposed theory of how 
language works but, as their aphoristic style suggest, ideas on language 
                                                     
three periods: either considering that the works from the early 1930s represent an 
attempt to reconcile his early views and his newfound concerns, see for instance 
Stern (1991), or considering the works post Philosophical Investigations to focus on 




which never amount to a system.151 Any attempt to systematise their 
thoughts misses the performative character of their writing and can thus be 
misleading. Combined with the idea of periodisation, this further suggests 
that there is no definite theory to be found but ideas which evolve with time 
and even sometimes contradict one another. It is important to keep in mind 
the performative dimension of their philosophies in order to avoid 
misinterpreting or overinterpreting some of their views. 
The third aspect to keep in mind is the enormous number of posthumous 
fragments Nietzsche and Wittgenstein have left. This is especially the case 
for Wittgenstein whose Tractatus is his sole published book, all the rest being 
remarks arranged by editors after his death. This makes it difficult to 
establish a hierarchy among the remarks and one should be cautious not to 
give one remark too much importance over others. For Nietzsche, although 
scholarship has long relied on The Will to Power to take into account his 
posthumous notes, it has now been shown that this work is his sister’s 
production and is thus not relevant to scholarship.152 When one knows the 
attention Nietzsche put in writing and editing his works, the reference to 
posthumous fragments should usually come to expand on something one 
can find in the published works rather than constitute the central element of 
an interpretation. 
Despite this caution regarding posthumous texts, and especially regarding 
Nietzsche’s views on language, it is difficult to avoid his short unpublished 
essay On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral sense. As Roger Hazelton for instance 
already notes in his 1943 study of Nietzsche’s theory of language, 
Nietzsche’s thoughts on language are not systematically developed but 
rather scattered around in his various works and notes, with a strong 
concentration around 1872-73, time when he writes his notes for his rhetoric 
                                                     
151 Following a similar line of thought, Werner Stegmaier considers that Nietzsche 
offers no doctrine but only signs which point us in one direction; see Stegmaier 
(2006) 




lectures in Basel and On Truth and Lie.153 Without being a ‘theory’ of language 
proper, it is in this essay that Nietzsche develops his views on language in 
the most systematic manner and these views remain influential even in his 
later works. There are at least three reasons to consider On Truth and Lie as 
an important text to interpret Nietzsche’s works. First, as Maudemarie Clark 
argues, it is ‘a reworked and polished essay, it is not a mere note that 
Nietzsche may have thought better of the next day.’154 Secondly, Nietzsche 
refers to it in his foreword to the second part of Human, all too Human and 
even qualifies it as a ‘pro memoria’ in an 1884 note, which shows that he did 
not change his views on the matter much.155 Thirdly and finally, this text has 
had a heavy impact on Nietzsche’s interpreters, especially those from the 
‘“linguistic turn” in French Nietzsche reception’156 such as Sarah Kofman or 
Jacques Derrida among others. 
More than a ‘linguistic turn,’ this essay shows the impact of rhetoric on 
Nietzsche’s works. This turn to rhetoric is not a mere ‘rhetoric detour,’ as 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe names it; it is not a project abandoned because 
unfruitful but on the contrary, rhetoric plays a foundational role in 
Nietzsche’s conception of language in the early 1870s and we will see that 
his views on language remain hardly changed in his later works.157 Nuancing 
                                                     
153 Hazelton (1943), p. 47: ‘The importance of Nietzsche's comments on the problem 
of language does not consist, it is true, either in a systematic statement of the 
problem or in a cogent declaration of its solution. These are not the sort of benefits 
conferred by a type of thinking which is suggestive and evocative rather than 
systematic or declarative. It consists rather, as we shall attempt to show, in locating 
and estimating a certain tension within language itself.’ 
154 Clark (1990), p. 64. 
155 NF-1884, 26[372] / KSA 11.249 
156 Kofman (1993), p. xiv. 
157 Lacoue-Labarthe (1971), p. 54: ‘Il [Nietzsche] a multiplié les lectures et les 
recherches, accumulé les notes les projets, ébauche, à plusieurs reprises, la rédaction 
de textes divers. Sans doute la rhétorique n’est-elle pas l’unique objet du travail 
produit à cette époque. Mais il n’est pas exagéré de dire, on le verra, qu’elle est bien 
le « centre »,—aussi dérobé soit-il. Or rien de tout cela n’est achevé et surtout, du 
moins en apparence, il n’en reste plus aucune trace dans la production ultérieure de 
Nietzsche. On repère encore, ici et là, de nombreux textes sur l’éloquence, la 




Lacoue-Labarthe’s notion of  ‘detour,’ Angèle Kremer-Marietti describes this 
period of Nietzsche’s works as a ‘rhetorical turn’ which shapes Nietzsche’s 
way of philosophising: ‘Anticipating on the 19th century critique of language 
and the 20th century linguistic turn, his “rhetorical turn” concerns and 
conditions both in form and content a peculiar mode of philosophising.’158 
Nietzsche thus anticipates the critique of language (developed by Fritz 
Mauthner for instance, as we have seen in Chapter Two) and the ‘linguistic 
turn.’ However, as Kremer-Marietti notes, Nietzsche’s critique of language 
has an impact on his way of philosophising, both in content and in form (as 
they are intimately linked). I will focus on these metaphilosophical 
consequences in further chapters but let us already note that the impact on 
form is one of the issues Nietzsche tackles following Friedrich Schlegel and 
the early German Romantics. 
Against these arguments for taking On Truth and Lie as basis for Nietzsche’s 
conception of language, some commentators argue that his views are heavily 
influenced by others at that time and would therefore not really be his own. 
Many have noticed the strong influence of Gustav Gerber’s Sprache als Kunst 
on Nietzsche’s early essay and the correspondence established by Anthonie 
Meijers and Martin Stingelin shows some striking similarities.159 Nietzsche 
takes from Gerber the thesis according to which language has a metaphorical 
                                                     
malgré quelques changements de terminologie, l’analyse que fait Nietzsche du 
langage variera assez peu et qu’il s’en tiendra pratiquement toujours à l’acquis de 
ces premières années. Il n’est pas surtout jusqu’à cette accusation constante de la 
responsabilité ontologique, métaphysique du langage et de la grammaire qui ne soit 
en effet une résurgence de ce travail. Mais rien, semble-t-il, qui prenne l’allure d’un 
effort systématique ; en tout cas nul recours déclaré et suivi au lexique propre de la 
rhétorique. Dès les années 75, la rhétorique a cessé d’être un instrument privilégié. 
On dirait même que Nietzsche lui retire tous ses droits et qu’elle cesse pratiquement 
d’être problème.’ 
158 Kremer-Marietti (2007), p. 9, my translation: ‘Anticipant sur la Critique du 
langage du XIXe siècle et sur le Tournant linguistique du XXe siècle, le “tour 
rhétorique” de Nietzsche concerne un mode particulier de philosopher qu’il 
conditionne dans sa forme et dans son contenu.’ 
159 For a detailed analysis of Gerber’s influence on Nietzsche, see Meijers (1988) who 
also elaborated a concordance between Nietzsche’s rhetoric lectures and On Truth 




nature, words are images for nerve stimuli. As we will see, this thesis is 
central in On Truth and Lie: ‘What is a word? It is the copy in sound of a nerve 
stimulus.’ (TL 1 / KSA 1.878) Meijers and Stingelin put this sentence in 
relation to a passage of Gerber’s Sprache als Kunst to show the similarities.160 
Meijers and Stingelin quote many other passages from Gerber to show what 
Nietzsche copied from him, especially this idea that words are transpositions 
from nerve stimuli through images. This idea can also be found in Herder’s 
Treatise on the Origin of Language, as indicated in Chapter Two.161 These 
influences are undeniable but Nietzsche’s ideas on language are not a mere 
copy of Gerber’s and Herder’s theories. He assimilates them (as he does quite 
often, including with some of the German Romantics) in order to elaborate 
his own views. As Claudia Crawford shows, these influences can be traced 
back to Kant, Schopenhauer, Lange, and Hartmann and Gerber’s Die Sprache 
als Kunst offers ‘Nietzsche a new metaphor, that of rhetoric, for a body of 
ideas concerning language which Nietzsche already had in place by 1871.’162 
The important point is that Nietzsche does not deny this thesis of the 
metaphorical nature of language in his later works but keeps it underlying 
his other philosophical concerns. His concerns with language are especially 
important regarding his critique of metaphysics, because language and 
metaphysics are intimately linked according to Nietzsche. 
2. Nietzsche, Metaphysics, and the Seduction of Language 
Nietzsche summarises his critique of metaphysics in the famous Twilight of 
Idols chapter ‘How the true world finally became a fable.’ In six steps, 
Nietzsche presents the history of metaphysics—‘the history of an error’ as 
the subtitle suggests—from Plato’s posing of the philosopher’s true world 
                                                     
160 Quoted in Meijers and Stingelin (1988), p. 368: ‘Wenn nämlich durch ein 
Hörbares—den Laut—ein Reiz, eine Empfindung dargestellt wird, kann diese 
Darstellung freilich nur ein Bild sein, wie wir schon oben (p. 157 sq.) erörterten, und 
insofern Empfindungslaute Lautbilder, aber das Bild, welches die Vorstellung 
entwirft, ist noch ein anderes.’ 
161 Bertino (2011) details Herder’s influence on Nietzsche, especially regarding the 
instinctive origin of language. 
162 Crawford (1988), p. x. 
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against the world of appearances to the abolition of the whole dualism 
between true and apparent worlds: ‘The true world is gone: which world is 
left? The illusory one, perhaps?… But no! we got rid of the illusory world along 
with the true one!’ (TI ‘How the True World’ / KSA 6.81) This dualism between 
true and apparent worlds is a metaphysical error and even the ‘longest error’ 
which must be overcome. But how can Nietzsche get rid of the metaphysical 
errors which have been sustained for so long? Following the developments 
leading to the end of metaphysics exposed in Chapter One, we can 
understand Nietzsche as shifting from metaphysics to language: as he 
suggests in Human, All Too Human, language is the birthplace of metaphysics: 
‘The significance of language for the development of human culture lies in 
the fact that human beings used it to set up a world of their own beside the 
other one, a place they deemed solid enough that from there they could lift 
the rest of world from its hinges and make themselves its master.’ (HH 11 / 
KSA 2.30) This idea of mastering the world is not unrelated to Descartes’s 
idea in the Discourse that science would make ‘ourselves as it were masters 
and possessors of nature.’163 Although science and language are related for 
Nietzsche, and especially in this paragraph from Human, All Too Human, 
Nietzsche shifts the primary focus from science to language. It is with 
language that humankind sets up a so-called ‘true world’ besides the 
apparent one. More precisely, as Nietzsche continues, it is the belief in 
concepts as ‘aeternae veritates’ that leads to metaphysical fallacies: the main 
feature of metaphysics is to make human beings believe that when they talk 
about a concept, they are talking about the world, so that ‘they really 
[believe] that in language they [have] knowledge of the world.’ (HH 11 / KSA 
2.30) This is a critique of Plato’s doctrine of ideas and the metaphysical 
conception of language according to which a word refers to a Platonic idea 
in a direct fashion.  
                                                     
163 Descartes (2006), p. 51. 
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As the quotation from Human, All Too Human suggests, language is not only 
the place for a critique of metaphysics, it is also the place for a larger critique 
of culture, i.e. of all the human phenomena built on this linguistic-
metaphysical fallacy: science, logic, and culture in this text, religion, art, and 
morality in many other. This notion of belief is central to this critique and 
ultimately leads to the revaluation of all values. Indeed, the high esteem 
towards ‘serious things’ has nothing natural, it comes from an excessive use 
or abuse of language: 
Conversely, the high estimation for the ‘most important things’ is 
almost never wholly genuine: the priests and metaphysicians have 
admittedly gotten us completely accustomed to a hypocritically 
exaggerated use of language in these areas, and yet not changed the 
tune of our feeling that these most important things are not to be 
taken to be as important as those disdained nearby things. (WS 5 / 
KSA 2.541) 
Nietzsche considers that the value we give to things—i.e. a high value for 
‘serious things’ and a low one for ordinary things such as eating, drinking, 
etc.—comes from the system of values the metaphysician and the priest 
establish through their control of language. They use language in order to 
build a conceptual and axiological system. To criticise metaphysical uses of 
language is therefore for Nietzsche a way to criticise the system of values 
and morality. 
This critique of metaphysical uses of language relies more specifically on a 
critique of concepts and of the relation between word and world: 
The word and the concept are the most visible reason for why we 
believe in this isolation of groups of actions: with them, we are not 
simply designating things, we originally think that through them we 
are grasping the essence of things. So now, we are continuously misled 
by words and concepts to think of things as being more simple than 
they are, separated from one another, indivisible, each one existing in 
and for itself. A philosophical mythology lies concealed in language, 
which breaks forth again at every moment, however careful we may 
otherwise be. (WS 11 / KSA 2.547) 
Words and concepts lead to a metaphysical use of language and Nietzsche’s 
task is to reveal the whole ‘philosophical mythology’ underlying the use of 
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language and especially that of the metaphysicians. His problem with 
language is that it is used not only to designate, but also and above all to 
generalise and regroup things in categories. This idea is central to On Truth 
and Lie, in which he considers words and concepts to be the result of 
metaphorical transpositions: ‘To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred 
into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: 
second metaphor.’ (TL 1 / KSA 1.879) 
This opposition between metaphors and concepts reflects the broader 
opposition between expressive and representational conceptions of 
language: whereas metaphors are lively and unique (because they are part 
of a process), concepts (and words) attempt to fix and group these metaphors 
under labels. Concepts are therefore dead metaphors for Nietzsche: 
‘Whereas each perceptual metaphor is individual and without equals and is 
therefore able to elude all classification, the great edifice of concepts displays 
the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium and exhales in logic that 
strength and coolness which is characteristic of mathematics.’ (TL 1 / 
KSA 1.882) Nietzsche’s reference to the ‘roman columbarium’ suggests that 
words and concepts are to be found in metaphors’ graveyard. Once the 
perceptual metaphors become fixed (and thus lose their uniqueness), they 
die and become words which immediately become concepts: ‘a word 
becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or 
less similar cases.’ (TL 1 / KSA 1.879) What Nietzsche criticises in concepts is 
their propensity towards generalisation: many perceptual metaphors must 
fit under one concept. In a similar way, Derrida criticises representational 
writing as being bearer of death in Grammatology: ‘representative, fallen, 
secondary, instituted writing, writing in the literal and strict sense, is 
condemned in The Essay on the Origin of Languages (it “enervates” speech; to 
“judge genius” from books is like “painting a man's portrait from his 
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corpse,” etc.). Writing in the common sense is the dead letter, it is the carrier 
of death. It exhausts life.’164 
One of the main problems Nietzsche has with definite concepts is that they 
equate unequal things: ‘Every concept arises from the equating of unequal 
things.’ (TL 1 / KSA 1.880) Concepts are thus born from equating individual 
metaphors. In other words, concepts oppose metaphors like generality 
opposes particularity. There is however a filiation between metaphors and 
concepts: ‘the concept […] is nevertheless merely the residue of a metaphor, 
and that illusion which is involved in the artistic transference of a nerve 
stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then the grandmother of every 
single concept.’ (TL 1 / KSA 1.882) How does this fixing happen? Mainly 
because we forget the metaphorical origin of all concepts: 
Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with 
any repose, security, and consistency: only by means of the 
petrification and coagulation of a mass of images which originally 
streamed from the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery 
liquid, only in the invincible faith that this sun, this window, this table 
is a truth in itself, in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an 
artistically creating subject, does man live with any repose, security, 
and consistency. (TL 1 / KSA 1.883) 
This forgetting of the metaphorical origins of language is necessary for 
human beings to live because without this ‘invincible faith,’ without this 
metaphysical belief in words, there could be no communication at all. The 
social and scientific edifice is built on this belief in such a conceptual relation 
between word and world. If there were only the original metaphors (from 
nerve stimuli to images) and no equating of unequal things, no 
transformation into words, communication would be impossible for there 
would be nothing common to talk about. For Nietzsche, human beings must 
therefore abandon their artistically creative selves in order to live in 
community, they must abandon the original metaphors in favour of 
concepts. Artists on the contrary live as artistically creative subjects and art 
                                                     
164 Derrida (1997), p. 17. 
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is the only place where the ‘drive to form metaphors,’ this ‘fundamental 
human drive’ is free. Everyday life and its necessary stability imprison this 
creativity. In everyday life, humans must forget their artistic ability to create 
new metaphors. But this forgetting also prevents humans from seeing new 
things and discoveries are left for the artists. In other words, ‘the way men 
usually are, it takes a name to make something visible for them.—Those with 
originality have for the most part also assigned names.’ (GS 261 / KSA 3.517) 
Language not only mirrors the world, it is not merely representational, but 
takes part into elaborating the world itself. To see the world, or things in the 
world, is to possess the words to grasp them. To that extent, metaphor is 
much more than a mere transposition, it opens our ways of seeing the world. 
In the later works, this conception of language remains and in Beyond Good 
and Evil, Nietzsche reminds us of this conception, widening the first step 
from nerve stimuli to sensations: ‘Words are acoustic signs for concepts; 
concepts, however, are more or less precise figurative signs for frequently 
recurring and simultaneous sensations, for groups of sensations. Using the 
same words is not enough to ensure mutual understanding: we must also 
use the same words for the same category of inner experiences; ultimately, 
we must have the same experience in common.’ (BGE 268 / KSA 5.221) 
Moreover, Nietzsche’s insistence on ‘common’ puts emphasis on the 
conventional dimension of language. In contrast to the artistically creative 
subjects, that is ‘uncommon’ or ‘extraordinary’ subjects, everyday people use 
language as it is established by convention. This is of importance to the 
concepts of knowledge and truth which we will explore more in depth in the 
fourth section of this chapter. In On Truth and Lie, Nietzsche argues: 
This peace treaty brings in its wake something which appears to be 
the first step toward acquiring that puzzling truth drive: to wit, that 
which shall count as “truth” from now on is established. That is to 
say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, 
and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of 
truth. For the contrast between truth and lie arises here for the first 
time. The liar is a person who uses the valid designations, the words, 
in order to make something which is unreal appear to be real. He 
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says, for example, “I am rich,” when the proper designation for his 
condition would be “poor.” He misuses fixed conventions by means 
of arbitrary substitutions or even reversals of names. (TL 1 / 
KSA 1.877) 
If language and its rules are conventional, the difference between truth and 
untruth is therefore not a difference of fact but a difference of use, or a 
difference of value. Liars use words in a way which does not conform to the 
rules established by the community—the dominant perspective—and are 
therefore excluded from it. An intelligent liar however uses and interprets 
the rules in order to make her claims seem true (this, to some extent, is the 
whole point of Plato’s and Socrates’ critique of the Sophists). In the passage 
quoted above, Nietzsche exposes the correspondence theory of truth. Liars 
are those who say ‘I am rich’ when ‘poor’ would have been the right 
description. The notion of truth Nietzsche discusses here is thus entirely 
dependent on language and on the conventions or rules embedded in it. 
What is true is what conforms to the rules. A shift in language-game—and 
therefore a shift in rules—would lead to a revaluation of truth: something 
true in one game might be false in another and vice versa. Truth depends on 
what language-game is played and rules attribute values to things: true, 
false, beautiful, ugly, good, evil, etc. These values aren’t absolute—hence 
Nietzsche’s critique of absolute concepts—they are cultural. Nietzsche’s 
critique of language is a critique of mankind’s belief in a metaphysical 
language in which values are not relative but absolute. 
This belief in a metaphysical conception of language is the result of 
philosophers being seduced by language. The metaphor of seduction is a 
recurrent feature in Nietzsche’s works and the preface to Beyond Good and 
Evil compares truth to a woman whom philosophers attempt to charm. Their 
failure in seducing this woman might indicate that it is they who are being 
charmed rather than the opposite. Uncovering the ‘mythology’ which 
underlies language, Nietzsche criticises the idea of a divine origin of 
language. According to Richard Rorty: ‘To drop the idea of language as 
representations, and to be thoroughly Wittgensteinian in our approach to 
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language, would be to de-divinize the world. Only if we do that can we fully 
accept the argument I offered earlier—the argument that since truth is a 
property of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their existence upon 
vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are 
truths.’165 To say with Nietzsche that ‘God is dead’ is to say that language is 
no longer a divine creation, but a human practice. If language is a human 
creation, it has a history. Concepts do not fall down from ‘cloud cuckoo 
land,’ to borrow Nietzsche’s image in On Truth and Lie, but have a human 
origin and are subject to development. To use a Derridean term, concepts 
can now be deconstructed and, most importantly, so can the concept of 
concept.166 
The idea of a seduction of language appears in various notes between 1875 
and 1884, but also in his published works, Beyond Good and Evil and Genealogy 
of Morals especially.167 The seduction which holds the metaphysician 
captive—‘the picture which holds us captive’ to use Wittgenstein’s term—
leads them to metaphysical errors. The problem is not language itself, but 
the metaphysician’s belief in it. Because they are seduced by it, 
metaphysicians do not realise that the language they believe in is ‘magic’ or 
metaphysical in the sense that the words are taken as referring directly to 
objects in the world: they take words as naming the essence of things. For 
Nietzsche—following the ideas explored in Chapter Two—language is a 
social practice established by convention and use rather than an eternal 
truth. Forgetting this, metaphysicians fall into the traps laid by language and 
one of the greatest errors they make is to believe in and to use abstract 
concepts such as ‘absolute knowledge’ or ‘thing-in-itself:’ 
                                                     
165 Rorty (1989), p. 21. 
166 Derrida undertakes such a deconstruction of the concept of concept in ‘White 
Mythology’ in which he returns to metaphors, following Nietzsche’s steps in On 
Truth and Lie, see Derrida (1982), pp. 207-271. 
167 See NF-1875, 6[39] / KSA 8.113; NF-1880, 10[D67] / KSA 9.428; NF-1884, 26[300] / 
KSA 11.231; BGE 16 / KSA 5.29 and GM1 13 / KSA 5.279 
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But I shall repeat a hundred times over that the ‘immediate certainty,’ 
like ‘absolute knowledge’ and the ‘thing in itself,’ contains a 
contradiction in adjecto: it’s time people freed themselves from the 
seduction of words! (BGE 16 / KSA 5.29) 
Nietzsche exhorts us to free ourselves from the charms of language. The 
‘thing-in-itself’ and similar concepts are all linguistic creations and must not 
be taken as metaphysical categories. In order to reach knowledge, we must 
look into language and try unfolding all that is embedded in it. In the 
remaining of the aphorism, Nietzsche presents his critique of the 
philosophers’ use of language aimed at Descartes’ ‘I think’ and 
Schopenhauer’s ‘I will.’ Nietzsche shows that by saying ‘I think,’ Descartes 
presupposes that the notion of ‘I’ is something simple and that ‘thinking’ is 
somehow unified. According to Nietzsche, the ‘I’ cannot be construed in 
such simplistic terms: it is a complex notion which cannot be posited in the 
way Descartes does and ‘thinking’ includes many nuances which Descartes 
does not take into account. As seen in Chapter Two, Nietzsche follows 
Lichtenberg’s critique of Descartes. Metaphysical language abolishes most 
of the nuances which make the world we live in what it is. This critique 
(which is, through the reference to Descartes, a critique of how metaphysics 
rely on, without putting it into question, a ‘magic’ language) leads Nietzsche 
to question not only language itself, but, as in most of the first section of 
Beyond Good and Evil, the ‘will to truth’ and why truth should be privileged 
over untruth. 
Even though Nietzsche’s views on language do not evolve much, there are 
three notable differences between On Truth and Lie and Beyond Good and Evil. 
First, Nietzsche abandons the use of the term ‘metaphor’ after 1875 and, in 
the Beyond Good and Evil quotation, he only talks about words as ‘acoustic 
signs for concepts’ without there being any mention of metaphor at all. 
According to Sarah Kofman, this suggests a shift in vocabulary: ‘If Nietzsche 
substitutes ‘perspective’ for ‘metaphor,’ then, it is because the meaning 
which is posited and transposed in things is no longer referred to an essence 
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of the world, a proper.’168 The notion of metaphor retains a metaphysical 
dimension in the sense that metaphorical meaning is usually thought to be 
related to and distinct from the literal or proper meaning. The idea that there 
is such a thing as a proper meaning is a remnant metaphysics. Moreover, the 
visual dimension of ‘perspective’ works well with the idea that metaphor 
suggests a change in ways of seeing. 
Second, Nietzsche puts the emphasis on the failure of language to account 
for inner experiences: ‘we must also use the same words for the same 
category of inner experiences; ultimately, we must have the same experience 
in common.’ We have already seen the negative evaluation in Nietzsche’s use 
of the term ‘common’ and language would therefore fail to account for inner 
experiences. Language can therefore be an obstacle to describing and to 
knowing things, especially drives, as Nietzsche argues in Daybreak: 
Language and the prejudices upon which language is based are a 
manifold hindrance to us when we want to explain inner processes 
and drives: because of the fact, for example, that words really exist 
only for superlative degrees of these processes and drives; and where 
words are lacking, we are accustomed to abandon exact observation 
because exact thinking there becomes painful; indeed, in earlier times 
one involuntarily concluded that where the realm of words ceased 
the realm of existence ceased also.169 (D 115 / KSA 3.107)  
As language is conventional, it contains many prejudices: the main one is the 
belief in such things as ‘eternal’ or ‘absolute’ truths. On the contrary, 
Nietzsche claims that truth is a cultural convention and is therefore relative. 
These prejudices prevent us from understanding our inner processes and 
drives because, as Nietzsche argues later in this paragraph from Daybreak, 
our language cannot account for the subtle differences in degrees but only 
renders the extremes. In other words, language operates a shift from a range 
of nuances (individual metaphors) to poles (definite concepts). The main 
                                                     
168 Kofman (1993), p. 82 
169 See also WS 5 / KSA 2.577 and NF-1886, 5[22] / KSA 12.193. The idea that the 
‘realm of existence’ depends on the ‘realm of words’ could be put in relation to 
Wittgenstein’s famous sentence: ‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world.’ (T 5.6) 
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problem is that language conditions existence and that language therefore 
restricts the possibilities of relating to the world, and especially the ‘inner 
world’ of sensations and drives. Things exist if and only if they can be 
described in language and, Nietzsche argues, we stop thinking about things 
which we cannot put into words. This problem comes from human beings 
who live with their habits, who do not attempt to think things through, and 
who do not attempt to push language further. Interestingly, Nietzsche 
argues that it is not relativism which leads to the impossibility of knowledge, 
but precisely a conception of concepts as definite and absolute. Metaphysical 
language for Nietzsche is a falsification of the world insofar as it reduces it 
to simpler categories. This reduction prevents us from acquiring knowledge 
of the world, or only allows a limited knowledge of it. 
Third, more important that the metaphorical nature of language is that 
human beings must fix these original metaphors in order to create a common 
language. This is according to Nietzsche the basis of community, the 
agreement on the words we use to describe things. But if convention 
transforms metaphors into words and concepts, a whole system of values is 
embedded in language. Using Wittgenstein’s words, a form of life is 
embedded in language: ‘“So you are saying that human agreement decides 
what is true and what is false?”—It is what human beings say that is true 
and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in 
opinions but in form of life.’ (PI 241) If language is conventional, the notion 
of agreement is central and at the basis of Wittgenstein’s form of life or 
Nietzsche’s community. Through their agreement—and for their agreement 
to make sense—words and concepts must be stable. Without this stability, if 
there were only metaphors, we would fall into a form of radical relativism: 
words could mean anything. We will explore this issue of relativism later in 
the chapter but let us note for now that the equating of unequal things, as 
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John Richardson argues, occurs both in representational and expressive 
languages.170 
According to Nietzsche, we should therefore try to escape the seduction of 
language and his invective to free ourselves from metaphysical conceptions 
embedded in language can remind us of Wittgenstein’s aim to ‘bring back 
words from their metaphysical use to their ordinary.’ (PI 116) But this is not 
the only connection to Wittgenstein. They both undertake a task of clarifying 
language: Nietzsche by revealing the metaphysical and axiological 
prejudices embedded in language and Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus at least, 
by showing the meaninglessness of metaphysical propositions. We have 
seen in the last chapter that their tasks revolve around what Lichtenberg says 
in one of his aphorisms: ‘Our whole philosophy is rectification of colloquial 
linguistic usage, thus rectification of a philosophy, and indeed of the most 
universal and general.’171 More than the ‘colloquial use of language,’ 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein try to rectify the colloquial conception of 
language, namely that of language as representation. The later Wittgenstein 
does indeed consider ordinary language as being fine as it is, without willing 
to change it. What can be changed is the way we relate to such a language; 
we can try and free ourselves from the trap of metaphysical language. 
3. Wittgenstein and the Traps of Language 
Wittgenstein shares Nietzsche’s concern with metaphysical uses of language 
and this is a concern which is central both to early and later works, although 
the answer changes. In the Tractatus he aims to limit language to non-
metaphysical statements, ending with the famous proposition: ‘Whereof we 
                                                     
170 Richardson (2015), p. 223: ‘On the one hand, language falsifies by equating with 
one another its referents, what it is about. Here there is a mismatch between words 
and things and a failure in words’ referential use. On the other hand, language also 
falsifies what we mean to say or express, our thoughts or feelings; once again it does 
so by an illegitimate equating of (for instance) these feelings with one another. Here 
there is a mismatch between words and our own attitudes, and a failure in words’ 
expressive use. (Of course, these two uses can run into one another: often one 
expresses a feeling by naming it.)’ 
171 Lichtenberg (1990), p. 122. 
119 
 
cannot speak we must pass over in silence.’ (T, 7) Metaphysical statements 
are meaningless and one should therefore not talk about them: 
The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to 
say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural 
science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and 
then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, 
to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain 
signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the 
other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching 
him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one. 
(T 6.53) 
If we were to follow Wittgenstein on that path, there would not be much left 
to say in philosophy. And he even acknowledges that the propositions of the 
Tractatus should be abandoned as meaningless. We should however not take 
him too literally: in a letter to Ficker, he says that the important part of the 
Tractatus is the one which is not written and, in another letter, he describes 
this work as literary. The only meaningful propositions are those of natural 
science and Wittgenstein argues that philosophy has nothing to do with 
them. Philosophy should only be concerned with showing the 
meaninglessness of metaphysical propositions. As we have seen in Chapter 
One, this kind of critique of metaphysics was influential on Carnap and the 
logical positivists. 
In Wittgenstein’s later works, the critique of metaphysics shifts because his 
conception of language has a radically different scope from that of the 
Tractatus. Whereas the Tractatus focuses on ‘ideal’ language, and thereby 
remains within the framework of representational language, the later works 
focus on the ‘ordinary’ one. The critique remains, metaphysical language 
must be avoided, but, rather than being kept silent, metaphysical statements 
should be brought back to their ordinary use. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
remains trapped into the metaphysics of language and its critique of 
metaphysics therefore fails. In that sense, the later Wittgenstein is much 
closer to Nietzsche’s views: 
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When philosophers use a word—‘knowledge,’ ‘being,’ ‘object,’ ‘I,’ 
‘proposition/sentence,’ ‘name’—and try to grasp the essence of the 
thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in 
this way in the language in which it is at home? – 
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use. (PI 116) 
The problem with philosophers’ use of language is that they believe words 
to refer to metaphysical entities. For instance, when they use the word 
‘being,’ they do not use it in its ordinary way, which causes no problem, but 
in a metaphysical one, as if by using the word ‘being’ they were getting to 
the essence of the thing. Wittgenstein’s point is not to reduce language to 
something simpler—that is what he has done in the Tractatus, reducing 
language to logic and placing boundaries to what can be said—but to avoid 
making it anything more than it is. Metaphysical uses of language push 
words out of their ordinary use and take them as directly linked to some 
kind of essence. 
The critique of metaphysics in PI 116 follows two remarks which criticise the 
Tractatus and its conception of language: 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4.5): ‘The general form of propositions 
is: This is how things are.’—– That is the kind of proposition one 
repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing 
nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the 
frame through which we look at it. (PI 114) 
A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in 
our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably. 
(PI 115) 
As already seen in Chapter Two, the general form of propositions from the 
Tractatus is a misguiding metaphysical statement: one believes to be talking 
about the nature of things when one is only building a perspective on it. This 
metaphysical picture—language gives us a direct relation to the nature of 
things—is what leads us to many philosophical confusions. This is also why 
Wittgenstein criticises Augustine’s picture of language in the opening 
sections of the Philosophical Investigations: ‘These words, it seems to me, give 
us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the words 
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in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.’ (PI 1) 
Augustine’s picture of language and the one Wittgenstein elaborates in the 
Tractatus are similar in the sense that they trap us into a metaphysical 
conception of language. This picture of language belongs to our language 
and that is why it is so difficult to get away from it. Wittgenstein’s aim to 
bring the word back from their metaphysical use to their ordinary use is an 
attempt at getting out of this trap. In his later works, his aim is therefore not 
to elaborate an ideal language, but to describe the ordinary one: ‘The task of 
philosophy is not to create an ideal language, but to clarify the use of existing 
language.’ (PG 72) 
His criticism of Augustine’s theory in the opening sections of the 
Philosophical Investigations does however not reject the idea that language can 
be used to communicate about the world, but rather that this is only one use 
among many others. According to Wittgenstein, Augustine describes ‘a 
system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this 
system.’ (PI 3) For instance, poetry does not qualify as a communicative use 
of language: ‘Do not forget that a poem, even though it is composed in the 
language of information, is not used in the language-game of giving 
information.’ (Z 160) The Augustinian picture of language is thus not 
completely wrong but it is mainly incomplete and does not represent all the 
aspects of language. 
Although a representational language as the one Augustine describes is 
useful as a system of communication and thus necessary to our everyday life, 
it does not encompass the whole spectrum of how one can use language. 
Nietzsche has a similar idea when he says that words and concepts are what 
unite a community: ‘Using the same words is not enough to ensure mutual 
understanding: we must also use the same words for the same category of 
inner experiences; ultimately, we must have the same experiences in 
common.’ (BGE 268 / KSA 5.221) Representational language is one way to 
unite a community, but is a limited means, and Nietzsche’s emphasis on 
common indicates also the negative aspect of it. For Nietzsche, although 
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community is necessary, it entails a reduction of our inner experiences to 
‘common’ experiences. Whereas our inner experiences seem specific and 
unique, language as representation makes these experiences similar and 
common. Language as representation fixes words and concepts which 
ultimately limit our experiences.  
In contrast to the fixed concept of language as representation, Wittgenstein 
develops the idea of ‘language-games’ to acknowledge the multiplicity of 
practices: 
We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one 
of those games by means of which children learn their native 
language. I will call these games ‘language-games’ and will sometimes 
speak of a primitive language as a language-game.  
And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after 
someone might also be called language-games. Think of certain uses 
that are made of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.  
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities 
into which it is woven, a ‘language-game.’ (PI 7) 
The Augustinian picture of language in which words name things and the 
meaning of a word is its reference is therefore only one language-game 
among many others. It is not an adequate description of our whole language 
because there is no such thing as the language. On the contrary, the notion of 
language-games brings into focus the fact that there are various linguistic 
practices: each language-game brings light on one or another aspect of 
language, on one or another practice. Interestingly, a primitive form of 
representational language reveals that the meaning of a word is not its 
reference (at least not in all language-games) but is its use within the game: 
‘So, one could say: an ostensive definition explains the use—the meaning—
of a word if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already 
clear.’ (PI 30) The meaning of a word is its use in a language-games and an 
ostensive definition can explain the meaning of a word only if the use of the 
word is already known. In other words, an ostensive definition does not 
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work as a primitive explanation as it presupposes that one already knows 
how a word can be used. 
Augustine’s description of the child’s learning of language through 
ostensive definitions does therefore not correspond to the learning of a first 
language but, Wittgenstein argues, that of a second language on which the 
child can project the rules she already knows from her first language: 
Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child 
came into a foreign country and did not understand the language of 
the country; that is, as if he already had a language, only not this one. 
(PI 32) 
The shift from meaning as reference to meaning as use brings to the fore the 
idea of practice: ‘The use of a word in practice is its meaning.’ (BB, p. 69) This 
focus on practice opens the possibility of a variety of practices in which 
words have different uses such as a scientific practice or a poetic one. This 
shows that language depends on practices and is therefore ever-changing; 
language is not something abstract, eternal, and never-changing. The picture 
that held Wittgenstein captive is the conception of language as abstract and 
ideal, as a divine creation. To follow Saussure’s distinction between langue 
and parole, the early Wittgenstein was held captive by the idea of a 
metaphysical langue cut off from its grounds of emergence—a society and a 
culture—whereas the later Wittgenstein shifts his focus to parole, speech in 
context, with all the possible variations this includes. Wittgenstein’s critique 
of language is therefore a critique of our belief in (or our being held captive 
by) the metaphysical conception of language as the only and absolute 
conception. 
The main problem Wittgenstein sees in the metaphysical use of language is 
its pretension to generalisation, its ‘craving for generality.’ Inasmuch as 
Nietzsche criticises the ‘equating of unequal things’ through the use of 
concepts, Wittgenstein sees in concepts a tendency towards generalisation 
which causes philosophical error and confusion: ‘This craving for generality 
is the resultant of a number of tendencies connected with particular 
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confusion.’ (BB, p. 17) Importantly, one of these tendencies is ‘our 
preoccupation with the method of science’ and the reduction necessary for it 
to operate. ‘This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness.’ (BB, p. 18) Like Nietzsche and his 
critique of scientism, Wittgenstein does not follow science blindly. The task 
of philosophy is not to follow the ‘method of science’ and reduce language 
to what it is not, what Wittgenstein had done in the Tractatus: ‘it can never 
be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy 
really is “purely descriptive.”’ (BB, p. 18) In the Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein pursues this thought: ‘Philosophy must not interfere in any 
way with the actual use of language, so it can in the end only describe it. For 
it cannot justify it either. It leaves everything as it is.’ (PI 124) The task of 
philosophy is not to modify language (or invent a new, better, one), but to 
look at, describe, and understand ordinary language (and through language, 
our relation to and conception of the world). 
Wittgenstein’s critique of the philosophical craving for generalisation is a 
critique of metaphysics on the grounds of one of its key presuppositions, 
namely the existence of definite concepts. As Michael Forster argues, this 
goes against the presuppositions of Plato’s metaphysics and many of his 
followers: ‘One fundamental point which he is concerned to establish with 
his demonstration of the family resemblance character of many concepts is 
that a certain theory about the nature of all general concepts that was first 
propounded by Plato, and then taken over by Aristotle, and by many 
philosophers since even down to the present day, is mistaken.’172 Nietzsche 
too was concerned with Plato: he criticises him as the first event in the history 
of metaphysics in Twilight of the Idols and he even states in an early note that 
‘My philosophy is an inverted Platonism: the further something is from true 
being, the purer, the more beautiful, the better it is. Living in illusion as the 
goal.’ (NF 1870-1871, 7[156] / KSA 7.199) Even though Nietzsche’s inversion 
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of Platonism is to be understood in the perspective of his critique of the 
metaphysical dualism between true and apparent worlds, Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s critiques are not unrelated. Plato’s metaphysics (and the 
dualism it entails) relies on a metaphysical conception of language. By 
criticizing Plato’s conception of the nature of concepts underlying the whole 
tradition of metaphysics, Wittgenstein works in the same direction as 
Nietzsche because the metaphysical dualisms cannot stand without concepts 
having a definite nature. 
Whereas Nietzsche does not really attempt to give a positive account of how 
we could work with metaphors instead of concepts (and therefore how—and 
whether—a language based only on metaphors could be acceptable), 
Wittgenstein overcomes the critique of generalisation in philosophy to 
produce a new understanding of concepts. To do so, he comes up with the 
notion of ‘affinities’ and ‘similarities.’ 
Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these 
considerations.—For someone might object against me: “You make 
things easy for yourself! You talk about all sorts of language-games, 
but have nowhere said what is essential to a language-game, and so 
to language: what is common to all these activities, and makes them 
into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very 
part of the investigation that once gave you the most headache, the 
part about the general form of the proposition and of language. 
And this is true.—Instead of pointing out something common to all 
that we call language, I’m saying that these phenomena have no one 
thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all—
but there are many different kinds of affinity between them. And on 
account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all 
‘languages.’ I’ll try to explain this. (PI 65) 
In the previous paragraphs, Wittgenstein gives different examples of 
language-games in order to argue in favour of his conception of ‘meaning as 
use,’ showing different uses in various linguistic practices. The ‘great 
question’ to which he is now confronted is how to unite these various 
language-games under the name ‘language.’ He does not want to elaborate 
a concept of ‘language’ with sharp and closed boundaries for it would lead 
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him back to a metaphysical use of the word ‘language’ and therefore to lose 
the multiplicity he just described. We have seen that ultimately, there is no 
such thing as the language but only a multiplicity of practices. However, 
these multiple practices or language-games share some things in common. 
To reconcile the different language-games, Wittgenstein comes up with the 
notion of affinities. 
There is no ‘one thing in common’ between different language-games but 
various affinities and Wittgenstein takes the example of ‘games’ to illustrate 
this: ‘For if you look at [games], you won’t see something that is common to 
all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: 
don’t think, but look!’ (PI 66) When you look at different games—and 
Wittgenstein insists on looking at rather than thinking about, the point is to 
observe and describe—you cannot find a single element common to all 
games but you can find a ‘whole series of similarities and affinities.’ Rather 
than thinking about a common essence to classify games under the label 
‘games,’ Wittgenstein looks at similarities and affinities between what is 
usually called ‘games.’ This means that the cluster of things united under the 
label ‘games’ is not closed and can be expanded but, correlatively, it cannot 
be given sharp boundaries: ‘And the upshot of these considerations is: we 
see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
similarities in the large and in the small.’ (PI 66) Wittgenstein collects these 
similarities as ‘family resemblances:’ 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities 
than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between 
members of a family—build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament, and so on and so forth—overlap and criss-cross in the 
same way.—And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family. (PI 67) 
The similarities between games (and between language-games) are 
comparable to similarities between members of a family. Rather than 
focussing on essential or ontological features, Wittgenstein focuses on the 
idea of resemblance. 
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This notion of resemblance brings to the fore the idea of seeing: open 
concepts such as ‘game’ require seeing a similarity among members of a 
family. I will develop this notion of seeing in further chapters, but it brings 
to the fore the fact that Wittgenstein attempts to avoid metaphysical errors 
by focusing on the description of what happens in language, rather than 
thinking and theorising. Rather than establishing and defining a concept, 
Wittgenstein shows the network of affinities and similarities in a family. 
Against the rigidity of the metaphysical notions of category and concept, 
Wittgenstein develops the notion of family resemblance which can render 
the ever-changing and evolving character of language. 
Quite surprisingly, and even though Nietzsche does not theorise this notion 
of concepts as family resemblance, he uses this exact term in Beyond Good and 
Evil: 
That individual philosophical concepts are not something isolated, 
something unto themselves, but rather grow up in reference and 
relatedness to one another; that however suddenly and arbitrarily 
they seem to emerge in the history of thought, they are as much a part 
of one system as the branches of fauna on one continent: this is 
revealed not least by the way the most disparate philosophers 
invariably fill out one particular schema of possible philosophies. […] 
This easily explains the strange family resemblance (Familien-
Ähnlichkeit) of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing. 
Wherever linguistic affinity, above all, is present, everything 
necessary for an analogous development and sequence of 
philosophical systems will inevitably be on hand from the beginning, 
thanks to the shared philosophy of grammar (I mean thanks to being 
unconsciously ruled and guided by similar grammatical functions), 
just as the way to certain other possibilities for interpreting the world 
will seem to be blocked. Philosophers from the Ural-Altaic linguistic 
zone (where the concept of the subject is less developed) will most 
probably look differently ‘into the world’ and will be found on other 
paths than Indo-Germans or Muslims: and in the last analysis, the 
spell of certain grammatical functions is the spell of physiological 
value judgements and conditions of race. This by way of rejection of 
Locke’s superficiality concerning the origins of ideas. (BGE 20 / KSA 
5.34-5) 
This paragraph contains quite a few themes and ideas that we find in 
Wittgenstein’s later works. Nietzsche considers that philosophical concepts 
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share a resemblance and that the family resemblance of various types of 
philosophising show they share something in common. Philosophy is, 
according to Nietzsche, a family resemblance concept because it is strongly 
tied to a language: philosophies in the same language will share affinities. 
Philosophy is however not the only domain developed in language, we have 
seen that science, religion, or morality, are all dependent on language. 
Nietzsche does not specify whether other concepts are family resemblance 
concepts as well, but we are strongly inclined to believe that concepts such 
as science, religion, and morality are. We could read the transformation 
process from metaphor to concept as putting together things that have a 
family resemblance with each other. However, Nietzsche does not develop 
his thoughts further on that matter and ‘family resemblance’ only appears 
this one time in all of his works. This however suggests that Nietzsche 
considers concepts to be relative to a language or culture, in a way similar to 
Wittgenstein’s ‘form of life.’ Concepts belong to a particular language and 
form a system, a culture, a worldview. Moreover, the way things are seen 
depends on the concepts or words one has at one’s disposal. In that sense, 
Nietzsche’s remarks concerning the development of the concept of subject in 
the Ural-Altaic linguistic zone leads to some kind of relativism close to that 
of Sapir-Whorf: the worldview depends on the concepts one has. In a 
perspectival vocabulary, the world depends on the optics through which it 
is seen and Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘form of life’ could be interpreted as 
playing a similar role: the ‘form of life’ or culture we live in affects the way 
we see the world. Nietzsche and Wittgenstein do share the critique of 
definite concepts (and Nietzsche in a way more radical than Wittgenstein) 
but they do not offer the same solution. Nietzsche rejects rigid concepts and 
tries to go back to metaphor, to the uniqueness of each experience (even 
though he acknowledges the necessity of fixation in language for community 
to exist) whereas Wittgenstein develops the notion of family resemblance 
concepts in order to group similar things under one category while allowing 
some adjusting in their use. 
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Despite the advantages of family resemblance concepts, especially to give an 
account of ever-changing domains such as art or poetry as we will see in the 
next chapters, the loss of rigidity entails the loss of boundaries and with them 
the risk of relativism. What are the limits of a family resemblance concept? 
Wittgenstein argues that boundaries are not necessarily closed and that 
closed boundaries are not necessary to define or explain a word. But if there 
are no boundaries to a concept, it could encompass anything and be 
unregulated: there lies the risk of an ‘anything goes’ relativism. Wittgenstein 
considers this objection in PI 68: ‘“But then the use of the word is 
unregulated—the ‘game’ we play with it is unregulated.” –– It is not 
everywhere bounded by rules; but no more are there any rules for how high 
one may throw the ball in tennis, or how hard, yet tennis is a game for all 
that, and has rules too.’ (PI 68) Although I will explore this risk of relativism 
in the next section, let us already give an element of Wittgenstein’s answer: 
the rules of a game do not operate on all of its aspects. There are no fixed 
boundaries and there are no rigid rules for each and every aspect of the 
game. There are some rules which shape the framework for the game and 
there is some space for adjusting. 
We could call this space for adjusting a space for interpretation and 
Wittgenstein elaborates on this idea by comparing rules to signposts in PI 85. 
One of the specificities of signposts is that they sometimes need to be 
interpreted, just like rules. Moreover, signposts only give information 
concerning one or another aspect: direction, state of the road, type of road, 
and so on, but not on every aspect. There is always an interpretative process 
going on with family resemblance concepts because the classifying of this or 
that thing under the concept depends on the interpretation of the thing. 
Whereas definite concepts are somehow dogmatic, deciding what belongs to 
and what does not, family resemblance concepts call for interpretation, and 
interpretation can vary according to the interpreter or time. As we will see, 
to bring the notion of interpretation to the fore does not necessarily lead to 
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an ‘anything goes’ relativism because there are rules for interpretation to 
make sense. 
4. From Logic to Relativism 
We have seen that Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share the suspicion that the 
traditional conception of language is metaphysical and should therefore be 
avoided. Although their concerns are quite close, Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein disagree on many aspects of the criticism of metaphysical 
language, and one important aspect is their relation to logic. If, for 
Wittgenstein, logic is a tool to reveal the meaninglessness of metaphysical 
propositions and therefore a tool to overcome metaphysics as Carnap 
elaborates it, for Nietzsche it is quite the contrary. We will however see that 
Wittgenstein’s focus on agreements also modifies the scope of logic. 
In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche acknowledges, like Wittgenstein, that we 
are held captive by language but suggests that one of the reasons for that is 
our entrapment within the bounds of rationality: 
Language began at a time when psychology was in its most 
rudimentary form: we enter into a crudely fetishistic mindset when 
we call into consciousness the basic presuppositions of the 
metaphysics of language—in the vernacular: the presuppositions of 
reason. It sees doers and deeds all over: it believes that will has causal 
efficacy: it believes in the ‘I,’ in the I as being, in the I as substance, 
and it projects this belief in the I-substance onto all things—this is 
how it creates the concept of ‘thing’ in the first place… (TI ‘Reason’ 5 
/ KSA 6.77) 
One of the reasons we are trapped into the metaphysics of language is 
rationality. Reason leads us to project our belief onto things because things 
must have an explanation. But if we follow the later Wittgenstein, 
philosophy can only describe (and thereby reveal), not explain. This belief in 
the ‘I’ as substance is precisely what Wittgenstein criticises in metaphysical 
uses of language: because philosophers aim at the essence of the ‘I,’ they 
move away from the ordinary understanding of it, from the practices in 
which it is embedded. For Nietzsche, the problem is that by doing so, the 
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philosopher eradicates the whole psychology and physiology at play in the 
human subject, in other words the whole context in which the word occurs, 
basically that my ‘I’ is not identical to Descartes’s ‘I’ or Wittgenstein’s ‘I;’ and 
perhaps even, following Heraclitus’s saying that ‘No man ever steps in the 
same river twice,’ that my ‘I’ is never self-same, that as Arthur Rimbaud says 
‘Je est un autre.’ The metaphysician’s ‘I’ is an inanimate, abstract, and general 
one, whereas in language the ‘I’ is always particular. 
Metaphysics focuses on substances and general ideas because it isolates 
things and opposes them: ‘The metaphysicians’ fundamental belief is the 
belief in the opposition of values.’ (BGE 2 / KSA 5.16) The important term here 
is ‘belief.’ Metaphysical language is based on beliefs (and even reason itself 
is based on beliefs) and that is one of the reasons Nietzsche turns to 
psychology as ‘the queen of the sciences.’ (BGE 23 / KSA 5.39) This term of 
belief leads Nietzsche to compare metaphysics and language to religion: 
‘“Reason” in language: oh, what a deceptive old woman this is! I am afraid 
that we have not got rid of God because we still have faith in grammar…’ (TI 
‘Reason’ 5 / KSA 6.78) The beliefs on which metaphysical language relies are 
the same as those on which religion and morality rely that Nietzsche 
criticises at various points in his works. This relation of language to culture 
is what Wittgenstein expresses through his notion of ‘forms of life.’ When he 
says that ‘to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life’ (PI 19), we 
could see it in the Nietzschean sense of imagining a range of valuation. 
Hence Nietzsche’s attempt at a revaluation of all values calls for a 
revaluation of language: there can be no revolution in values without 
revolution in language. 
With this critique of language and of the prejudices embedded in it, 
Nietzsche adopts a position close to Wittgenstein and other proponents of 
the ‘linguistic analysis.’ Richard Schacht, following Arthur Danto, even 
considers Nietzsche as both a precursor and critic of ‘analytic philosophy’ 
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understood as linguistic analysis.173 Indeed, they consider that philosophers 
must free themselves from the charms of language to avoid metaphysical 
errors. However, and quite importantly, Nietzsche denies that logic has the 
power to solve the problems of metaphysical knowledge. On the contrary, 
logic is as problematic as language because it is based on the same belief in 
‘absolute truth.’ Whereas the early Wittgenstein and ‘linguistic analysis’ use 
logic as an ideal language to solve the problems embedded in natural 
language, Nietzsche does not believe that logic can be helpful and does not 
elaborate, unlike Heidegger, a notion of logic which suits his needs. He does 
not go as far as to consider with the later Wittgenstein that ordinary language 
is all right, and this is certainly a point where Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
strongly differ. A schematic way of seeing this opposition would be to 
consider Nietzsche as aiming towards creating through language whereas 
Wittgenstein only aims at describing this language, but this is oversimplified 
as we will see in Chapter Five. Nietzsche however considers that language 
can be of use because of its ability to express the world through metaphors 
and therefore to overcome the limitations of metaphysical language. 
As logic is based on the same principles as metaphysical or ‘magic’ language, 
Nietzsche takes it as an object of criticism. Although propositional logic 
might be (as the belief in truth and language) a condition for life, it is also the 
basis for the formation of concepts and metaphysical forms: 
Logic is merely slavery in the bonds of language. But language 
contains an illogical element, such as metaphor etc. The initial force 
causes unequal things to be equated and is thus an effect of the 
imagination. This is the foundation of concepts, forms, etc. (NF-1873, 
29[8] / KSA 7.625) 
If we relate this to On Truth and Lie, logic is the force which fixes metaphors. 
Nietzsche can compare logic to slavery because he sees logic as enslaving 
and ‘equating unequal things’ (Gleichsetzen des Ungleichen). Language itself 
possesses an illogical dimension which is represented by metaphor. This 
                                                     
173 Schacht (1974), p. 154. 
133 
 
illogical dimension is that presented by poetry and literature for instance as 
they do not rely on the rules of logic. The value of logical truth must therefore 
also be put into question. Logical truth is only one kind of truth among 
others, and according to Nietzsche not the most prominent or important one. 
Nietzsche criticises logic on the same grounds he criticises concepts. His 
focus on metaphor and interpretation entails a revaluation of the conception 
of knowledge. Such a conception of knowledge has famously been construed 
as Nietzsche’s perspectivism which Danto summarises in saying ‘there are 
no facts but only interpretations.’174 Many commentators consider 
perspectivism as problematic and Clark for instance considers that 
‘Although perspectivism denies metaphysical truth, it is perfectly 
compatible with the minimal correspondence account of truth and therefore 
with granting that many human beliefs are true.’175 Clark’s answer aims at 
saving Nietzsche from relativism but requires a fine distinction between two 
theories of truth. As I will argue in the next chapter, the main problem of 
Clark’s account, and the main reason commentators consider perspectivism 
as problematic, is that she considers perspectivism as a doctrine whereas 
Nietzsche’s texts always attempt to avoid such theorising. Moreover, 
perspectivism is not necessarily linked to relativism. As Babette Babich 
argues, relativism is always tied to an ideal (or an absolute) the relativist 
claims we cannot reach, whereas Nietzsche’s perspectivism is tied to no 
absolute at all.176 This however does not resolve the problem of self-
contradiction which, as I will argue in the next chapter, can be avoided by 
relating perspectivism to poetry. Let us note already that Nietzsche does not 
deny truth itself, but questions the value of truth and the preference for truth 
over untruth as he argues in the first paragraph of Beyond Good and Evil: 
‘Given that we want truth: why do we not prefer untruth? And uncertainty? 
                                                     
174 Danto (2005), p. 59. 
175 Clark (1990), p. 135. 
176 Babich (1994), p. 48. 
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Even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth appeared before us—or 
did we before it?’ (BGE 1 / KSA 5.15) 
Although I will develop my reading of perspectivism in relation to poetry in 
the next chapter, I will already mention Nietzsche’s answer to this problem 
in Beyond Good and Evil as it is related both to interpretation and values. 
And given that he too is just interpreting—and you’ll be eager to raise 
that objection, won’t you?—then, all the better. (BGE 22 / KSA 5.37) 
Much has been said about this ‘all the better.’ It seems as if Nietzsche tosses 
the objection away, as if it were insignificant. But this is not the case as he 
would not be pointing out this objection were it insignificant. By pointing it 
out he avoids self-contradiction. And moreover, that everything is 
interpretation does not mean that all interpretations are equal and 
interchangeable. As Babich says: ‘If Nietzsche claims that there is no 
“correct” interpretation, he does not assert that there are no faulty or false 
interpretations. Just the opposite.’177 This ‘all the better’ also and above all 
reveals something of Nietzsche’s style. This sentence ends the paragraph and 
except for this last part, it is constructed in a rather argumentative way. The 
shift occurs at the first dash where another voice comes into play and gives 
a dialogical dimension to the sentence. This shift reveals the performative 
character of Nietzsche’s text. The question after the first dash comes to 
perform the supposition made before the dash. Once entered in this 
performative mode, there is no need for argumentation anymore; the text 
and the argument evolve on another rhetorical level. Nietzsche 
acknowledges that his view is an interpretation among many others. As 
there are different values given to different interpretations, this is not a 
problem for him: perspectivism is the interpretation he finds the most 
valuable because it is not a nihilist one, it promotes life and multiplicity 
rather than denying it.  
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Nietzsche’s critiques of language and truth occur within his project of 
revaluation of all values. Nietzsche does not criticise language or truth in 
themselves (for it would rely on a metaphysical understanding of them and 
such a criticism would be impossible from within language), but criticises 
the value we attribute to them. His critiques of language and truth are to be 
understood within the larger framework of his critique of culture (and we 
have seen that his critique of culture and his critique of metaphysics are 
intimately related). A revaluation of all values means a revaluation of the 
foundations of our culture. As long as the philosopher (or anyone else) does 
not put into question her belief in or valuation of language and truth, she 
remains trapped in the metaphysical nets of language, to take an image from 
one of Nietzsche’s early notes: ‘The philosopher caught in the nets of 
language.’ (NF-1872-1873, 19[135] / KSA 7.463) 
Wittgenstein also uses this image of language as a trap, for instance in 
Culture and Value: ‘Language sets everyone the same traps; it is an immense 
network of well kept wrong turnings. And hence we see one person after 
another walking down the same paths and we know in advance the point at 
which they will branch off, at which they will walk straight on without 
noticing the turning, etc., etc. So what I should do is erect signposts at all the 
junctions where there are wrong turnings, to help people past the danger 
points.’ (CV, p. 25) The philosopher should be a guide in the maze of 
language. The task of the philosopher is therefore not to clarify language in 
the sense of making it simpler or idealising it, but to indicate where dangers 
or traps can be found in the actual language. Wittgenstein also compares 
language to a labyrinth in the Philosophical Investigations: ‘Language is a 
labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and you know your way 
about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know 
your way about.’ (PI 203) The task of the philosopher then becomes to 
discover the traps and to show a way to avoid them or, as Wittgenstein says: 
‘What is your aim in philosophy?—To show the fly the way out of the fly-
bottle.’ (PI 309) Nietzsche’s solution involves the ideas of perspectivism and 
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interpretation (which brings the perceiving subject to the fore, against 
Descartes’ primacy of the thinking I) whereas Wittgenstein replaces the 
metaphysical conception of ‘language’ with a more pragmatic multiplicity of 
‘language-games’ which he grounds in the notion of ‘form of life.’ 
Language is no longer a unique and definite concept but a term which 
encompasses various language-games. These language-games are practices 
which require not only players, but also a playing ground. Wittgenstein calls 
this ground a form of life: ‘And to imagine a language means to imagine a 
form of life.’ (PI 19) If we need to imagine a game, we need to imagine the 
context in which this game can be played. Imagining a language, and this is 
what Wittgenstein does in his examples by showing one or another practice, 
cannot be reduced simply to imagining words and relations between them; 
it must also take into account the context, the players, and their relation to 
the game. When Wittgenstein imagines the builders’ language-game, he 
does not only imagine the words they use and the things they refer to, but 
also the builders, their relations to one another, their positions, and so on. In 
other words, to explain a language-game, Wittgenstein must explain the 
whole context of the game (who the players are, what the rules are, what the 
pieces are, and so on). 
This context in which language occurs, this form of life, is something cultural 
which could be interpreted in Nietzschean terms as the value judgments or 
the map of values with which this game operates. Our language depends on 
our culture and to imagine a language is to imagine a culture in which this 
language can make sense: 
Imagine a use of language (a culture) in which there was a common 
name for green and red on the one hand and yellow and blue on the 
other. Suppose, e.g., that there were two castes, one the patrician 
caste, wearing red and green garments the other, the plebeian, 
wearing blue and yellow garments. Both yellow and blue would 
always be referred to as plebeian colours, green and red as patrician 
colours. Asked what a red patch and a green patch have in common, 
a man of our tribe would not hesitate to say they were both patrician. 
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We could also easily imagine a language (and that means again a 
culture) in which there existed no common expression for light blue 
and dark blue, in which the former, say, was called “Cambridge,” the 
latter “Oxford.” If you ask a man of this tribe what Cambridge and 
Oxford have in common, he'd be inclined to say “Nothing.” (BB, pp. 
134-135) 
Our uses of language are dependent on our culture. This means that our 
view of language and our family resemblance concepts are cultural and 
cannot pretend to universality. To understand concepts, we must 
understand the culture that created them. If we cannot understand the 
culture, we cannot understand its concepts (and vice versa). This notion of 
culture also involves a historical dimension and Nietzsche often insists on 
the necessity of taking the historical or genealogical dimension into account. 
Values vary in space and time and language-games are dependent on these 
values. This is one way of understanding Wittgenstein’s remark: ‘If a lion 
could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it.’ (PPF 327) The lion’s 
concepts, values, and whole culture, its ‘form of life,’ would be so remote 
from ours that we would not be able to overcome the distance. The tribe 
Wittgenstein describes does not see that ‘light blue’ and ‘dark blue’ belong 
to the same family, shades of blue, but consider them as separate and 
distinct. They cannot see this family resemblance as they do not share our 
form of life. 
Wittgenstein’s focus on ‘forms of life’ brings to the fore the cultural 
dimension of language and goes against any essentialist understanding of it: 
language is a social and cultural practice which cannot be abstracted from 
this socio-cultural ground. In his Lectures on Aesthetics, Wittgenstein links 
once again language-game and culture: ‘What belongs to a language game is 
a whole culture.’ (LA 26) The form of life to which a language belongs thus 
has an important socio-cultural dimension and Peter Hacker argues that this 
dimension can be found in Wittgenstein’s use of the notion: 
§19 and §23 were concerned with emphasizing that language is a 
form of activity integrated in a way of living, §242 shifts focus. It is 
concerned with emphasizing the fact that the shared language of a 
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community involves a deep and unquestioned agreement on the 
rules for the use of expressions of the language and on what counts as 
their correct use. It is obvious enough that in order for language to be 
used as a means of communication, there must be agreement on what 
the expressions of language mean.178 
The first dimension brings to the fore the active side of language—language 
is a practice, an ordinary activity—and the second the notion of agreement 
which grounds linguistic practice—language is a practice shared among 
people and these people must agree on basic terms for the language to be 
functional. Indeed, if the players do not agree on the rules beforehand, they 
cannot play the game. If language is to be functional, speakers must agree 
not only on concepts and meanings, but also on values. Some language-
games aim at disturbing this ordinary agreement; poetry, for instance, 
functions precisely by modifying the uses of language (for instance by 
breaking sentences into lines in versified poems, or by playing with the 
sound of words and not only their place in the grammatical structure). 
This focus on agreement and the blurred borders of concepts however open 
the door to a form of conceptual relativism. If there are various forms of life 
and that any language-game is dependent on a form of life, then true and 
false are values only within one or another of these language-games. Once 
again, literature and poetry are places where true and false (understood in 
the context of a correspondence theory of truth) cannot apply. In other 
words, humans agree on a conceptual system or scheme which they follow. 
But this does not mean that the agreed conceptual scheme is the only and 
best possible one. Agreement is key, and I have already quoted this remark: 
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and 
what is false?”—What is true or false is what human beings say; and 
it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not 
in opinions, but rather in form of life. (PI 241) 
Wittgenstein argues that truth and falsity only exist in language, in what 
humans say. Like Nietzsche, Wittgenstein nuances the notion of truth: to 
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state that a proposition is true depends on the game which is played. To state 
that a proposition is true therefore reveals less of the proposition (for to 
attribute the value ‘true’ depends solely on the game) than of the game itself: 
it reveals one of the value judgments on which the game is built. A poetic 
statement such as ‘la terre est bleue comme une orange’ reveals less of the 
colour or the shape of the earth than of some idea of what poetry is.  
A statement thus reveals the agreements the players have made: ‘It is not 
only agreement in definitions, but also (odd as it may sound) agreement in 
judgements that is required for communication by means of language. This 
seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.’ (PI 242) Not only must the 
community of players agree on the use of words in order to communicate, 
but also agree on judgments. The agreements—and the form of life thereby 
established—do not only confer meanings to words but also values. 
Obviously, if there are different language-games based in different forms of 
life, then logic might lose its primacy as a method of thinking. However, as 
Paul O’Grady argues, logic is not abolished but the uniqueness of the system 
of logic is abandoned: ‘So rather than focussing on a single system of logic, 
Wittgenstein begins to explore the possibility that there may be quite 
different systems of logic.’179 Just as there might be different systems of logic, 
there are different language-games and the most common ones reveal the 
most common values of a community or society. Nietzsche’s revaluation of 
all values is, as we have seen, an attempt to change the nihilistic values on 
which culture is built: Nietzsche does not question truth itself but the value 
we agree to give to it over untruth. On the contrary, Wittgenstein does not 
question this value but describes its relation to our agreements, our form of 
life, and therefore relativises it: truth is not absolute but a value on which we 
agree. 
The objection to Wittgenstein’s pluralist view is that this variety opens the 
door to relativism—different forms of life might have different agreements 
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on values—and Wittgenstein’s problem with scepticism is certainly related 
to this issue. Wittgenstein can always escape this problem and rely on the 
agreement we share in our form of life. Truth might be dependent on our 
language, but inasmuch as this language is more or less fixed, as long as we 
agree on it, truth is not a relative notion. As O’Grady argues: ‘There is a 
multiplicity possible in the conceptual systems by which we think about 
reality—but there isn’t relativism about truth, incommensurability, or 
radical relativism about rationality.’180 Relativism concerns the conceptual 
system: different contexts or different cultures are based on various 
conceptual systems. Within one conceptual system—once it is agreed on we 
could say—there is no space left for relativism. Moreover, and like with 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism, this does not mean that all conceptual systems 
are equal. Some are better suited than others to perform certain tasks. Truth, 
logic, and reason are not absolute in the sense that they are relative to the 
conceptual system in which they are used. Within the conceptual system 
they can be granted an absolute dimension. Wittgenstein’s moderate 
relativism would thus avoid some of the problems encountered by 
straightforward readings of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. 
In other words, Wittgenstein can be considered a conceptual relativist. His 
relativism does not concern how language works within practices, but the 
choice of the preferred language-game and form of life. As Maria 
Baghramian argues, what is common to all conceptual relativists ‘is the 
rejection of realism on the one hand and cultural—or “anything goes”—
versions of relativism, on the other.’181 The rejection of realism suggests that 
there is no world we can grasp outside of our conceptual scheme and the 
rejection of cultural relativism suggests that there is a possibility of sharing 
worldviews. Wittgenstein escapes the problems of more radical versions of 
relativism (such as cultural relativism or relativism about rationality) and 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism can be fruitfully read in a similar way to avoid 
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problems of self-contradiction. We have seen that Nietzsche aims at 
revaluating the values we usually attribute to truth and reason for instance, 
and Wittgenstein’s conception of language-games and their related forms of 
life can be interpreted as suggesting something similar. 
Indeed, for Wittgenstein, values exist only within a system of thought as he 
notes in On Certainty: ‘Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only 
within this system has a particular bit the value we give it.’ (OC 410) There 
is no absolute knowledge and no absolute value because they depend on a 
conceptual system. As Wittgenstein argues: ‘When language-games change, 
then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of 
words change.’ (OC 65) Each language-game presents a system of thought 
which highlights some aspects and hides some others. The choice of such or 
such system of thought depends on what one is looking for, in a pragmatic 
way. For Nietzsche, for instance, the criterion would be ‘enhancing life.’ He 
argues that many perspectives are nihilistic or decadent because they reject 
life. Wittgenstein does not give a criterion; he only describes the possibility 
of choice without expressing his choice. The possibility he gives however 
brings light on the fact that one should not remain enclosed within one 
perspective, that one should not play only one language-game, but that there 
is much to be learned from change. Therefore, his method is, as he claims in 
the Blue Book, ‘not merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but rather 
deliberately to invent new ones, some of them because of their absurd 
appearance.’ (BB, p. 28) The invention of a language-game, which, as said 
before, involves the invention of a form of life, is a way to propose new 
interpretations and understandings of the world. 
A lot of what Wittgenstein tells us about language can be understood 
through his use of the ‘game’ metaphor. If language is a game, it needs to be 
played. But this entails that there are players for it, and ready to play 
according to the rules. The notion of game Wittgenstein uses to conceptualise 
language brings to the fore its essentially social and cultural dimensions. A 
chess game cannot be reduced to chess pieces on a board, the rules and the 
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relations between the pieces are important too. The scope is however not 
limited to the board itself, one must also take into account the bigger picture: 
the players playing the game and the aim they want to achieve, namely 
winning the game. The whole context in which the game is played reveals 
the cultural dimension of language. We have seen that, for Nietzsche, 
language serves to link a community together and we can find the same 
emphasis on the socio-cultural dimension in Wittgenstein’s later works. 
Everyday communication is one practice among many others. Some 
practices reinforce values from everyday life whereas others try to bring us 
to change perspective. Art for instance—and poetry will be my focus in the 
next chapter because of its direct relation to language—aims precisely at 










Approaching Poetry After Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
It’s true if you believe it.  
The world is the world but it’s all how you see it.  
Kate Tempest, ‘The Truth’  
To take the end of metaphysics seriously raises the suspicion that a 
conception of language as representation—and its corollary conception of 
truth as correspondence—cannot account for all that happens in language. 
Such a conception is a metaphysical or ‘magic’ theory of language which 
Wittgenstein endorses in the Tractatus for instance. We have however seen 
that Wittgenstein quickly turns his back on such a theory and criticises 
Augustine’s ostensive conception of language at the beginning of the 
Philosophical Investigations: Augustine’s designative conception of language 
is only one aspect of language among many others, and Wittgenstein 
develops the notion of language-games to encompass this diversity in 
language: each language-game highlighting one or another aspect (or 
practice) of language.182 In the second half of the 18th century and in 
opposition to the representational theory of language, what Charles Taylor 
calls the ‘HHH view’183 comes up with a conception of language as 
expression in which language discloses rather than represents reality and 
both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein inherit from this tradition. Using an 
analogy to the arts, we could say that the representational theory compares 
language to photography184—hence Wittgenstein’s picture language theory 
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reject a strong distinction between Wittgenstein’s early and later works and consider 
there is a continuity in the sense that philosophy is seen as a therapeutic activity. As 
I will argue, what is usually considered as a shift in Wittgenstein’s works can be seen 
as a broadening of his spectrum. The Tractatus thus becomes one part of the larger 
picture and not the definite theory of language (for there cannot be any definite 
theory). 
183 Taylor (1985), p. 273. 
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in the Tractatus—whereas the expressive theory compares language to 
music. Indeed, music is the art form par excellence in which expression is a 
key notion and Andrew Bowie argues that the changes in the conceptions of 
language at the end of the 18th century are closely related to changes in the 
conceptions of music at that time.185 If comparison with music often appears 
in theories of language, this is even more so concerning theories of poetic 
language, because poetry must be heard as much as it must be read. This 
tension between sound and word is further explored in the 20th century with 
two extreme kinds of poetry: sound poetry which abandons words and 
focuses only on sounds and graphic poetry which follows Mallarmé’s Un 
coup de dés in which typography and blanks on the page are necessary for the 
understanding of the poem.186 In any case, poetic experiments to exclude the 
musical dimension of language are opposed to some more traditional 
conceptions of poetry in which sound is an essential aspect (as in lyric poetry 
for instance). As Henri Meschonnic argues: ‘The major obstacle for thinking 
poetry remains the common representation of language through sign, with 
the duality-heterogeneity of its two constitutive elements, sound, and 
sense.’187 Representational language focuses on the unit of the word, the sign, 
and separates sound from sense whereas such a separation is impossible in 
poetry. Poetry reveals that there is a tension between image and sound in 
language. 
This tension between representation and expression can be conceptualised 
through Nietzsche’s opposition between Apollo and Dionysus in The Birth of 
                                                     
and experiments with photographic methods can take quite some distance from 
representing something. However, photography has this capacity to represent in an 
ordinary understanding, contrary to music; hence all the people taking pictures 
rather than writing musical pieces to capture a moment of their lives. 
185 Bowie (2007), p. 48. 
186 Two examples of these opposite moves in poetry at the beginning of the 20th 
century: Hugo Ball’s ‘Caravan’ which consists only in sounds and Apollinaire’s 
Caligrammes in which the words are disposed in such a way that they draw the 
object. 
187 Meschonnic (2001), p. 31, my translation: ‘L’obstacle majeur pour penser la poésie 
reste bien la représentation commune du langage par le signe, avec la dualité-
hétérogénéité de ses deux éléments constitutifs, le son, le sens.’ 
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Tragedy: Apollo would be the god of appearance and image, whereas 
Dionysus would be the god of expression and music. Nietzsche develops this 
idea in Twilight of the Idols where he considers the two types of intoxication 
that Apollo and Dionysus represent: 
Apollonian intoxication keeps the eye in particular aroused, so that it 
receives visionary power. The painter, the sculptor, the epic poet are 
visionaries par excellence. In the Dionysian state, on the other hand, 
the whole system of the emotions is aroused and intensified: so that 
it discharges its very means of expression at one stroke, at the same 
time forcing out the power to represent, reproduce, transfigure, 
transform, every kind of mime and play-acting. (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 10 / 
KSA 6.117) 
Apollonian art forms therefore rely on the power of vision whereas 
Dionysian ones force out the idea of imitation by privileging expression. 
Tragedy for Nietzsche must combine and balance between Apollonian and 
Dionysian, between representation and expression. For Nietzsche tragedy 
must not be limited to drama and we will see that poetry is very close to 
tragedy in Nietzsche’s understanding of it. In a similar way, Wittgenstein’s 
distinction and combination of two kinds of understanding (one that can be 
paraphrased and the other that cannot) in PI 531 opposes once again 
designation and expression, representation and music. Wittgenstein’s 
attempt at combining these two kinds of understanding work towards 
achieving the same task: to elaborate a conception of language which can 
balance between the two poles, which can encompass the various language-
games as a family of practices. 
As briefly said in Chapter Two, in each of these conceptions of language, a 
different theory of truth is at work: truth as correspondence against truth as 
disclosure. The correspondence theory relies on a referential conception of 
meaning—there cannot be any correspondence if language does not 
represent (and therefore words denote) the world; the disclosure theory 
relies on an expressive conception of language—the process of expressing 
the world reveals something of it. Neither Nietzsche nor Wittgenstein 
elaborate a theory of truth as disclosure because their aim is not to construct 
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such a theory but to reveal the failures of existing theories and to bring this 
to our attention: in Wittgenstein’s words, his aim in philosophy is ‘to show 
the fly the way out of the fly-bottle’ (PI 309) without forecasting what 
precisely will come afterwards. Here, Nietzsche’s talk about values is central: 
he does not criticise the correspondence theory as such but our unconditional 
belief in it and the value we give it: ‘The problem of the value of truth 
appeared before us.’ (BGE 1 / KSA 5.15) As long as we believe that the 
correspondence theory is the only one, we are under the seduction of the 
metaphysics of language. Moreover, our belief in metaphysics relies on our 
belief in language as representation: ‘I’m afraid we are not rid of God 
because we still believe in grammar…’ (TI ‘Reason’ 5 / KSA 6.78) The word 
‘belief’ has its importance: the problem is not with language, metaphysics, 
or god, but with the values we give them and therefore the place they take 
in our life and worldview. But why does the representational conception 
fail? And which problems of the representational conception are solved by 
shifting to a conception of language as expression? 
As already mentioned in previous chapters, one of the main criticisms of 
representational conceptions of language is their failure to account for 
poetry, literature, or any creative use of language in which what is 
represented does not necessarily exist. The long-lasting debates around the 
nature and truth of metaphor reveal the difficulty such a conception of 
language has in accounting for ‘poetic’ phenomena, and I will explore the 
phenomenon of metaphor in a further chapter. The end of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus reveals one of the problems of the picture language theory: much 
of the language we use everyday does not correspond to the ideals of 
language and should therefore be kept silent, following the famous last 
proposition of the Tractatus: ‘What we cannot speak about we must pass over 
in silence.’ (T 7) If Wittgenstein’s Tractatus traces the limits of what can be 
meaningfully said and if the only propositions which satisfy the conditions 
are those of science: ‘say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions 
of natural science’ (T 6.53), this excludes poetic uses of language and even 
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many ordinary uses. But, following Aimé Césaire: ‘Poetic knowledge is born 
in the silence of scientific knowledge.’188 The existence of poetry demands a 
conception of language which can account for it and a conception of 
knowledge which goes with it. One solution is to consider language only as 
expression, but this conception comes with its own problems: if language 
only expresses, there are no criteria to fix and stabilise it and such instability 
opens the door to relativism and to the impossibility of communication: for 
people to communicate, they must have something in common, and 
Nietzsche’s views on language often insist on this ‘common’ character of 
language. We have seen that he argues that language is at the basis of 
community in Beyond Good and Evil. 
Relativism is not a problem in itself but it leads, if taken in a radical way, to 
the impossibility of saying anything that can be intersubjectively shared. Too 
much certainty with a representational theory excludes many uses from 
language; too much uncertainty with an expressive theory carries the risks 
of relativism and of an ‘anything goes’ conception of language. We have seen 
that both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein can be considered as conceptual 
relativists as they consider that our concepts (and thereby language) takes 
part in elaborating our worldview, as Maria Baghramian argues: ‘The world 
as conceived by us is not one but many, and how each of these worlds is 
depends on the conceptual apparatus that we bring into play.’189 Their views 
of language oscillate between representation and expression, or rather 
consider that representational language is one practice among many others. 
We have seen that the Nietzschean notion of perspectivism is helpful in 
characterising their relativism: all is relative to a perspective or an 
interpretation, to a way of seeing the world. I will argue that they can both 
be considered as perspectivists and that their perspectivism is a poetic notion 
which can be conceptualised at best through their understanding of poetry 
and poetic language. Two aspects come to the fore in elaborating this 
                                                     
188 Cook (2004), p. 276. 
189 Baghramian (2004), p. 186 
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perspectival poetics: first it places aesthetics in its etymological sense of 
aesthesis, of perceiving the world, at the centre of philosophical concerns 
(aesthetics takes the place of metaphysics) because the whole dualism 
between true and apparent world is gone; second, it places the task of poetics 
within this aesthetic framework and it is therefore a way not only of seeing 
the world but of making it. 
In this chapter, I move away from an essentialist definition of poetry to a 
wider family resemblance concept of poetics (which could therefore be 
applied to other art forms than poetry) and this occurs in the specific use of 
language that one finds in poetry. This poetic use of language should 
however not be considered as distinct from ordinary language but rather as 
emerging from within the ordinary. These two aspects, ontology and 
linguistic characteristics, are those which dominate philosophical studies of 
poetry. These essentialist searches are problematic because poetry seems to 
defy definition, be it in ontological or linguistic terms. This chapter explores 
these questions from the perspective of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, and 
therefore attempts to escape from the essentialist move. The discussion on 
the nature of poetry and of poetic language leads to conceptualising the 
notion of perspectival poetics in the next chapter. 
1. What Is Poetry? 
In the field of contemporary aesthetics, such a question would lead to 
considerations about the ontology of poetry and its specific characteristics or 
properties.190 Following Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s critique of 
                                                     
190 See for instance Anna Christina Soy Ribeiro’s definition of a poem as ‘an 
intentional abstract artefact; a type, consisting of an instantiation template, whose 
creation is spatio-temporally located via its original token, and thus embedded in 
either a declamation-based or an inscription-based practice, which will dictate the kinds 
of ontological strictures embodied in that original token and required future tokens’ 
Gibson (2015), pp. 130-131. Such a definition does not tell us much about what is 
really at play in poetry for poetry is an always evolving practice in which the context 
(historical, social, cultural) plays an essential role. Moreover, and like the 
theoreticians of reception theory have shown, not only the context of creation is 
important but also the context of reception, that is the context of the reader. 
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metaphysics and rejection of concepts as closed categories with well-defined 
borders, defining poetry (or any other art form) in such a way would prove 
impossible and vain. My question therefore aims at considering what 
happens in poetry rather than finding its ontology, why poetry can be 
considered as a case for rejecting the picture language theory, and ultimately 
why poetry matters to philosophy. 
First, let us return to the distinction between representative and expressive 
theories of language from the perspective of poetry. This distinction has a 
rather long history as, according to Nietzsche, it was already at play in the 
Greeks’ conceptions of language: 
Here we find sketched out for us the only possible relationship 
between poetry and music, between word and sound: the word, the 
image, the concept, seeks an expression analogous to music and now 
feels the force of music in itself. In this sense we may distinguish two 
main currents in the history of language of the Greek people, 
according to whether language imitates the world of phenomena and 
images or the world of music. (BT 6, KSA 1.49) 
The history of language in Ancient Greece is, according to Nietzsche, 
separated in two trends: one towards images, one towards music. Nietzsche 
links expressive language to music, and such a comparison can be found 
quite often in the literature on the subject. This distinction between the world 
of music and the world of images reflects the Apollonian-Dionysian 
distinction we have already mentioned. Nietzsche thus distinguishes 
between a theory of language based on image—language is the 
representation of the world—and one based on music—language is the 
expression of the world. As we have seen, Nietzsche criticises the 
representational conception of language as being too metaphysical. 
However, he, like Wittgenstein, does not attempt to reject language as 
representation completely but to focus on the fact that it is not the only way 
one can consider language and that we must reject the primacy we usually 
give to language as representation. Nietzsche takes tragedy as the best 
example for this dual-conception of language because it combines both 
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representation (through performance and text) and expression (through 
music and text). Nietzsche considers poetry as having this duality as well, 
combining images and music in the text. To analyse tragedy and its 
constitutive duality, Nietzsche takes Apollo as the god of representation and 
Dionysus as the god of expression. Tragedy comes from the union of Apollo 
and Dionysus, and these contrary forces must remain in an equilibrium for 
tragedy to exist.  
In Nietzsche’s conception of it, tragedy is closely related to poetry. In poetry 
as well, the words must both represent and express, and Schiller is a good 
example for a ‘musical poet:’ ‘For [Schiller] admitted that in the preparatory 
state which precedes the act of writing poetry he did not have before him 
and within him a series of images and casually organized thoughts, but 
rather a musical mood.’ (BT 5 / KSA 1.43) But a poem is not merely a musical 
mood, it is a succession of words which all have some kind of relation to 
images. In that sense, poetry cannot be seen as a purely expressive art form 
(for it would be music) or a purely representational one (for it would be 
painting). And it might be argued that even music is not only expressive and 
painting only representational. Moreover, it is possible to look at a poem 
under the scope of representation or the scope of expression, as Jacques 
Rancière argues: 
There are only two kinds of poetics: a representational poetics which 
determines the genre and the generic perfection from the invention 
of their fable; and an expressive poetics which determines them as 
direct expressions of the poetic power; a normative poetics which 
says how poems must be made and a historical poetics which says 
how they are made, i.e., at the end of the day, how they express the 
state of things, of language, of morals which gave them birth.191 
                                                     
191 Rancière (2010), p. 49, my translation: ‘Il n’y a que deux sortes de poétiques : une 
poétique représentative qui détermine le genre et la perfection générique des 
poèmes à partir de l’invention de leur fable ; et une poétique expressive qui les 
détermine comme expressions directes de la puissance poétique ; une poétique 
normative qui dit comment les poèmes doivent être faits et une poétique historique 
qui dit comment ils sont faits, c’est-à-dire, en définitive, comment ils expriment l’état 
des choses , du langage, des mœurs qui leur ont donné naissance.’ 
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A representational poetics would therefore be one searching for the ontology 
of poetry: how to determine whether this or that poem belongs to the 
category ‘poetry,’ whereas an expressive one focuses on the relation between 
the poem and the world—and as this relation is neither direct nor obvious, 
it calls for an interpretation which is precisely the task of poetics—and on 
what the poem reveals of the world. In other words, inasmuch as 
representational language helps us name things in the world by linking 
objects and categories, representational poetics tells us how to classify a 
poem among various genres. 
One important question remains however: if poetry has an expressive 
dimension, what is its relation to truth? We have seen that there can be no 
truth as correspondence when one abandons language as representation and 
in On Truth and Lie, Nietzsche’s critique of truth is a critique of the 
correspondence theory of truth and the value we give it (i.e. believing it is 
the only truth, whereas Nietzsche aims to show that truth is also a socio-
cultural and moral phenomenon). What truth is left once correspondence is 
gone? According to Nietzsche, poetry is closer to truth because it avoids the 
traps of metaphysical language: 
The sphere of poetry does not lie outside the world, as the fantastic 
impossibility imagined by the brain of a poet: it wants to be the very 
opposite, the unadorned expression of truth, and must therefore cast 
off the deceitful finery of the supposed reality of the man of culture. 
(BT 8 / KSA 1.58) 
Whereas poetry is often considered as being outside the world, as being an 
imaginative creation that sprang out of the poet’s mind, as something maybe 
pleasant but never true, Nietzsche turns the relation between poetry and 
truth upside down and considers poetry as the expression of truth. 
Nietzsche’s reversal of the relation between poetry and truth leads him to 
consider poetry as being ‘the unadorned expression of truth’ and 
representational language as deceitful. Nietzsche’s use of the term 
‘unadorned’ might seem strange as poetic language can be seen as primarily 
ornamental, but this suggests precisely the opposite: for Nietzsche, the 
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language of poetry is not ornamental but responds to a necessity of 
expression. 
Following Nietzsche’s distinction between metaphor and concept in On 
Truth and Lie, we could say that metaphors are ‘unadorned expressions’ 
whereas concepts would be deceitful. Moreover, ‘For the true poet, 
metaphor is no rhetorical figure but rather an image which takes the place of 
something else, which really hovers before him in the place of a concept.’ 
(BT 8 / KSA 1.60) Nietzsche therefore reverses the relation between art and 
truth: art and its expressive language is less artificial and deceitful than the 
representational language used by science, for instance. As he argues in On 
Truth and Lie, art and poetry are on the side of myth rather than of science. 
Ernst Cassirer elaborates on this distinction between scientific and mythic 
thought by opposing them in their use of language: science focuses on the 
word as sign and its relations whereas mythic thought takes things as they 
appear, in the uniqueness of their perception; in other words, there is a 
mediation in scientific thought which is not at play in mythic thought: 
In discursive thought, the particular phenomenon is related to the 
whole pattern of being and process; with ever-tightening, ever more 
elaborate bonds it is held to that totality. In mythic conception, 
however, things are not taken for what they mean indirectly, but for 
their immediate appearance; they are taken as pure presentations, 
and embodied in the imagination. […] For theoretical thinking, a 
word is essentially a vehicle serving the fundamental aim of such 
ideation: the establishment of relationships between the given 
phenomenon and others which are ‘like’ or otherwise connected with 
it according to some co-ordinating law.192 
                                                     
192 Cassirer (1953), p. 56. See also pp. 32: ‘The aim of theoretical thinking, as we have 
seen, is primarily to deliver the contents of sensory or intuitive experience from the 
isolation in which they originally occur. It causes these contents to transcend their 
narrow limits, combines them with others, compares them, and concatenates them 
in a definite order, in an all-inclusive context. […] Mythical thinking, when viewed 
in its most elementary forms, bears no such stamp; in fact, the character of 
intellectual unity is directly hostile to its spirit. For in this mode, thought does not 
dispose freely over the data of intuition, in order to relate and compare them to each 
other, but is captivated and enthralled by the intuition which suddenly confronts it. 
It comes to rest in the immediate experience; the sensible present is so great that 
everything else dwindles before it. 
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Cassirer opposes theoretical thinking as a totalising force and mythic 
thinking as relating to the immediate perception. In Nietzsche’s words, 
theoretical thinking aims at equating the unequal—the task of the concept—
whereas myth keeps the uniqueness of metaphor intact. Contrary to 
Nietzsche, Cassirer does not criticise science on this ground, he only 
observes, distinguishes, and describes different perspectives without 
privileging one or another. ‘To put it another way,’ according to Aimé 
Césaire on whom Nietzsche’s influence is apparent, ‘science rejects myth 
where poetry accepts it. This is not to say that science is superior to poetry. 
In truth myth is at one and the same time inferior and superior to the law.’193  
Poetry does not imitate but expresses the world and in that sense it is closer 
to truth than any conception of ‘reality’ crafted by the man of culture. 
‘Reality’ is a socio-cultural and metaphysical creation from which we must 
take a step back; concepts are constructs which generalise and simplify 
phenomena. There is no such thing as ‘reality,’ Nietzsche will argue in his 
later works, and ‘reality’ cannot be reached according to The Birth of Tragedy. 
Poetry expresses the world and therefore offers a worldview different from 
that of science, ‘A perspective on the world,’ says Aimé Césaire, ‘Yes. Science 
offers him a perspective on the world. But of a summary and superficial 
kind.’194 
Nietzsche searches for a culture which would not restrict itself to this 
‘summary and superficial’ perspective on the world. He finds such a culture 
which follows an expressive conception of language and truth in the Greek 
and calls it a tragic culture in which science (as the believer in 
representational language par excellence) is no longer considered as an ideal 
and is replaced by wisdom: 
With this knowledge a culture is introduced which I dare to describe 
as tragic, a culture whose most important characteristic is that 
wisdom replaces science as the highest goal, wisdom which, 
undeceived by the seductive distractions of the sciences, turns a calm 
                                                     
193 Cook (2004), p. 284. 
194 Cook (2004), p. 276. 
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gaze towards the whole image of the world and seeks to grasp as its 
own the eternal suffering found there with a sympathetic feeling of 
love. (BT 18 / KSA 1.118) 
When talking about poetry, Nietzsche’s focus is mainly on the poet. But if 
the task of the poet is to express the world and reveal something of the world, 
it would make only little sense if there weren’t a reader to understand what 
the poet says. And the difficulty in understanding often appears as a 
distinctive feature of poetic works.195 
Shifting our focus from the poet to the reader also shifts our attention from 
Nietzsche to Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein too, the musical dimension of 
poetic language plays an important role: ‘The way music speaks. Do not 
forget that a poem, even though it is composed in the language of 
information, is not used in the language-game of giving information.’ (Z 160) 
There is a similarity between understanding music and understanding 
poetry, for they both are a particular language. Understanding a poem 
cannot occur on the same grounds as understanding information; as we will 
see, information can be paraphrased, whereas poetry cannot. This does not 
mean that there is some content or a message in informative uses of language 
and none in poetic uses, nor that in poetic uses the message is the form, but 
that this notion of message relies on a metaphysical conception of language 
in which there is a distinction between form and content. Poetry is the place 
par excellence in which form and content fuse: the form is the content or, in 
other words, there is no such thing as a message in poetry if by message we 
understand something separated from its vehicle of transmission. What 
poetry shows is that message and vehicle, content and form, are one, and 
                                                     
195 See for instance Jesse Prinz’ and Eric Mandelbaum’s conception of poetic opacity 
as poetry’s defining feature: ‘In summary, we think that poetic opacity may be a 
mark of the poetic. Perhaps there are other marks, but poetic opacity may even prove 
to be the mark of poetry’ in Gibson (2015), p. 78. See also Empson (1966) who 




that such an identity is also at work in ordinary language, although to a 
lesser extent.196 
Even though language sometimes works on the grounds of representation 
(or rather can be seen from the perspective of representation), this is not 
always the case. What distinguishes poetry from representational language 
is not the content or the words, but only the use of these words. To 
understand the Zettel remark, it is important to grasp the distinction between 
language and language-game. What is a language of information? And what 
is a language-game of information? We see that the distinction between 
poetic and ordinary language does not happen at the level of language but 
at that of language-game, of the use and context. The distinction between 
poetic and ordinary is not a metaphysical distinction between two categories 
of language but a distinction in use. Poetic language is not purely expressive 
just as ordinary language in not purely representational: both representation 
and expression are at work in language but poetry is one of the fields in 
which their combination is the most visible. As Henri Meschonnic argues: 
Both poetry and ordinary language realise themselves in the non-
separation from sound and sense. Because the sign model misses a 
great part of the empiricism of language. Trivially speaking, and in 
all the activities of language, it is speech that comes first and not the 
unit word, which is the place of separation from sound and sense. 
And the poem only starts when the continuum of a serial semantics 
is at work in a speech. In a non-separation from affect and concept.197 
                                                     
196 Roman Jakobson considers that the poetic function of language precisely lies in 
the self-referentiality of the message: ‘The set toward the message as such, focus on 
the message for its own sake, is the poetic function of language.’ Jakobson (1960), p. 
356. This poetic function of language is not limited to poetry but can be found to 
various degrees in many uses of language. 
197 Meschonnic (2001), p. 31, my translation: [Poésie et langage courant] se réalisent 
dans une inséparation du son et du sens. Parce que l’empirique du langage est en 
grande partie manqué par le modèle du signe. Banalement, et dans toutes les 
activités du langage, c’est le discours qui est premier et non l’unité mot, qui est le 
lieu de la séparation entre le son est le sens. Et du poème ne commence que quand 
le continu d’une sémantique sérielle travaille un discours. Dans une inséparation de 
l’affect et du concept. 
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The non-separation from affect and concept brings back the combination of 
representation and expression in language. A purely representational 
language can only be achieved in the dictionary, when one focuses on the 
word rather than the speech. The language of information is not ordinary 
language: it constitutes the pool of words we ordinarily know and use. The 
language-game of information, on the contrary, is the ordinary language, the 
one we use in our everyday activities. 
At the level of language-games, meaning does not come from the words and 
their corresponding dictionary entries but from the way these words are 
used. A language-game, because it is a socio-cultural practice, always takes 
place at the level of speech and not of words. The distinction between the 
ordinary and the poetic language-games is therefore not a matter of words 
but of speech. As Joachim Schulte argues, the difference between 
information and poetry does not occur on the grounds of words, of 
vocabulary, but on those of use: 
The terms ‘information’ and ‘communication’ are far too 
comprehensive and too vague to permit any drawing of boundaries 
around uses for the purpose of information or communication. I 
think that Wittgenstein merely wants to say that poetry, even though 
it employs the same building-blocks as ordinary (‘prosaic’) speech, is 
subject to different conventions from those regulating the manifold 
kinds of uses of language which serve to impart information and to 
communicate facts. And of course Wittgenstein does not want to 
deny that poetry can be used to communicate all sorts of information. 
He only reminds us of the fact that if poetry is used as poetry it is not 
(mainly) used to give information; and that if it is chiefly used to 
convey information it is not really used as poetry—it may, for instance, 
be employed in an, as it were, ‘quotational’ way.198 
The main task of poetry is not to communicate information; poetic language-
games do not principally focus on communicating information. On the 
contrary, poetry includes dimensions such as the musical which are clearly 
not informational. Poetry uses the same words as ordinary language but not 
                                                     
198 Gibson and Huemer (2004), pp. 154-155. 
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in the same way, not under the same rules. The vocabulary might be the 
same but the rules are not. 
Poetry is thus a good example where meaning is defined by its use, and a 
very specific use. According to Timothy Binkley: ‘The meaning of a poem, 
far more than the meaning of a factual report, is crucially dependent upon 
the way in which the poet uses his language, upon how he arranges his 
words and what he uses them to do in the poem, and upon the way his words 
are used in other (poetic and non-poetic) context.’199 Language can be used 
to give information but it can also be used in other ways. If language is 
something like a tool, then it has a very practical and straightforward 
function. But language is not just a tool. And if it is not a tool, then the 
function of language is much less clear. Poetic language focuses precisely on 
other functions, as Richard Eldridge argues: ‘The special use of language 
aims at the achievement of seeing, or holistic insight, or getting the sense of 
things. The relevant seeing, insight, or sense-getting is to be distinguished 
from simply understanding a message that might be communicated 
otherwise and from simply grasping that things are observable thus-and-so, 
independently of the specific invitations and guidances of imagination and 
attention that successful poetic language embodies.’200 
One way of understanding this function of poetic language is to consider 
language as expressive: to invent a language is a way to express something. 
It is this expressive function that Wittgenstein brings forward regarding 
poetry:  
But how about this: when I read a poem, or some expressive prose, 
especially when I read it out loud, surely there is something going on 
as I read it which doesn't go on when I glance over the sentences only 
for the sake of their information. I may, for example, read a sentence 
with more intensity or with less. I take trouble to get the tone exactly 
right. (RPP1 1059) 
                                                     
199 Binkley (1973), p. 5. 
200 Gibson (2015), p. 232. 
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Quite interestingly, what happens with expressive language happens 
‘especially when I read it out loud.’ The comparison with music comes back 
to the fore. Expressive language has something to do with sound and tone, 
unlike the language of information. However, unlike what Frege suggests, 
sound and tone do not belong to ‘the colouring and shading which poetic 
eloquence seeks to give to the senses’201 but is an essential feature of 
language. In poetry, words are used in a different way that calls for their 
sounds as well as their ordinary meanings. A poem creates a specific context 
in which words can take new meanings. 
In the Philosophical Investigations, remarks 527 and following, Wittgenstein 
compares understanding a sentence to understanding a musical theme and 
opposes musical themes to sentences. Remarks 531 to 533 focus on important 
elements to conceptualise poetic language: 
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be 
replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in 
which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one 
musical theme can be replaced by another.)  
In the one case, the thought in the sentence is what is common to 
different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by 
these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.) (PI 531) 
This remark brings forward an important problem in approaching poetry 
and poetic meaning: the problem of paraphrase. In Must We Mean What We 
Say?, Stanley Cavell uses Wittgenstein to tackle the problem of paraphrase 
as inherited from Cleanth Brooks’ view in ‘The Heresy of Paraphrase’ 
according to which a poem cannot be paraphrased. Cavell takes the example 
of metaphors which can be paraphrased because they can be understood and 
explained. In explaining a metaphor (or to a wider extent a poem), I give a 
paraphrase. ‘In summary: Brooks is wrong to say that poems cannot in 
principle be fully paraphrased, but right to be worried about the relation 
between paraphrase and poem.’202 The relation between paraphrase and 
                                                     
201 Frege (1997), p. 155. 
202 Cavell (1976), p 82. 
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poem brings up the fact that understanding and explaining poetry is 
somehow different from understanding and explaining in ordinary 
language because there is a double understanding going on in metaphors 
(and poems): ‘I must understand the ordinary or dictionary meaning of the 
words it contains, and understand that they are not there being used in their 
ordinary way, that the meanings they invite are not to be found opposite 
them in a dictionary.’203 
This corresponds to the two possibilities Wittgenstein sees in understanding 
a sentence: either a sentence can be explained by another (enabling the 
possibility of paraphrase), as it seems to be the case in the language-game of 
information; or it cannot, as it seems to be the case in music. Indeed, a 
musical phrase cannot be explained by a different musical phrase. The 
phrase itself is the only possible one; the only explanation is repetition. This 
type of sentence is not limited to musical phrases as Wittgenstein notes in 
parenthesis that understanding a poem follows the same lines. We must 
however nuance the idea that the only possible paraphrase for a poem is its 
repetition as, following Cavell, interpretation (or criticism as he puts it) is a 
way of paraphrasing a poem, an attempt in saying what the poem means 
with different words. One might however argue that musical language is not 
only a different language-game but a different language from the language 
of information altogether; they do not use the same building blocks. Poetry, 
unlike music, is written in the language of information, Wittgenstein states. 
But understanding a poem does not follow the same rules as understanding 
a proposition. As for music, an important aspect of poetry is the place given 
to words; not only the place in a sentence, but also the place on the page (as 
for instance in Mallarmé’s Un coup de dés). As musical phrases present these 
notes at these times, poetic sentences present ‘these words in these positions.’ 
In the following remark, Wittgenstein considers ‘understanding’ to have the 
two different meanings we noted, paraphrasing and repeating: ‘Then has 
                                                     
203 Cavell (1976), p. 79. 
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“understanding” two different meanings here?—I would rather say that 
these kinds of use of “understanding” make up its meaning, make up my 
concept of understanding. For I want to apply the word “understanding” to 
all this.’ (PI 532) There are two kinds of understanding which build up the 
concept of understanding. In a similar way to Nietzsche’s attempt at 
combining Apollo and Dionysus rather than separating them, Wittgenstein 
does not distinguish the concept of understanding in the everyday use from 
the concept of understanding in the poetic use. He does not split language 
into two different domains: the ordinary and the poetic. There is only one 
concept of understanding and it must be able to consider both information 
and poetry, according to the perspective taken on language. Language is not 
constituted by different entities (such as ordinary, poetic, or scientific), but 
by various perspectives which focus on one or another feature. Each 
language-game highlight one or another aspect of language and 
Wittgenstein gives a clue as to how understanding is at work in poetic 
language-games in the next remark: 
But in the second case, how can one explain the expression, 
communicate what one understands? Ask yourself: How does one 
lead someone to understand a poem or a theme? The answer to this 
tells us how one explains the sense here. (PI 533) 
Wittgenstein’s answer is another question. We already know that one type 
of understanding, paraphrasing, cannot provide an explanation of a poem. 
Wittgenstein already affirms the impossibility of paraphrasing a poem in 
Philosophical Grammar: ‘No one would believe that a poem remained 
essentially unaltered if its words were replaced by others in accordance with 
an appropriate convention.’ (PG 32) Similarly, a poem cannot be 
convincingly translated according to Wittgenstein: ‘(Who says that this 
English poem can be translated into German to our satisfaction?!) (Even if it 
is clear that there is in some sense a translation of any English sentence into 
German.)’ (RFM 85) And if Wittgenstein does not give a clear answer 
regarding how to understand a poem, he does point out something 
important in his question. To help someone understand a poem means to 
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explain its meaning. But how does one explain the meaning of a poem? One 
shows how to look at it. Understanding a poem is a matter of perspective; I 
have to look at it the right way. But if poetry is a language-game asking for 
a change of perspectives, what are the rules for this game? 
2. What Is Poetic Language? 
One needs to look at a poem in the right way in order to understand it and 
this notion of ‘looking’ brings up another of Wittgenstein’s concepts: ‘seeing-
as.’ As Wittgenstein notices, ‘seeing-as’ often occurs in aesthetic 
reflections.204 This is especially the case concerning visual art forms, perhaps 
because of the word ‘seeing.’ However, Wittgenstein clearly distinguishes 
‘seeing-as’ from ‘seeing’ (PPF 137), the former being ‘half visual experience 
half thought’ (PPF 140). Being ‘half thought,’ art forms which are not 
primarily visual can also be grasped under this notion and Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on music and ‘hearing-as’ or ‘playing-as’ go in this direction. This 
notion can also be used to conceptualise what is at play in poetry, where 
‘seeing-as’ becomes ‘reading-as.’ 
In his Lecture on Aesthetics, Wittgenstein takes up this question of how poetry 
should be read: 
Take the question: ‘How should poetry be read? What is the correct 
way of reading it?’ If you are talking about blank verse the right way 
might of reading it might be stressing it correctly—you discuss how 
far you should stress the rhythm and how far you should hide it. A 
man says it ought to be read this way and reads it to you. You say: 
‘Oh yes. Now it makes sense.’ […] I had an experience with the 18th 
century poet Klopstock. I found that the way to read him was to stress 
his metre abnormally. Klopstock put – (etc.) in front of his poems. 
When I read his poems in this new way, I said: ‘Ah-ha, now I know 
why he did this.’ (LA 12) 
There are ways of reading poetry which make more sense and the poet, like 
Klopstock, might give a few hints on how the poem should be read. Other 
poets on the contrary give no instructions at all, leaving the reader free to 
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read as she likes. But this entails that there are different ways of reading: 
there are different interpretations. This notion of interpretation, which is 
central in art criticism, is, Wittgenstein suggests, related to ‘seeing-as:’ ‘But 
we can also see the illustration now as one thing, now as another.—So we 
interpret it, and see it as we interpret it’ (PPF 116). There is interpretation in 
‘seeing-as,’ just as there is interpretation in ‘reading-as.’ But how can we 
know how to read? Poetry requires from the reader that she stresses the 
words in a way different from everyday reading. A poem makes sense only 
once it is read in the right way. We should not understand ‘right way’ as 
something too specific: there can be multiple right ways to read a poem, 
more precisely, the right way to read a poem is the one that makes sense for 
the reader. The meaning of the poem, or the way it makes sense, depends on 
the reader and how she reads it. It might make sense to read in this way but 
not in that way. This idea could be called ‘reading-as,’ following 
Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing-as:’ a duck-rabbit can be seen as a duck or as a rabbit; 
a poem can be read as a meaningless series of words or as a meaningful 
whole.205 Another interesting aspect from this quote is the reference to 
Klopstock. Although the reader is free to read the poem as she likes, the poet 
can indicate how it should be read and Klopstock does so by indicating the 
rhythm. Reading a poem in one way might not make sense whereas reading 
it following the instructions does. In that sense, a poem is subject to 
interpretation. Its meaning varies according to how the readers read it. More 
than that, it shows a different use of language. Reading a poem and reading 
a newspaper both involve reading, but not in the same sense. This difference 
is similar to Wittgenstein’s distinction between seeing and ‘seeing-as.’ 
                                                     
205 An important distinction to make here however is that both seeing a duck and 
seeing a rabbit are meaningful, are seeing something, whereas reading a poem as a 
meaningless series of words is not meaningful and is like reading nothing. However, 
we could argue that reading a poem as a meaningless series of words is like 
searching (and failing to find) for the rabbit while seeing the duck. A failure to 
understand a poem, therefore a failure to read it as something else than a 
meaningless series of words, is like failing to see the rabbit while looking for it.  
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The poetic language-game, or better the poetic language-games for there is 
more than one way of doing poetry, bring light on different aspects of 
language, aspects which are not highlighted in the ordinary 
communicational practice. In a way, poetry resembles Duchamp’s ready-
mades: Duchamp takes an everyday object and transforms its meaning by 
placing it in a different game, in a different context. Similarly, poets take 
everyday words and transform their meaning. Some examples of poems 
show this transformation (or transfiguration in Danto’s sense) of the 
everyday. First is an excerpt from William Carlos Williams’s poem ‘Two 
Pendants: for the Ears:’ 
2 partridges 
2 Mallard ducks 
a Dungeness crab 
24 hours out 
of the Pacific 
and 2 live-frozen 
trout 
from Denmark206 
What is more ordinary than a grocery list? The fact that it is written by a poet 
and presented as a poem brings us, readers, to believe there is something 
more to it, to read it as a poem. I believe it could work as an autonomous 
text, but Williams’s poem is a bit more complex than that: the grocery list is 
a part of the poem and is introduced as follows:  
Listen, I said, I met a man 
last night told me what he’d brought 
home from the market:207  
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Taken in the wider context of the whole poem, the grocery list appears as a 
bursting in of the ordinary in the poetic and its place within a poem makes 
of this all too ordinary grocery list something poetic. 
The grocery list is not the only bursting in of the ordinary in Williams’s 
poems, the apparition of a ‘SODA’ signboard in ‘The Attic Which Is Desire’ 
is another example of it.208 The word ‘soda’ is staged as a sign—and one 
could see here a play on word as sign and the signboard as sign—within the 
poetic discourse. This play with the ordinary appearing within the poetic is 
a feature of many poems, for instance T. S. Eliot’s repetition of the sentence 
‘HURRY UP PLEASE IT’S TIME’209 in The Waste Land is a use of an ordinary 
voice to bring rhythm to the discourse. This ordinary voice therefore 
becomes a poetic element although it appears at first glance to be an all too 
ordinary sentence. The ordinary therefore brings a poetic element despite its 
ordinary dimension. What is interesting in these apparitions of the ordinary 
within the poetic is not only that the ordinary becomes poetic, but also and 
above all that the poem stages this ordinary becoming poetic and by doing 
so, abolishes any essential difference between ordinary and poetic. The most 
ordinary words, the most ordinary sentences can become poetic in a certain 
context. The context of the poem transforms the ordinary grocery list into a 
poetic element. Williams comments on his use of a grocery list in Paterson: ‘If 
you say “2 partridges, 2 mallard ducks, a Dungeness crab”—if you treat that 
rhythmically, ignoring the practical sense, it forms a jagged pattern. It is, to 
my mind, poetry.’210 As with Wittgenstein’s remark, the poetic dimension 
arises from rhythm in this case as well. In poetry, there always something 
more than the ordinary meaning, as Williams further comments: ‘In prose, 
an English word means what it says. In poetry, you're listening to two things 
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… you're listening to the sense, the common sense of what it says. But it says 
more. That is the difficulty.’211 
Rhythm is one aspect which can change the perspective on words, another 
possible one being sound. In the poem ‘The Crate,’ Francis Ponge plays for 
instance on the sound of the word: 
Halfway between cage (cage) and cachot (cell) the French language has 
cageot (crate), a simple openwork case for the transport of those fruits 
that invariably fall sick over the slightest suffocation.212  
Describing a very ordinary object, Ponge focuses on the sound of the word 
and brings other meanings in the word through sound similarities. He then 
plays with these meanings: ‘fall sick’ and ‘suffocation’ are here related to the 
idea of the cell and transposed onto the crate. The sound of ordinary words 
becomes the playground for the emergence of the poetic. These examples 
show ways in which poetry can modify the ordinary or, better, how poetry 
can arise or appear within the most ordinary words. An important 
dimension in this change of meaning is the context in which the word or the 
object appears. Depending on the context, the meaning changes. By 
displacing a sentence or a statement from an ordinary context to a poetic one, 
the poet, to some extent, makes the ordinary extraordinary. This idea of 
decontextualization can also be found in the works of the Russian Formalists, 
especially Viktor Shklovsky who discusses this extensively in his article ‘Art 
as Device.’ Following Tolstoy, he elaborates the notion of ‘ostranenie:’ 
The goal of art is to create the sensation of seeing, and not merely 
recognizing, things; the device of art is the “ostranenie” of things and 
complication of the form, which increases the duration and 
complexity of perception, as the process of perception is its own end 
in art and must be prolonged.213 
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Through the ‘ostranenie’ or defamiliarization, art brings viewers and reader 
to see things differently. However, Shklovsky’s theory still attempts to 
define poetry in essentialist terms by defining poetic language as different 
from ordinary language: ‘Thus, we arrive at a definition of poetry as 
decelerated, contorted speech.’214 
The grocery list example is the inscription of an ordinary text within a poetic 
one. Another poem by Williams, ‘This Is Just to Say,’ operates a similar move 
but it is no longer the inscription of the ordinary within the poetic which 
grants a poetic status to the ordinary text, but the inscription of an ordinary 
text, or rather a seemingly ordinary one, as a whole in a collection of poems. 
‘This Is Just to Say’215 could very well be a note hung on the fridge (here is 
another similarity with the grocery list), but by moving it from the fridge to 
the collection of poems, Williams changes its status. These examples of 
poems all go in the same direction, namely that there is no essential 
difference between ordinary and poetic language, and that the specificity of 
poetry is not to be found in specific words or sentence constructions, but that 
the poetic always lies at the heart of the ordinary language, as Stanley Fish 
argues: ‘What philosophical semantics and the philosophy of speech acts are 
telling us is that ordinary language is extraordinary because at its heart is 
precisely the realm of values, intentions, and purposes which is often 
assumed to be the exclusive property of literature.’216 Fish’s idea is 
interesting because it breaks down the difference between ordinary and 
poetic language, and does not attempt to define literature as a use of 
language whose essential characteristics are fundamentally different from 
ordinary speech. What is at play in literature for Fish, and that goes in the 
direction of what Wittgenstein says, is that literature is a matter of context or 
perspective and this notion of perspective is also related to the notion of 
imagination. 
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‘Seeing-as’ brings up a new mode of comparison which does not rely on a 
general view of the object but on a specific perspective taken on it, namely 
‘noticing an aspect.’ (PPF 127) ‘Seeing-as’ is a contextual notion depending 
on the perceiver: everyone can notice different aspects and according to the 
importance given to this or that aspect, the understanding of the object can 
differ completely. This specific type of seeing does however not occur all the 
time and one domain in which it occurs frequently, as I have mentioned 
above, is art. In the everyday language-game, just as we follow a rule blindly, 
we see ‘blindly’ along the everyday routine (PPF 137). ‘The concept of 
seeing,’ Wittgenstein adds: 
makes a tangled impression. Well, that’s how it is.—I look at the 
landscape; my gaze wanders over it, I see all sorts of distinct and 
indistinct movement; this impresses itself sharply on me, that very 
hazily. How completely piecemeal what we see can appear! And now 
look at all that can be meant by “description of what is seen!”—But 
this just is what is called “description of what is seen.” There is not 
one genuine, proper case of such description—the rest just being 
unclear, awaiting clarification, or simply to be swept aside as rubbish. 
(PPF 160) 
There can be no ‘genuine descriptions’ because they depend on who 
describes. This can be understood in a phenomenological and intentional 
fashion such as Husserl’s noetico-noematic relation to the world according 
to which we project the thesis on the object when perceiving it, but 
Wittgenstein also draws our attention to the fact that the perceiver is ‘struck.’ 
The intentional part of ‘seeing-as’ is not the only one and certainly not the 
most important one for Wittgenstein. As we will see, ‘seeing-as’ is somehow 
linked to interpretation—a process which includes intentionality—but is not 
identified with it: there can be some ‘seeing-as’ without interpretation. If a 
change of aspect can follow our will (and our intention), ‘it can also occur 
against our will.’ (LW 612) A description will therefore always depend on 
which features struck the spectator and there can be no two identical 
descriptions of a landscape for instance, just as there can be no two identical 
paintings of this landscape. The danger in believing in a ‘genuine description’ 
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is, according to Wittgenstein, the danger of metaphysics, the danger of 
believing in a reality which can be described absolutely and objectively, 
independently from the spectator. 
The task of the painter can be to represent a landscape ‘faithfully,’ but it can 
also be to create a language-game in which her description will fit. And the 
task of the critic or interpreter would be to find the right perspective from 
which to see it.  
Here it occurs to me that in conversation on aesthetic matters we use 
the words “You have to see it like this, this is how it is meant;” “When 
you see it like this, you see where it goes wrong;” “You have to hear 
these bars as an introduction;” “You must listen out for this key;” 
“You must phrase it like this” (which can refer to hearing as well as 
to playing). (PPF 178) 
In painting and music, one must often see something from a certain 
perspective to understand the work. Wittgenstein’s remark in brackets is 
interesting because it shows that this applies not only to the spectator but 
also to the artist herself. The artist sees something as, notices an aspect from 
her surrounding world, and brings it to the fore. She is an interpreter whose 
interpretation will then be subject to the spectator-reader’s interpretation. 
According to Wittgenstein, we do not always interpret because we often see 
things as (in the sense of taking them for) without any reflexive act. 
However, understanding and meaning both depend on the context or the 
language-game in which an object appears. As Fish argues: ‘communication 
occurs within situations and […] to be in a situation is already to be in 
possession of (or to be possessed by) a structure of assumptions, of practices 
understood to be relevant in relation to purposes and goals that are already 
in place; and it is within the assumption of these purposes and goals that any 
utterance is immediately heard.’217 Understanding a sentence depends on the 
context or situation in which the sentence is heard. But there is no 
interpretive act at first: the immediate understanding occurs because of the 
expectations I have. If my understanding is wrong, then the interpretative 
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process begins and I have to modify my assumptions in order to understand 
it. This is precisely what is at play in ‘seeing-as’ or ‘reading-as:’ when I look 
at the duck-rabbit, I can see a duck without any interpretation but if someone 
tells me it is a rabbit and not a duck, then I will have to look at it differently. 
The first understanding is something like an immediate interpretation 
(which would not be an interpretation in Wittgenstein’s terms) whereas the 
second is a reflexive interpretation. Fish’s notion of situation is similar to 
Wittgenstein’s language-game: if two people play different language-games 
(or are in different situations), they will never come to an understanding. 
They will have to find a common ground in order to understand each other. 
One can see something in different ways, giving various interpretations, and 
these interpretations all depend on the context in which she sees this thing, 
or the context she creates around it: 
I can imagine some arbitrary cipher—this,  for instance, to be a 
strictly correct letter of some foreign alphabet. Or again, to be a 
faultily written one, and faulty in this way or that: for example, it 
might be slapdash, or typical childish awkwardness, or, like the 
flourishes in an official document. It could deviate from the correctly 
written letter in a variety of ways.—And according to the fiction with 
which I surround it, I can see it in various aspects. And here there is 
a close kinship with ‘experiencing the meaning of a word.’ (PPF 234) 
Wittgenstein interestingly uses the word ‘fiction’ to name the context. When 
there is no given context, when an object stands out and cannot be attached 
back to its original background, one creates a context in which the object 
makes or takes sense. Of course, an object is never seen out of any context 
and one can usually easily attach an object to the everyday world. But it can 
also happen that one finds an object and does not recognise it. She will 
therefore build fictions in order to find the use for the object. This also applies 
to works of art: a painting, whether seen in a museum or in a church, can be 
subject to various interpretations. The same applies to a poem, whether read 
in its original context or in a different one (in the original anthology or in a 
textbook for instance). 
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For Wittgenstein, this importance of fiction and context links ‘seeing-as’ to 
‘experiencing the meaning of a word.’ Noticing an aspect is identifying an 
element in a larger picture, among various other elements, just as 
‘experiencing the meaning of a word’ is identifying its use among the many 
possible ones. One art form in which experiencing meanings is central is 
poetry, and Wittgenstein brings up this comparison: 
‘When I read a poem or narrative with feeling, surely something goes 
on in me which does not go on when I merely skim the lines for 
information.’—What processes am I alluding to?—The sentences 
have a different ring. I pay careful attention to intonation. Sometimes 
a word has the wrong intonation, stands out too much or too little. 
[…] I can also give a word an intonation which makes its meaning 
stand out from the rest, almost as if the word were a portrait of the 
whole thing. (And this may, of course, depend on the structure of the 
sentence.) (PPF 264) 
Poetry, or any other ‘creative’ use of language, draws attention to something 
which does not occur in the everyday language-game. In poetry, intonation 
makes a word stand out from the rest; this word gains an ‘outstanding’ 
meaning which differs from its meaning in the everyday use and an 
‘outstanding’ position which differs from that of the other words. As we 
have seen, Wittgenstein relates the understanding of a poem to the positions 
of the words in PI 531. What matters in poetry is the position of the words 
and one cannot change them without changing the meaning of the poem. 
Understanding a poem differs from understanding a sentence in the 
everyday language-game as we have seen: in the everyday one, it is possible 
to paraphrase; in poetry, the only paraphrase is repetition or, following 
Cavell, interpretation and criticism. 
Poetry is a specific language-game in which understanding does not follow 
the rules of the everyday one. It is a game with language which must be 
understood in its context. Poetic and ordinary languages must however not 
be considered as two distinct entities. The poetic is a language-game, a 
practice which must be recognised as such. According to Peter Lamarque, 
the practice of poetry is governed by rules on which poets and readers agree: 
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‘Poetry is constituted by a practice, which is grounded in convention-
governed expectations among poets and readers.’218 One limit to such a 
conception of poetry, and one of the reasons why poetry seems to always 
defy definition, is that poetry, especially in the 20th century, challenges the 
established conventions and expectations. In this sense, the practice of poetry 
would rely on the convention that it disturbs and challenges established 
conventions. The reader who therefore approaches the poem cannot always 
rely on the tools she usually uses to understand poetry, but might be brought 
to find new ways of approaching it, new tools, to engage into an 
interpretative process. In other words, and as Fish argues, the interpreter 
who engages in such a practice makes the poem: ‘Interpretation is not the art 
of construing but the art of constructing. Interpreters do not decode poems; 
they make them.’219 Just as I sometimes need to create a fiction around 
something for it to make sense, in interpreting a poem I have to create the 
conditions or situation for this interpretation to make sense. Interpretation is 
thus central in ‘seeing-as’ but it calls for another more creative notion: 
imagination: ‘In other words, the concept “Now I see it as…” is related to 
“Now I am imagining that.”’ (PPF 254) 
Poetry cannot be understood in the everyday language-game; poetry is a 
game which can be likened to the children’s game Wittgenstein describes in 
PPF 205-207 in which the children take a chest for a house. We have seen that 
interpretation depends on a context which can be understood as the fiction 
created around an object. The same happens with children playing: they 
weave ‘a piece of fancy around [the chest],’ they create a context in which 
the meaning is not the same, in which the interpretation of the object does 
not follow the lines of the everyday language-game. ‘Seeing-as’ is to some 
extent similar to interpreting. But the children’s game example shows 
another aspect of ‘seeing-as:’ it is also similar to imagining. To take the chest 
for a house does not call for interpretation but for imagination. 
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Wittgenstein’s discussion of imagination brings the creative dimension of 
‘seeing-as’ to the fore and its relation to the will: ‘Seeing an aspect and 
imagining are subject to the will.’ (PPF 256) Imagination enables us not only 
to describe a change of aspect (as with interpretation) but to create it. This 
dimension reinforces the link between ‘seeing-as’ and the work of an artist. 
If a poet interprets the world to create her poem, she also needs imagination 
do so. As Charles Altieri suggests, in matters of Wittgensteinian literary 
aesthetics, imagination is an essential feature.220  
Just like the children’s game, poetry is a game in which the meanings of the 
words are changed. Insofar as the chest becomes a house for the children, the 
meanings the poet uses for a word become this word’s meaning. This 
creation of new meanings is also used in everyday language, but poetry 
represents a stage on which this creation is brought to a greater degree. The 
various language-games are not completely separated but are interrelated, 
and the potentialities of poetic language lie in the very heart of everyday 
language:  
We don’t notice the enormous variety of all the everyday language-
games, because the clothing of our language makes them all alike. 
(PPF 335) 
There are many language-games, but we do not notice them all. One of the 
characteristics of poetic language-games is that they reveal themselves as 
language-games, as games on or with language. This game is based on 
noticing aspects which can take different meanings according to which one 
is played. But the external appearance does not change, all language-games 
use the same material: words. And the meanings of these words vary 
according to their use, the language-game in which they appear. A poetic 
use of language might use a word in a yet unknown way and by doing so 
poetry reveals aspects of words and of the world we did not know, just as ‘a 
good simile refreshes the intellect.’ (CV, p. 3) 
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Nietzsche and Wittgenstein thus consider poetry to be a way of opening new 
perspectives on the world. Before turning our attention to one of the tools 
the poet uses to create these perspectives, metaphor, it is necessary to focus 
on the creative aspect of perspectivism. Although Wittgenstein considers 
that philosophy has a descriptive task, Nietzsche considers it also has a 
creative one, in that sense similar to poetry, and we will explore this creative 
part in the next chapter. This focus on the creative aspect of perspectives 
offers an interesting insight to approach Nietzsche’s perspectivism. As I will 
argue in the next chapter, one way to avoid the self-contradicting problem 
of perspectivism is to set it on aesthetic grounds and this places aesthetics as 







Towards a Perspectival Poetics 
To approach poetry, Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing-as’ can be translated as ‘reading-
as’ and these notions share similarities with Nietzsche’s idea of perspectives. 
Poetry, and other art forms, by forcing us to ‘noticing aspects,’ ask that we 
look with perspective.221 In the previous chapter, we have focused our 
attention on the reader, but the artist also plays a role in this perspectivism. 
Her role is a creative one and this chapter explores the poet’s role in relation 
to Nietzsche’s perspectivism. In the first part of the chapter, I focus on 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism on aesthetic and poetic grounds. In the second 
part, I turn to the creative dimension of this perspectivism. This creative 
dimension is for instance at play in metaphor, one of the poet’s favourite 
tools, and this notion will be the focus of the next chapter. 
If both the spectator and the artist ‘see as,’ the artist looks at the world with 
her perspective. A note from Culture and Value brings up this notion of 
perspective in art: 
Let’s imagine a theatre, the curtain goes up & we see someone alone 
in his room walking up and down, lighting a cigarette, seating 
himself etc. so that suddenly we are observing a human being from 
outside in a way that ordinarily we can never observe ourselves; as if 
we were watching a chapter from a biography with our own eyes,—
surely this would be at once uncanny and wonderful. More 
wonderful than anything that a playwright could cause to be acted 
or spoken on the stage.—But then we do see this every day & it makes 
not the slightest impression on us! True enough, but we do not see it 
from that point of view. […] The work of art compels us—as one 
might say—to see it in the right perspective, but without art the object 
is a piece of nature like any other & the fact that we may exalt it 
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(2015), p. 184. They idea of experiencing-as allows to consider the epistemic value of 
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through our enthusiasm does not give anyone the right to display it 
to us. (CV, p. 7) 
Just as everyday language does not make much impression on us, precisely 
because we use it every day, a scene from the everyday life does not surprise 
us. Once transposed on stage, however, this scene takes another dimension, 
just like the poet gives words a dimension they did not previously have. 
Some poets bring this to another level, and that is what makes them great 
poets: they are not only users of words but creators: ‘I do not think that 
Shakespeare can be set alongside any other poet. Was he perhaps a creator of 
language rather than a poet?’ (CV, p. 95) More than a ‘creator of language,’ 
Shakespeare and all great poets and artists are creators of perspectives which 
expand the scope of everyday life. 
Great poets and artists give us new perspectives and only with their help can 
we realise that the ordinary is nothing ordinary, but that, following 
Shakespeare in As You Like It: ‘All the world’s a stage and all the men and 
women merely players.’222 As Fish argues in his essay ‘How ordinary is 
ordinary language?,’ at the heart of the ordinary lies the very possibility of 
the extraordinary; at the heart of our everyday language lies the possibility 
of literature and poetry. Artists are those who take this potentiality and make 
it actual. But one does not need to be a great poet with words, poetry in that 
sense outgrows the borders of language, one needs to be poet of one’s own 
life as Nietzsche argues.223 To do so, she needs the help of great artists and 
poets who open perspectives and present them to her eyes: 
Only artists, and especially those of the theatre, have given men eyes 
and ears to see and hear with some pleasure what each man is 
himself, experiences himself, desires himself; only they have taught 
us to esteem the hero that is concealed in everyday characters; only 
they have taught us the art of viewing ourselves as heroes—from a 
distance and, as it were, simplified and transfigured—the art of 
staging and watching ourselves. Only in this way can we deal with 
some base details in ourselves. Without this art we would be nothing 
but the foreground and live entirely in the spell of that perspective 
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which makes what is closest at hand and most vulgar appear as if it 
were vast, and reality itself. (GS 78 / KSA 3.433-4) 
The artist’s strength is to show us the extraordinary dwelling at the heart of 
the ordinary: we all are heroes, but we need the right perspective to realise 
it. This passage from The Gay Science is somehow similar to Wittgenstein’s 
remark on theatre, but with a shift of focus from spectator to creator: whereas 
Wittgenstein draws our attention on the perspective one takes when looking 
at a stage, Nietzsche brings to light the way artists free us from the ordinary 
perspective according to which our surrounding world is reality itself. The 
last sentence quoted in this passage has a very metaphysical feel to it: the 
world of appearance is close to us and reality is hidden behind it, but I think 
there is something more subtle than that at play here. What Nietzsche says 
is that we need to take some distance from ourselves to understand that we 
are linked to a context or a situation and that this context affects our 
understanding of ourselves. There is no such thing as a world of appearance 
as opposed to reality, but we are embedded in a context which imposes a 
certain perspective (through social and moral norms for instance). 
In that sense, there is no such thing as ‘reality,’ but only interpretations and 
projections we make according to our situation and context, and this is the 
basis for Nietzsche’s perspectivism: 
That mountain there! That cloud there! What is ‘real’ in that? Subtract 
the phantasm and every contribution from it, my sober friends! If you 
can! If you can forget your descent, our past, your training—all of 
your humanity and animality. There is no ‘reality’ for us—not for you 
either, my sober friends. (GS 57 / KSA 3.421-2) 
Art allows us to take another perspective on our lives and ourselves and by 
doing so reveals new details. In Nietzsche’s perspectivism, there is no truth 
as correspondence but only truths as disclosure: the truth of art is to reveal 
something from the surrounding world. There have been many discussions 
of Nietzsche’s perspectivism in Nietzschean literature, most of it coming to 
terms with perspectivism being a self-refuting claim. As I will argue, such 
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claims do not stand when perspectivism is taken on aesthetic and poetic 
grounds. 
1. Nietzsche’s Perspectivism 
In a very concise way, Arthur Danto defines perspectivism as ‘the doctrine 
that there are no facts but only interpretations.’224 Despite its efficiency, this 
definition is not completely uncontestable. More specifically, whereas one 
part of this definition seems to be common sense to a Nietzschean discussion 
of perspectivism, another is subject to interpretation. First, the uncontested 
aspect of this definition is that perspectivism is about interpretation and 
suggests replacing the notion of fact by that of interpretation, i.e. replacing 
the metaphysical ‘true world’ by perspectives. As we have seen in previous 
chapters, this replacement is part of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and 
suggests that the interpreter is involved in the process of understanding the 
world and is not a mere passive and external observer. Second, the 
contestable aspect of this definition is the idea that perspectivism is a 
doctrine. As already mentioned regarding Nietzsche’s views on language, 
assigning any fixed and stable theory or doctrine to Nietzsche (as to 
Wittgenstein) is a dangerous move which misses the performative and 
rhetorical dimensions of his writings. 
Without going as far as Werner Stegmaier who considers that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is not made of doctrines but only of signs indicating directions 
the reader can follow,225 attributing any kind of doctrine to Nietzsche can 
prove to be a dangerous and contradictory task. The attribution of doctrines 
to Nietzsche is contradictory not only because his thinking evolves with time 
and he reinterprets earlier works with later ideas—see for example the 
various prefaces written in 1886—but also and above all because the 
fragmentary aesthetics of his works often presents aphorisms which 
contradict themselves if taken as elements of a doctrine. Because of the 
                                                     
224 Danto (2005), p. 59. 
225 See Stegmaier (2006). 
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poetics of his philosophy, taking Nietzsche’s ideas as doctrines only leads to 
the poetic paradox Zarathustra’s disciple faces when Zarathustra claims that 
‘poets lie too much’ while being a poet himself. Furthermore, taking 
Nietzsche’s philosophy as presenting doctrines opens the door to a danger 
of which the history of Nietzsche’s reception contains many examples, 
namely that of an ideological and instrumental reading of Nietszche. Against 
such views, the literary dimension of his writings calls for interpretation, and 
straightforward understandings of his aphorisms as building blocks for a 
doctrine leaves this aspect aside. A doctrine is always somehow absolute and 
tends towards universality whereas perspectivism states the opposite. In this 
sense, the self-refuting problem of perspectivism is a consequence of taking 
it as a doctrine, and especially an epistemological one as we will see. 
To elaborate my reading of Nietzsche’s perspectivism as an ‘aesthetic 
perspectivism’, I will proceed in two steps: first, I will contest the idea that 
perspectivism is an epistemological doctrine and suggest that it rather offers 
an alternative to traditional epistemology; second, I will show the 
importance of value in perspectivism and argue that this importance of value 
is related to the aesthetic dimension of perspectivism. 
The connection between perspectivism and values is clearly stated by 
Nietzsche in his 1886 ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’ in The Birth of Tragedy. In 
this retrospective account, Nietzsche considers The Birth of Tragedy to be a 
perspectival work ‘viewing science through the optic of the artist, and art through 
the optic of life’ (BT ‘Attempt’ 2 / KSA 1.14) and to be his first revaluation of 
all values. These two ideas, perspectivism and revaluation of all values, are 
therefore connected as being two ideas necessary to understand his early 
work. More than a connection through a common task, we could say that the 
revaluation of all values calls for a change of perspective. This connection is 
a hint into considering perspectivism on the grounds of values rather than 
that of knowledge. Knowledge, for Nietzsche, should not necessarily be 
valued positively. He does not cast doubts on knowledge itself, but on the 
value we give it, on our taking knowledge as the most important (if not the 
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only possible) perspective. In other words, traditional epistemology is only 
one perspective among others. Perspectivism is therefore not another 
epistemological doctrine but operates at a more fundamental level in 
conceptualising our relation to the world. By taking perspectivism as an 
aesthetic and axiological matter rather than an epistemological one, we can 
come to a more convincing use of the notion. Perspectivism is above all a 
matter of vision and seeing, of the way we relate to the world, and by taking 
this notion back to its original ground of perception, we can not only connect 
it to Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing-as’ but also to Nietzsche’s early conceptions of 
language and metaphors. 
a. Perspectivism as an Alternative to Epistemology 
Many commentators in the English-speaking world consider perspectivism 
to be central to Nietzsche’s philosophy and, more importantly, central to the 
use contemporary philosophy can make of Nietzsche.226 According to 
Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche’s perspectivism ‘constitutes his most obvious 
contribution to the current intellectual scene, the most widely accepted 
Nietzschean doctrine.’227 We have already seen that making perspectivism a 
doctrine is somehow dangerous, but Clark’s conception of Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism relies on another aspect, namely that perspectivism is a matter 
of epistemology. Clark defines perspectivism as ‘the claim that all 
knowledge is perspectival’ and points out that ‘Nietzsche also characterizes 
values as perspectival but [that she] shall be concerned here only with his 
perspectivism regarding knowledge.’228 Against Clark, I will explore the 
relation between perspectivism and values in the second part of this section. 
                                                     
226 Perspectivism has indeed become an important strand in contemporary 
epistemology but has done so by extracting itself from the Nietzschean 
realm. For instance, Michaela Massimi advocates for perspectivism as a 
‘middle ground between scientific realism and antirealism’ by referring not 
to Nietzsche (whom she nevertheless mentions en passant) but to Kant, a 
much more common figure in epistemological research. See Massimi (2018). 
227 Clark (1990), p. 127. 
228 Clark (1990), p. 127. 
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Among the many scholars who have tackled the question of Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism, most agree on considering it an epistemological doctrine and 
are therefore confronted to the so-called self-refuting problem of 
perspectivism. To present this problem, Steven Hales and Rex Welshon 
oppose ‘strong perspectivism’ to ‘absolutism’: 
Recall that absolutism is the denial of strong perspectivism. Since 
strong perspectivism is the claim that every statement is true in some 
perspective and untrue in another, the following is a rendering of 
absolutism: there is at least one statement that is either true in all 
perspectives or untrue in all perspectives. […] Suppose that strong 
perspectivism is true in all perspectives. If so, then there is a 
statement that has the same truth value in all perspectives—viz., the 
thesis of strong perspectivism itself. But, if there is some statement 
that has the same truth value in all perspectives, then absolutism is 
true, or, to put the matter in an equivalent form, if strong 
perspectivism is true in all perspectives, then strong perspectivism is 
untrue.229 
This treatment of Nietzsche’s perspectivism is precisely what leads scholars 
to consider it to entail a contradiction. If we consider Hales and Welshon 
(and with them a certain tradition of Nietzsche interpretation) to be right in 
opposing perspectivism to absolutism, i.e. as two opposed and distinct 
metaphysical-epistemological doctrines, then there is indeed a contradiction 
within Nietzsche’s ‘doctrine.’ The next step for most commentators is then 
to find a way of avoiding this contradiction, for example by proposing a 
‘weak perspectivism’ in the case of Hales and Welshon or by showing that, 
despite his criticisms, Nietzsche has a minimal conception of truth as 
correspondence in the case of Clark. 
However, a more interesting move, and probably more consistent with 
Nietzsche’s rhetoric, is to consider perspectivism not as opposed to 
absolutism but as an alternative to it. Doing so undercuts the contradiction 
as it moves perspectivism to another field of discussion. In other words, 
perspectivism would not be another epistemological doctrine, but an 
                                                     




alternative to traditional epistemology. It would be, as Tracy Strong 
suggests, an attempt at replacing epistemology. 230 As we will see, this 
alternative suggests taking perception as a central notion rather than 
knowledge. 
A first step towards this alternative is taken by Alan Schrift who considers 
that ‘Nietzsche’s perspectival account does not provide a theory at all; it is a 
rhetorical strategy that offers an alternative to the traditional epistemological 
conception of knowledge as the possession of some stable, eternal “entities,” 
whether these be considered “truths,” “facts,” “meanings,” “propositions,” 
or whatever. As we shall see, Nietzsche views these “entities” as beyond the 
limits of human comprehension, and, whether or not they exist (a question 
Nietzsche regards as an “idle hypothesis” [see WP, 560]), he concludes that 
we are surely incapable of “knowing” them.’231 According to Schrift, 
Nietzsche’s philosophy should not be understood as presenting a theory of 
knowledge, but rather as explaining why remaining within the metaphysical 
framework which considers world and words as ‘aeternae veritates’ leads to 
the impossibility of knowledge.232 
Schrift’s account of perspectivism brings us back to Danto’s concise 
definition of it. Against the idea that there are facts (or any other stable 
metaphysical entity, a ‘true world’) of which we can reach an absolute 
knowledge, perspectivism suggests there are only interpretations. This 
notion of interpretation casts an aesthetic or literary light on perspectivism, 
as Christoph Cox argues: ‘Unlike the notion of “perspective”—which, 
literally construed, generates serious epistemological difficulties—the 
                                                     
230 Strong (1985), p. 165. 
231 Schrift (1990), p. 145. 
232 Such a view is not unrelated to Wittgenstein’s idea that any framework in 
which truth is understood as a metaphysical and absolute ‘entity’ can only 
lead to scepticism. Against this scepticism, Wittgenstein suggests going back 
to the ordinary. Nietzsche does not follow the same route as even ordinary 
language is metaphysically loaded for him but suggests understanding our 




notion of “interpretation” operates within a rich and increasingly important 
literary and philosophical tradition.’233 It is not really the notion of 
‘perspective’ that generates difficulty, but rather the placing of perspective 
in the epistemological realm. Leaving perspective in its original grounds of 
perception and vision avoids such difficulties. The notion of interpretation 
however interestingly brings to the fore the interpreter, the spectator, rather 
than what is seen, be it the ‘world,’ ‘reality,’ ‘facts,’ notions which all have 
heavy metaphysical connotations. 
Perspectivism offers an alternative to traditional epistemology insofar as it 
relies precisely on this interpreter, on this eye that sees rather than on the 
‘reality’ which is seen. This dimension of vision, which is central to the 
notion of perspective itself, is however completely left aside in discussions 
on perspectivism. For instance, Hales’ and Welshon’s book-length 
discussion on perspectivism contains chapters on ‘Truth,’ ‘Logic,’ 
‘Ontology’, ‘Causality,’ Epistemology,’ ‘Consciousness,’ and ‘The Self’ with 
almost no mention of perception at all.234 In a sense, contemporary 
interpreters of Nietzsche remain within the traditional epistemological 
framework from which Nietzsche attempts to escape. The alternative to 
epistemology Nietzsche offers relies precisely on the notions of vision and 
perception. These notions are central to perspectivism and we have seen that 
he considers the task of philosophy to be ‘that of viewing science through the 
optic of the artist, and art through the optic of life…’ (BT ‘Attempt’ 2 / KSA 1.14). 
Coming back to the etymology of aesthetics, aisthesis, sensation or 
perception, Nietzsche’s focus on vision suggests that perspectivism should 
be linked to aesthetic concerns rather than epistemological ones. As Kathleen 
                                                     
233 Cox (1997), p. 272. 
234 The only time Hales and Welshon discuss the notion of perception in 
Nietzsche is in relation to Leibniz’s distinction between ‘perception,’ 
‘sensation,’ and ‘apperception.’ They however do not attempt to relate their 
discussion of perception to perspectivism, although there might be a 
connection between perspectivism and Leibniz. See Hales and Welshon 
(2000), pp. 136-137. 
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Higgins argues: ‘This term [aesthetic] is appropriate, I think, because it gets 
at the root and range of the perspectival variables that are relevant to a true 
picture of the situations in which we apprehend. An additional advantage of 
the term is that Nietzsche's images drawn from the sphere of art and 
aesthetics more narrowly conceived usually reverberate, illuminating 
features of life, broadly conceived. Nietzsche dethrones “traditional” 
epistemology from its queenly place in philosophy in favor of aesthetics, the 
study of perception and value within the perceptual sphere.’235 By bringing 
to the fore perception, and especially the place or situation of the perceiver, 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism offers an alternative way to relate to the world, a 
way in which the seeing or perceiving is more fundamental than what is seen 
or perceived. 
Taken as a doctrine concerning knowledge, perspectivism is a self-refuting 
claim: if all is perspectival, then perspectivism is only a perspective. 
Nietzsche is well aware of this self-refuting problem and we have seen that 
he responds to it in Beyond Good and Evil only by saying ‘then, all the better’ 
(BGE 22 / KSA 5.37). As the shift to a performative language in Nietzsche’s 
reply to the charge of self-refutation suggests, the interpretation according 
to which Nietzsche’s perspectivism is self-refuting misses the point of 
perspectivism. This claim is self-refuting only if one takes it as an 
epistemological or metaphysical doctrine, but perspectivism precisely aims 
at moving away from this epistemological-metaphysical framework. 
Returning to the etymological sense of aesthetics, I believe perspectivism to 
be an aesthetic matter, which places the aesthetic, i.e. the perceptual and the 
sensual, at the centre of philosophical concerns: perspectivism is a matter of 
perception and more precisely ‘half visual experience half thought’ (PPF 140) 
similar to Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing-as.’ 
Following Nietzsche, perspectivism would be an alternative to epistemology 
in a way similar to which aesthetics is an alternative to the rationalist 
                                                     
235 Higgins (2000), p. 52. 
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philosophy of the 16th and 17th centuries. Baumgarten’s understanding of 
aesthetics as the science of sensations contests the rationalist’s epistemology 
which relies solely on reason and suggests that the senses, too, can give us 
knowledge of the world. As Stefan Majetschak argues, Baumgarten’s 
conception of aesthetics is a ‘rebellion against the rationalists’ narrow 
concept of knowledge.’236 Nietzsche’s perspectivism pursues Baumgarten’s 
rehabilitation of the senses but takes it in a completely different direction. If 
there are no metaphysical entities we can know, the senses are not only a 
supplement to reason, but all that there is. A perspective, in this framework, 
could be considered a ‘situated perception’ or, in Wittgensteinian terms, a 
‘seeing-as.’ 
In a sense, Nietzsche operates the shift Rorty calls for in criticising traditional 
epistemology and philosophy as being the ‘mirror of nature.’ Against a 
representational epistemology and against a representational conception of 
language—which both rely on the metaphysical idea that the philosopher 
can objectively describe the world and that her being part of it does not 
influence the description—Nietzsche shifts the focus from the world and 
what we can say about it (because we can never reach any certainty about it, 
Wittgenstein would argue) to the way we relate to it, to our perception, to 
our worldview, and to all the elements that come into play in such 
perceptions. Perspectivism shifts the focus from what one sees to how one 
sees and to the various elements (linguistic, cultural, moral, religious, 
historical, etc.) that modify the way of seeing. As we will see, an important 
element in Nietzsche’s understanding of how one sees the world is language 
                                                     
236 See Majetschak (2007), p. 13: ‘mit dem seinerzeit dominanten 
philosophischen Rationalismus, der ausschließlich begriffliches Wissen als 
wahres Wissen anerkannte und gegen dessen damit einhergehende 
Verkennung der in den Sinnesvermögen gelegenen vernunftanalogen 
Kompetenzen des Menschen Baumgartens Aesthetica rebellierte. Diese 
Rebellion gegen den aus seiner Sicht verengten Erkenntnisbegriff des 
Rationalismus führte Baumgarten—philosophiehistorisch gesehen 
erstmals—dazu, die Eigengesetzlichkeit und Erkenntnisfähigkeit der 
Sinnesvermögen des Menschen explizit zu thematisieren.’ 
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as our relation to the world is always mediated by language (the 
metaphorical process in On Truth and Lie). As Nietzsche says: ‘The way men 
usually are, it takes a name to make something visible for them.’ (GS 261, 
KSA 3.517) 
This notion of seeing is also strongly present in one of the most famous of 
Nietzsche’s text on perspectivism in The Genealogy of Morals: 
From now on, my dear philosophers, let us beware of the dangerous 
old conceptual fable which posited a ‘pure, will-less, painless, 
timeless knowing subject,’ let us beware of the tentacles of such 
contradictory concepts as ‘pure reason,’ ‘absolute spirituality,’ 
‘knowledge in itself;’—for these always ask us to imagine an eye 
which is impossible to imagine, an eye which supposedly looks out 
in no particular direction, an eye which supposedly either restrains 
or altogether lacks the active powers of interpretation which first 
makes seeing into seeing something—for here, then, a nonsense and 
non-concept is demanded of the eye. Perspectival seeing is the only 
kind of seeing there is, perspectival ‘knowing’ the only kind of 
‘knowing;’ and the more the feelings about a matter which we allow 
to come to expression, the more eyes, different eyes through which we 
are able to view this same matter, the more complete our ‘conception’ 
of it, our ‘objectivity,’ will be. (GM III 12/ KSA 5.365) 
This passage condenses most of Nietzsche’s critique of traditional modes of 
thinking and presents the main characteristics of his perspectivism. First of 
all, Nietzsche opposes the perspectival to the ‘pure,’ the ‘absolute,’ and the 
‘as such.’ What Nietzsche criticises here, as we have seen in the previous 
chapters, is the philosophers’ tendency to universalise a concept against the 
multiplicity of phenomena. Rather than stating his critique in terms of 
language and metaphysics as he does in On Truth and Lie for instance, he 
elaborates it around the notion of ‘seeing.’ For any seeing to occur, there 
necessarily must be an eye, and therefore a subject, which perceives. 
Nietzsche criticises philosophers who have tried to annihilate this 
subjectivity in order to reach absoluteness. He takes the counterpoint of his 
predecessors by promoting a perspectival seeing, that is a seeing by a subject 
who interprets. It is interesting to note that Nietzsche first talks about a 
‘perspectival seeing’ before a ‘perspectival knowing.’ Perspectivism is not at 
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first a matter of knowledge but above all a matter of perception. If there is a 
perspectival knowing, it is only because in order to know something, one 
must first perceive it (and this often happens visually). This perception being 
perspectival, the knowledge built upon it can only be perspectival as well. 
As already discussed in previous chapters, perspectivism does not lead to a 
radical relativism but to a conceptual one according to which we can never 
know what the world is outside of our conceptual scheme (or even if there is 
such a thing as ‘the world’) or, in a Nietzschean vocabulary, outside of our 
perspective. The perspective limits or frames the perception and therefore 
the knowledge elaborated from it. This perspectivism is mainly an attack 
against the objectivity science or metaphysics pretend to reach. There cannot 
be any non-perspectival knowledge and in opposition to the ‘bad’ objectivity 
he criticises—objectivity which eradicates subjectivity—Nietzsche calls 
‘objectivity’ the sum of the multiple perspectives. As the multiplicity of 
perspectives is, if not infinite, at least indefinite, one can never reach any 
absolute sum, any absolute objectivity. The knowledge of a thing depends 
first on our perspectival seeing, then on our description of it. And one 
element essential to any description of a thing is, according to Nietzsche, the 
affects we put into our words: the more affects, the better the description. 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism aims to show that there can be no knowledge 
without context, no absolute knowledge, for there is no ‘objective’ 
perception. All perception is perspectival and linked to a perceiving subject. 
Whereas Wittgenstein’s focus with ‘seeing-as’ is on the object seen, 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism focuses on the perceiving subject. ‘Seeing-as’ and 
perspectivism both revolve around the same idea—’seeing-as’ is a kind of 
perspectivism—but the former focuses on what is seen and the possible 
interpretations, whereas the latter focuses on who or what sees and the 
affects at play in this perspectival seeing. The main difference between 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein is that Nietzsche takes perspectivism into the 
realm of values, therefore linking it to his critiques of morality and culture, 
whereas Wittgenstein’s main focus with ‘seeing-as’ is not culture but 
190 
 
psychology. Of course, psychology is important for Nietzsche as well—he 
considers psychology as the ‘queen of the sciences’ (BGE 23 / KSA 5.39)—but 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein do not operate at the same level: Wittgenstein 
seeks to observe and describe the effects of psychology on seeing, among 
other things, whereas Nietzsche focuses on the deeper and unconscious level 
of the influence of affects and context on psychology. Their shared concern 
with psychology does however lead them to connect seeing to interpreting, 
and therefore to language. As we have seen, ‘seeing-as’ can be linked to 
language-games, each language-game entailing a specific kind of seeing and 
for Nietzsche too, perspectivism is linked to language. 
This perspectival seeing can already be seen as playing a role in Nietzsche’s 
conception of language in On Truth and Lie. Whereas most commentators 
take On Truth and Lie to contain an early version of perspectivism in which 
Nietzsche has not yet abandoned the thing-in-itself, I believe that we can 
interpret Nietzsche’s notion of metaphor as a perspectival seeing.237 Most of 
the critiques regarding Nietzsche’s perspectivism in On Truth and Lie concern 
its focus on the thing-in-itself, the object of perspectivism. This focus forces 
Nietzsche to hold a difficult metaphysical position in which he criticises 
truth as correspondence, metaphysical language, and the thing-in-itself, 
whilst using them to say what he wants. If we shift focus from the object to 
the subject, as Nietzsche does in his later works, there are quite a few 
elements which can be of use to perspectivism in On Truth and Lie. The main 
element is the notion of metaphor which is the place of the perspectival 
seeing. Nietzsche describes language as being the result of a double 
metaphorical process: ‘To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an 
image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated into a sound: second 
metaphor.’ (TL 1 / KSA 1.879) As we have seen in our discussion of On Truth 
and Lie in Chapter Three, this can be understood as some basic sense data 
                                                     
237 On Nietzsche’s early perspectivism, see for instance Conant (2005), pp. 40-49. 
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empiricism: a stimulus reaches the mind of the perceiver who creates a 
corresponding image in her mind. 
In this sense, metaphor operates a translation and we must shift our focus 
from the thing (the sense data) to the perspective. If there is a translation, this 
means it is a process and that elements from the context (external and 
internal to the perceiver) can come into play. The seeing process 
characterised as metaphor can therefore be understood as a ‘seeing-as’ or an 
interpretation. This is Sarah Kofman’s thesis mentioned in Chapter Three 
according to which Nietzsche replaces metaphor with perspective in his later 
works.238 The process Nietzsche describes concerns various metaphorical 
processes: the translation from stimuli to images is only the first one. The 
second metaphor gets closer to Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing-as:’ the image created 
in the perceiver’s mind is then translated into a word. The perceiver does 
therefore not yet understand the images: understanding calls for another 
metaphorical process. The image is interpreted through its translation into a 
word. We have seen that, for Wittgenstein, interpretation does not always 
play a role in ‘seeing-as.’ In the Nietzschean process, it would mean that the 
translation from image to word is sometimes immediate, without reflection, 
sometimes requires interpretation. As Nietzsche’s theory aims at explaining 
the origins of language, it would mean that language is built on various 
‘seeing-as’ and that new language can be created with new ‘seeing-as,’ new 
perspectives. 
b. Perspectivism and Values 
What happens between the ‘seeing’ and the ‘seeing-as’? What happens 
between the first and the second metaphor? Whether there is an 
interpretative process or not, a whole set of values are brought into the 
seeing. When observing, the perceiver brings her whole system of values 
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with her. And language is filled with values: ‘Every word is a prejudice’ (WS 
55 / KSA 2.577), Nietzsche argues, and every value judgment is a perspective:  
You must learn how to grasp the perspectival element in every 
valuation—the displacement, distortion, and seeming teleology of 
horizons and everything else that pertains to perspectivism; and also 
how much stupidity there is in opposed values and the whole 
intellectual loss that must be paid for every For, every Against. You 
must learn to grasp the necessary injustice in every For and Against, 
injustice as inseparable from life, life itself as conditioned by 
perspective and its injustice. (HH ‘Preface’ 6 / KSA 2. 20) 
In the preface to Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche explicitly relates 
perspectivism to values. Knowledge is perspectival in the sense that 
knowledge is a perspective taken on life, and it is not the only perspective. 
With each perspective comes a value judgment and Nietzsche uses 
perspectivism to show that what we usually take for granted are only 
perspectives and that what we take for being good or bad is only a value 
attached to such a perspective. The opposition between true and untrue is a 
perspective (or an optics) through which we look at the world. In this 
perspective, we attribute positive values to truth, negative ones to lies. 
However, and hence the title ‘On Truth and Lie in a Non-Moral Sense,’ other 
perspectives can be taken, with other valuations attached to them. 
This casting doubts on the value we attribute to truth is the starting point of 
Beyond Good and Evil: as there is no such thing as an objective, real, or true 
perspective, our valuations must depend on other criteria: be it beauty, use, 
love, and so on. As much as the description depends on the subject who 
describes, the valuation depends on the person who evaluates. Perspectives 
and valuations are numerous, and one can change perspective at any time 
(just as one can focus on the duck or the rabbit in Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit 
example). This does not mean that changing perspective is something easy 
to do, on the contrary it is rather difficult and violent as one has to abandon 
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one’s old ways of seeing.239 Because of their unconstrained imagination and 
their supposedly innocent gaze, children (and they are an example 
Wittgenstein uses a lot) are great at changing perspectives. And let us not 
forget that ‘In a genuine man a child is hidden: it wants to play.’ (Z I ‘Women’ 
/ KSA 4.85) The image of the child is a recurring feature in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy and especially in Zarathustra. Let us not forget that the child is 
the last transformation of the spirit after the camel and the lion. The child is 
the yes-saying spirit: ‘the spirit now wills its own will, the one who had lost 
the world attains its own world.’ (Z I ‘Transformations’ / KSA 4.31) The spirit 
transformed back into a child is the only one that can affirm the world and 
affirm its own world. It is the spirit that can affirm its own perspectives. 
Whereas the camel follows the established perspectives and collapses under 
the weight of old values, whereas the lion negates the old values with a 
negative or destructive perspective, the child is the one who can create from 
the debris of the old values, who can affirm positive and creative 
perspectives. 
Following one of Heraclitus’ images, Nietzsche compares the poet to the 
child at play. This child, according to Nietzsche’s reading of Heraclitus, 
playfully destroys and creates perspectives. 
That striving towards the infinite, the beating of the wings of longing, 
which accompanies the highest joy in clearly perceived reality, recall 
that we must recognize in both states a Dionysian phenomenon, 
which reveals to us again and again the playful construction and 
destruction of the individual world as the overflow of an original joy, 
in a similar way to that in which Heraclitus the Obscure compares 
the world-forming force to a child at play, arranging and scattering 
stones here and there, building and then trampling sand-hills. (BT 24 
/ KSA 1.153) 
                                                     
239 In Sophie Fiennes’s documentary The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema, Žižek analyses 
John Carpenter’s film They Live and suggests a similar violence to change ideology. 
In this film, the main character finds glasses which show him the message behind 
advertising and a fight ensues his attempt to bring from his friend to use the glasses. 
Ideology is so embedded in us that, Žižek argues, violence is sometimes necessary 
to question it. See Fiennes (2006). 
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This child at play, this yes-saying spirit destroying and creating perspectives, 
is similar to the poet who offers an aesthetic interpretation of the world. The 
Dionysian poet, too, creates and destroys perspectives to give her 
interpretation of the world. At the opposite of this aesthetic interpretation is 
the moral one Christianity defends: 
In truth, there is no greater contradiction of the purely aesthetic 
interpretation and justification of the world as it is taught in this book 
than the Christian doctrine which is and wants to be exclusively 
moral and, with its absolute standard—already for example with the 
truthfulness of God—exiles art, each and every art, to the realm of lies—
that is, denies, damns, condemns it. (BT ‘Attempt’ 5 / KSA 1.18) 
The moral perspective is opposed to the aesthetic one because the former 
aims at stability whereas the latter aims at movement. There are many 
interpretations of the world: art and religion are two perspectives (and even 
more as art and religion contain many different perspectives). What 
Nietzsche criticises in Christianity and the herd morality is its claim to be the 
unique interpretation of the world. 
Nietzsche criticises science on similar grounds: ‘A “scientific” interpretation 
of the world, as you understand it, might therefore still be one of the most 
stupid of all possible interpretations of the world, meaning that it would be 
one of the poorest in meaning.’ (GS 373 / KSA 3.626) Science is only one 
interpretation among others and by taking it as the ‘true’ interpretation, we 
follow the mistakes of metaphysical absoluteness. More than science itself, 
Nietzsche criticises here scientism, the application of scientific method to all 
objects. Interpreting the world (and this means not only the natural world 
but also the cultural one) according to the sole perspective of scientific 
method precisely reduces the number of perspectives to a single one. Hence 
scientism would be the poorest in meaning because the poorest in the 
number of possible perspectives whereas the poetic allows for multiple 




The fear of science, of ‘scientism,’ of ‘naturalism,’ of self-
objectivation, of being turned by too much knowledge into a thing 
rather than a person, is the fear that all discourse will become normal 
discourse. That is, it is the fear that there will be objectively true or 
false answers to every question we ask, so that human worth will 
consist in knowing truths, and human virtue will be merely justified 
true belief. This is frightening because it cuts off the possibility of 
something new under the sun, of human life as poetic rather than 
merely contemplative.240  
Scientism is however not the only danger according to Nietzsche, a similar 
critique can be made to metaphysics and religion, especially Christianity as 
we have seen. This opposition between the plurality of perspectives and the 
single one promoted by Christianity can be linked to Nietzsche’s conception 
of ‘eternal recurrence:’ eternal recurrence could be interpreted as the never-
ending process of destroying and creating perspectives, whereas 
Christianity promotes a motionless eternity: eternal life is perhaps the most 
contradictory conception as life is nothing but moving. The eternal 
recurrence is opposed to eternal life as movement is opposed to stability. 
Morality and science work towards constructing their ‘cyclopic building’ 
(GS 7 / KSA 3.380), towards establishing their single perspective. But as 
Nietzsche often argues, and his critiques of morality and science occur on 
the same grounds as those of metaphysics and religion, to identify 
everything under a single perspective loses the multiplicity of life: ‘Behind 
such a way of thinking and evaluating, which must be hostile to art, if it is at 
all genuine, I always sensed hostility to life, the wrathful and vengeful disgust 
at life itself: for all life is founded on appearance, art, illusion, optic, the 
necessity of the perspectival and of error.’ (BT ‘Attempt’ 5 / KSA 1.18) 
Religion, scientism, morality: all are hostile to life and Nietzsche considers 
them nihilistic. To remain enclosed within one perspective is nihilistic as it 
contradicts the multiplicity of life. Indeed, existence is full of different 
perspectives giving various meanings (and this to an infinite extent): 
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How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed 
whether existence has any other character than this; whether 
existence without interpretation, without ‘sense,’ does not become 
‘nonsense’; whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially 
engaged in interpretation—that cannot be decided even by the most 
industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-
examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the 
human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, 
and only in these. […] Rather has the world become ‘infinite’ for us 
all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibility that it may 
include infinite interpretations. (GS 374 / KSA 3.626-7) 
Poetry and art might therefore be better at describing existence than science 
or religion because they allow for the multiplicity of perspectives to exist and 
co-exist. This is precisely Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s move against 
metaphysics, against the idea that the world can be fully grasped from one 
unique and only perspective. Rorty describes the quarrel between 
philosophy and poetry in these opposing terms of unicity and multiplicity: 
‘To take the side of the poets in this quarrel is to say that there are many 
descriptions of the same things and events, and that there is no neutral 
standpoint from which to judge the superiority of one description over 
another. Philosophy stands in opposition to poetry just insofar as it insists 
that there is such a standpoint.’241 
2. A Poetic Worldview 
Wreckage of stars: 
I built a world from this wreckage  
Nietzsche, ‘Through the circle of Dionysos Dithyrambs’ 242 
Perspectivism as discussed above is both an aesthetic and poetic matter: it is 
an aesthetic one because it is based on the multiplicity of perceptions 
through which the world appears to us; it is a poetic matter because the 
perspectives are made or created, and that this creation is, following the 
etymology of poetry, poiesis, a poetic making. Just as there can be various 
interpretations of a text, there can be multiple interpretations of anything 
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happening. In that sense, the world is all that is subject to interpretation. The 
multiplicity of perspectives and interpretations lead to various poetic 
worldviews created by a subject, the ‘eye’ (and hence the ‘I’) which is always 
at the source of the seeing as Nietzsche argues. If a worldview is poetic, it is 
because it is created, made, crafted. A perspectival poetics means a making 
of perspectives which lead to a worldview. 
In such a poetic worldview ‘What I want is more; I am no seeker. I want to 
create myself a sun of my own.’ (GS 320 / KSA 3.320) One must abandon the 
passive descriptive stance and become a creator (of perspectives): 
Moving away from things until there is a good deal that one no longer 
sees and there is much that our eye has to add if we are still to see 
them at all; or seeing things around a corner and as cut out and 
framed; or to place them so that they partially conceal each other and 
grant us only glimpses of architectural perspectives; or looking at 
them through tinted glass or in the light of the sunset; or giving them 
a surface and skin that is not fully transparent—all this we should 
learn from artists while being wiser than they are in other matters. 
For with them this subtle power usually comes to an end where art 
and life begins; but we want to be poets of our life—first of all in the 
smallest, most everyday matters. (GS 299 / KSA 3.538) 
To be poets of our life means to be creators of our life because, as in 
Apollinaire’s description of the task of poetry: ‘It is that poetry and creation 
are one and the same; only that man can be called poet who invents, who 
creates insofar as man can create. The poet is who discovers new joys, even 
if they are hard to bear. One can be a poet in any field: it is enough that one 
be adventuresome and pursue new discovery.’243 Just as the artist’s 
perspective reveals the hero within us, we can adopt the right perspective to 
become poets and heroes of our life, creators of something rather than 
followers. Creation is Nietzsche’s escape route from herd morality. But how 
can one become a creator? 
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According to Nietzsche the act of creation is tightly linked to the act of 
destruction: to create one must destroy. And one way of creating things for 
the poet is to create words: 
to realize that what things are called is incomparably more important 
than what they are. […] What at first was appearance becomes in the 
end, almost invariably, the essence and is effective as such. How 
foolish it would be to suppose that one only needs to point out this 
origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world 
that counts for real, so-called ‘reality’. We can destroy only as 
creators.—But let us not forget this either: it is enough to create new 
names and estimations and probabilities in order to create in the long 
run new “things.” (GS 58 / KSA 3.422) 
In order to destroy the false belief in the metaphysical dualism between 
reality and appearance, the philosopher must create ‘new things’ to replace 
the ‘old’ ones. The creation of something new replaces the old one and 
therefore destroys it. In order to create these ‘new things,’ one must create 
new words to account for those not yet existing things. This calls for 
originality according to Nietzsche: ‘What is originality? To see something that 
has no name yet and hence cannot be mentioned although it stares us all in 
the face. The way men usually are, it takes a name to make something visible 
for them.—Those with originality have for the most part also assigned 
names.’ (GS 261 / KSA 3.261) In order to create new words, one needs 
originality, and an original perspective. However, Nietzsche is not saying 
that creating a word creates a thing, there is no such thing as a direct 
correspondence between language and world, but rather that the process of 
creating a word (the metaphorical process explored in On Truth and Lie) 
opens new perspectives which disclose something of the world and allow 
communicating it. The word is the product of a certain perspective taken and 
the creation of a word creates possibilities of interpretation. In turn, this new 
word allows new perspectives to be taken on the world. The process is 
therefore double: a perspective creates a new word and a new word creates 
new possibilities in interpretation, i.e. new perspectives. Let us note however 
that the interpretative process is not necessarily always an interpretation in 
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Wittgenstein’s sense: interpretation can be unconscious and perspectivism is 
often unconscious. 
This notion of unconsciousness on which Nietzsche develops quite 
extensively is another aspect of the critique of metaphysics and its ‘magic’ 
language as the metaphysical conceptions of language and the world are 
made by negating the unconscious: 
This is the essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as I 
understand them: Owing to the nature of animal consciousness, the 
world of which we can become conscious is only a surface- and a 
sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever 
becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively 
stupid, general, sign, herd, signal; all becoming conscious involves a 
great art and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to 
superficialities, and generalization. (GS 354 / KSA 3.593) 
This process of ‘becoming conscious’ is what happens in the metaphorical 
transposition of an image into a word: we become conscious of the object 
through the word. But the world disclosed through this process of naming 
loses its uniqueness: words equate unequal metaphors. There is a whole 
world of which we are not conscious either because it is lost in the process of 
naming or has not been named yet. And this unconscious dimension of the 
world is not the least part of it. To some extent, Nietzsche’s unconscious 
world is similar to Wittgenstein’s ‘mystical.’ The unconscious is what cannot 
be named because there is no word to describe it. 
Nietzsche’s poetic worldview does not aim at returning to the Greeks’ tragic 
culture. Like the tragic culture, however, it aims at replacing science as the 
highest goal. Science, morality, or Christianity cannot be the highest goal, for 
there is no highest goal. This is what a perspectival poetics teaches us: the 
poetic worldview Nietzsche suggests calls for destruction and creation or, 
better, destruction through creation and vice versa. This is a point on which 
Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s views seem the most distant from one 
another as Wittgenstein considers that philosophy should remain at the level 
of description. However, description can lead to change as it can lead to take 
another perspective on a matter and might even require the creation of a 
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perspective which can satisfy the description, in the same sense that one 
might need to create a context to understand a sign. Nietzsche’s process of 
creation of perspectives destroys the one-sided perspective we usually 
follow. We must overcome the absoluteness of the scientific, moral, and 
religious (those being linked for Nietzsche) perspectives to embrace the 
plurality of perspectives without privileging one or another a priori. 
Nietzsche does not want science, morality, and religion to disappear, but he 
wants to escape their absolute character. It is however clear that if the 
scientific perspective loses its absoluteness, it will not be the same 
perspective as the one we know (perhaps it will become the wisdom 
perspective from Greek culture); and the same goes for the herd morality 
and Christianity. The overcoming of the old perspectives should not be seen 
as a Hegelian ‘Aufhebung’ because it is not the opposition of two 
perspectives that give rise to a third uniting one but, as Nietzsche suggests 
with his conception of fight between wills to power, the constant fight 
between perspectives that lead to consider perspectivism as the only viable 
option. Nietzsche’s interest is in the fight itself, not the issue (for there is no 
issue). Various interpretations fight each other and by doing so enrich each 
other. One of these fights between perspectives can be exemplified by the 
‘quarrel’ between philosophy and poetry, two interpretations which can 
enrich each other. 
To exemplify this overcoming of old perspectives through the fight with new 
perspectives, both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein use the figure of the child. 
The poetic worldview could very well be called a childlike worldview, in a 
positive sense. We have seen that, in Zarathustra, the third and final 
transformation of the spirit is in the yes-saying child, and that Wittgenstein 
calls for the children’s imagination in order to discuss the notion of ‘seeing-
as.’ Wittgenstein’s example shows that one cannot sustain multiple 
interpretations at the same time: the children see the chest as a house and no 
longer as a chest, just as it is not possible to see both the duck and the rabbit 
at the same time but only to shift from one to another. In their games, 
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children use a different perspective and enrich the usual one. The poet, or 
the artist in general, has something of a child (or has preserved a childish 
character) and poetry or other arts all play a role in creating worldviews 
which we can follow or not. Using a different terminology, Nelson Goodman 
considers ‘that the arts must be taken no less seriously than the sciences as 
modes of discovery, creation, and enlargement of knowledge in the broad 
sense of advancement of the understanding, and thus that the philosophy of 
art should be conceived as an integral part of metaphysics and 
epistemology.’244 Whereas I agree with Goodman that the arts should be 
given an importance similar to that of the sciences, I think perspectivism 
overcomes the distinction between philosophy of art, metaphysics, and 
epistemology. Once taken into account, perspectivism states that the arts, 
metaphysics, and epistemology are all perspectives to which we give more 
or less importance. With the rise and progress of science, epistemology has 
become the valuable perspective. But let us not forget that the multiplicity of 
perspectives will always be more valuable than a single one, for a problem 
in a perspective might be solved by shifting point of view. This is, once again, 
one of the reasons Nietzsche criticises science as a ‘cyclopic building’ whose 
only eye cannot account for the depth of the world. The creation of new 
perspectives is a way to give depth to the world. To give depth to the world 
is also to give depth to our lives, as mentioned before, ‘we want to be poets 
of our life.’ Why should one limit oneself to seeing only the duck in the duck-
rabbit? And why should one limit oneself to viewing the world as science 
presents it? There are many ways of approaching and making the world and 
there are no reasons other than socio-cultural norms to explain why we 
privilege one over another. 
We have seen that Nietzsche criticises scientism and religion as nihilistic 
perspectives which enclose within one perspective only. On the contrary, 
poetry—and art in general—represents a lively perspective, one in which 
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one can live. Heidegger argues towards something similar in ‘Poetically Man 
Dwells:’ ‘Poetry is what really lets us dwell. But through what do we attain 
to a dwelling place? Through building. Poetic creation, which lets us dwell, 
is a kind of building.’245 For Heidegger, poetry understood as poiesis is a 
making, creating, building of a world in which we can live. It is an attempt 
at making sense of the world, a perspective from which things can take sense. 
If, following Nietzsche’s ‘death of God,’ there is no given meaning to 
existence and that nihilistic perspectives should be avoided, poetry and art 
offer an element of an answer. In this perspective-building, poetry reveals 
something of our relation to the world which, like the language we use to 
describe it, does never exist out of a perspectival viewing. And when this 
perspectival viewing comes to one’s consciousness, one realises that all 
seeing is not only a ‘seeing-as’ (intentional or not), but also a creating of such 
a ‘seeing-as.’ To that extent, poetry as poiesis shares quite a lot with 
philosophy as they both engage in the activity of creating perspectives. 
In that sense, philosophy and poetry share the idea that a worldview or a 
perspective has a poetics: every perspective is created. Poetry, but to a wider 
extent art, is the place where this perspectival poetics reveals itself as such, 
as the creation of a worldview. If the task of philosophy is to uncover this 
perspectival poetics and bring it to one’s consciousness, it overlaps the task 
of poetry and the arts. Once philosophy abandons the idea of metaphysics 
and adopts rather than rejects the multiplicity of perspectives as an essential 
feature of our relation to the world, it must find a way of expressing it. 
Insights can be found in poetry and other literary arts but, in the end, this 
means that a perspectival poetics leads to a philosophical poetics: 
philosophy can no longer write itself as a metaphysical system but must find 
a new expression, and searches for it in poetry rather than in science. The 
questioning of the relations between philosophy and poetry ultimately leads 
philosophy to the question of style, and more specifically of its own style. 
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Both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein tackle this question and their reflections on 
language and poetry are embodied in their stylistic activity. Before turning 
to more general considerations about style in philosophy in Chapter Seven, 
let us now focus on one specific poetic tool which is also often at play in 






Metaphor: A Case Study in Poetics 
The notion of perspectival poetics suggests that philosophy aims at 
uncovering and changing our ways of seeing by creating new perspectives. 
Although Nietzsche and Wittgenstein seem to disagree on the creative aspect 
of the philosophical task, both aim to effect change and uncover the fact that 
the ordinary perspective is only one among many others. We have seen that 
this task comes to the fore when philosophy encounters poetry and takes its 
challenges seriously. This does not mean that there are closed borders to the 
concepts of philosophy and poetry and some poetic philosophies such as 
Nietzsche’s—philosophies which accept or take poetics as a central 
concern—come close to what is usually said to be poetry (and we will see in 
Chapter Seven that in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche even considers he ‘flew a 
thousand miles beyond what had hitherto been called poetry’ by writing 
Zarathustra). 
The question however remains of how this change can be effected: how can 
poetry change our relation to the world and how can philosophy 
conceptualise this change? We have seen that the arts can change our ways 
of seeing by staging an object or action in a certain context: the 
decontextualization and recontextualization of the object or action changes 
our perception of it. Wittgenstein’s and Nietzsche’s remarks on theatre 
indicate the possibility of change in perspective through the staging of an 
action or a character, and Duchamp’s ready-mades would be an example of 
such a recontextualisation in the realm of visuals arts: the recontextualisation 
Duchamp operates by placing an ordinary object in a museum or an art 
gallery brings us to see it in a different light, brings our attention to features 
we might usually not notice. The same goes with language and poetry; we 
have seen that words in poetry are recontextualised in such a way that they 
signify differently. This recontextualisation can occur in various ways and 
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we have already seen that two possibilities to do so are plays on sound or 
rhythm for instance. 
A more specific tool which has caused great problems to philosophy of 
language (and especially a philosophy of language which relies on reference 
and truth-conditions), and that philosophers also extensively use, is 
metaphor. As already mentioned, it is one of the poet’s most important tools 
according to Nietzsche: ‘For the true poet, metaphor is no rhetorical figure 
but rather an image which takes the place of something else, which really 
hovers before him in the place of a concept.’ (BT 8 / KSA 1.60) Many theories 
of metaphor have been developed throughout the history of philosophy and 
I will not attempt to trace back the genealogy of these theories. My aim in 
this chapter is to explore how metaphor takes part in a perspectival poetics, 
how metaphors can be seen as ways of creating perspectives. If Nietzsche 
and Wittgenstein do not specifically elaborate a theory of metaphor—and 
we have seen that attributing any theory to either of them is a dangerous 
move—their remarks on this notion shed an interesting light on it, especially 
when it comes to the role of metaphor in philosophy. This chapter is divided 
in three sections: in the first, I focus on Nietzsche’s conception of metaphor 
in his early texts to show how metaphor is not only a rhetoric trope, but 
above all a fundamental way of seeing and relating to the world; in the 
second, I shift my attention to Wittgenstein’s ideas to show how metaphor 
can help renew our ways of thinking; in the third and last section, I discuss 
the role of metaphor in philosophy. These reflections on metaphor open the 
path to the question of style in philosophy which I will tackle in Chapter 
Seven and they therefore serve as a bridge from the perspectival poetics to 
the poetics of philosophy. 
1. From a Rhetoric Trope to a Way of Seeing the World 
In Nietzsche’s early texts from the first half of the 1870s, the word metaphor 
appears many times and is even the central notion of On Truth and Lie. He 
however abandons the use of this term after 1875, the word ‘Metapher’ and 
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its derivatives appearing only four times (out of 62 in total) after this year. 
Nietzsche’s heavy use of the term metaphor and his abandoning of this 
notion after 1875 has been interpreted by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe as 
related to Nietzsche’s ‘rhetoric turn’ or detour. This ‘rhetoric turn’ is linked 
to his work as a professor at the University of Basel in the early 1870’s, where 
he gives lectures on rhetoric and rhetoric tropes. Although he considers 
metaphor to be an important trope in these lectures, Nietzsche follows 
Quintilian’s classical definition of metaphor and does not give it an 
importance outside of the rhetorical world. A 1872-1873 note defines 
metaphor as follows: ‘Metaphor means treating as equal something that one 
has recognised to be similar in one point.’ (NF-1872-1873, 19[249] / KSA 7.498) 
This definition relies on the rather classic idea that metaphor is a kind of 
simile: metaphor would be an implicit simile whereas comparison is an 
explicit one. A metaphor is therefore a way of acknowledging or showing a 
similarity between two objects. 
This definition seems to conform to Aristotle’s and Quintilian’s definitions. 
Aristotle defines metaphor in section 21 of the Poetics: ‘A metaphor is a 
carrying over of a word belonging to something else, from genus to species, 
from species to genus, from species to species, or by analogy.246’ The main 
idea of metaphor is therefore that it modifies the meaning of a word by 
carrying another meaning over. If comparison carries the meaning of one of 
the terms on the other using a comparative word, metaphor does it 
implicitly, without the comparative word. As Quintilian argues, following 
Aristotle on this point: ‘On the whole metaphor is a shorter form of simile, 
while there is this further difference, that in the latter we compare some 
object to the thing which we wish to describe, whereas in the former this 
object is actually substituted for the thing.’247 Metaphor is a shortened simile 
and operates a substitution. 
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If Nietzsche follows this idea in his lectures on rhetoric, there is another 
aspect of Aristotle’s definition which comes to the fore in Nietzsche’s use of 
the word metaphor in his other works, namely that to be able to use 
metaphors well is a gift, ‘since to use metaphors well is to have insight into 
what is alike.’248 Metaphor requires seeing a similarity between two things 
and Nietzsche’s use of metaphor in On Truth and Lie relies on this definition. 
There is more to metaphor than merely seeing a similarity according to 
Nietzsche, there is a creative force at play. As he suggests in the second part 
of On Truth and Lie, there is a metaphorical drive at the heart of the human, 
that is a drive to create similarities, which is exhibited especially by artists 
and myths. In his definition of metaphor as a handling as alike of two things 
which have been recognised as alike, the important part is the second—and 
the implicit creative task it requires. In other words, what a metaphor brings 
into question is: what does it mean to recognise (and also and above all 
create) a similarity? This focus on the recognition of the similarity is 
fundamental because it puts into play our ways of seeing and relating to the 
world. To see a similarity is, in Wittgensteinian terms, to see something as 
something else and I will develop the relation between metaphor and 
‘seeing-as’ in the next section. This notion of ‘seeing-as’ involves, as we have 
seen, a creative dimension through the use of imagination among other 
things. Nietzsche’s focus on the implicit task at play in establishing a 
metaphor makes it something more than a mere rhetoric trope: metaphors 
engage our whole way of seeing the world. To that extent, metaphors can 
also change our ways of seeing. The idea of the creation of metaphor must 
be understood in both directions of the genitive: there is a metaphor which 
is created by the poet and there is a creation of a way of seeing the world 
through the metaphorical process. 
Whereas the classical conception of metaphor, that is Quintilian’s 
interpretation of Aristotle, considers it as a shortened or implicit comparison, 
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Nietzsche interprets Aristotle differently and makes him say something 
more. Metaphor is no longer the result of a comparison; it does no longer 
follow this caricatural process: ‘I see a similarity, I establish a comparison, I 
make this comparison implicit, and call it a metaphor.’ The important step, 
the real metaphorical step of this process is, according to Nietzsche, not the 
making implicit of the comparison, such as classical theorists of metaphor 
think, but the first one, the seeing a similarity. This seeing a similarity, 
insofar as it is a ‘seeing-as,’ is also a creation or invention of a similarity. This 
is the conception of metaphor Nietzsche develops in On Truth and Lie where 
he speaks abundantly about metaphor without defining what it is. As we 
have seen, Nietzsche argues in On Truth and Lie that metaphors are at the 
origins of language and that language constitutes itself by successive 
metaphors. Each step transposes something into something else (perception, 
image, sound) and this transposition serves to establish concepts. The 
conceptual task is to equate unequal metaphors whereas the metaphorical 
task is creative and transforms something into something other. As 
Nietzsche says, the first metaphor is to transpose the nerve stimulus into an 
image and the second the image into a sound. Nietzsche never characterises 
these transpositions as natural ones; there is no ‘natural’ relation between 
the image and the sound, as this would precisely amount to return to a 
‘magic’ conception of language such as that defended by Cratylus. There is 
an arbitrariness of the signifier according to Saussure, the relation between 
sound and image is a conventional one, and Nietzsche would argue that it 
comes from the necessity of communication, that is of building a community. 
What occurs within the translation from image to word is nothing less than 
a creation: from a nerve stimulus, an image is created; from an image, a word 
is created. 
As already mentioned, this creative task is precisely that of poets and myths, 
as Nietzsche argues in the second part of On Truth and Lie:  
That drive to form metaphors, that fundamental human drive which 
cannot be left out of consideration for even a second without also 
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leaving out human beings themselves, is in truth not defeated, indeed 
hardly even tamed, by the process whereby a regular and rigid new 
world is built from its own sublimated products—concepts—in order 
to imprison it in a fortress. The drive seeks out a channel and a new 
area for its activity, and finds it in myth and in art generally. (TL 2 / 
KSA 1.887) 
There is a fundamental human drive to form metaphors, to see and to create 
similarities which outgrow those established by linguistic and scientific 
concepts. To that extent, Nietzsche’s conception of metaphor shifts from a 
rhetoric (and linguistic) understanding to an aesthetic one: metaphor is not 
only a way to express a comparison but above all a way of expressing and 
seeing the world, a way of transposing nerve stimuli into images and images 
into sounds. We will see that the aesthetic understanding of metaphor as a 
way of seeing the world leads, in turn, to a poetic understanding of metaphor 
as a creative process. 
When Nietzsche argues in The Birth of Tragedy that ‘for the true poet, 
metaphor is no rhetorical figure but rather an image which takes the place of 
something else, which really hovers before him in the place of a concept,’ (BT 
8 / KSA 1.60) this means that the poet goes back to the lively process which 
is at the origins of language. Metaphor, for the poet, is not a mere rhetorical 
trope, but a fundamental way of seeing the world. As said before, by doing 
so, the poet shifts from the rhetoric realm to the aesthetic one. Insofar as 
metaphors create new ways of seeing the world, they acquire a poetic 
dimension in the etymological sense of poiesis, making or creating. Metaphor 
is not a comparison or a means for comparison, it is rather what the poet sees 
and the expression of her way of seeing. The poet does not compare two 
things through a metaphor but rather sees the metaphor where we see a 
concept. 
If we come back to the classic example ‘Juliet is the sun’ which we have 
discussed in Chapter Two, it does not mean that the poet compares Juliet to 
the sun, or that Juliet shares characteristics with the sun, but rather that the 
poet sees the sun where we see Juliet. Through this metaphor, the poet 
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expresses her way of seeing the world and shares it with us. We could then 
interpret the metaphor saying for instance that Juliet is as valuable as the sun 
for the poet, or that Juliet shines like the sun, or that the poet could not live 
were Juliet not to rise anymore (and this is actually what happens). We could 
then consider that all these interpretations have a similar meaning and 
attribute this meaning to the metaphor. However, this whole interpretative 
process needs not necessarily be done. It is one way of interpreting a 
metaphor among others, and perhaps not the most fruitful one. 
For the poet, metaphor therefore outgrows the mere idea of comparison: it is 
the way in which she constructs or creates a perspective on the world and 
shares it. Metaphors create ways of seeing and do not merely state 
similarities; they do not describe a state of affairs (and hence the problems 
encountered by representational conceptions of language in accounting for 
metaphors) but act upon our worldview by acting upon language. This 
conception of metaphors as creation of perspectives suggests something 
similar to Sarah Kofman’s idea mentioned in the previous chapters 
according to which Nietzsche replaces the word metaphor with the notion 
of perspective in his later works.249 We have already seen that the notion of 
interpretation is related to perspectivism, and a metaphor, insofar as it is a 
perspective on the world, could be stated in terms of interpretation. Pursuing 
Kofman’s idea, we could say that the abandon of the notion of metaphor 
coincides with the rise of perspectivism and the related notion of 
interpretation. 
If we understand the shift from metaphor to perspective in this way, we can 
also apply to perspectives the life-death characterisation Nietzsche applies 
to the metaphor-concept opposition. The poetic attempt to multiply 
perspectives (and therefore going towards the realm of metaphor) would be 
lively whereas monoperspectival ways of seeing (such as science or religion) 
would go towards concepts and death. These monoperspectival 
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undertakings are therefore nihilistic as they promote death over life. Poets, 
by creating metaphors, create new and lively perspectives which enrich the 
reader’s life, whereas concept-based forms enclose the reader-thinker within 
a unique perspective, and a morbid one moreover. More than escaping the 
‘cyclopic buildings’ of science and religion, metaphors (and with them the 
whole poetic realm) are ways of escaping the superficiality of reality seen 
from the ordinary perspective: 
There are no ‘literal’ expressions and no knowing the literal sense 
without metaphor. But the deception about this exists, i.e. the belief 
in the truth of sensory impressions. The most common metaphors, 
the usual ones, are now regarded as truths and as the standard by 
which to measure the rarer ones. Actually what prevails here is only 
the difference between habituation and novelty, frequency and rarity. 
(NF-1872-1873, 19[228] / KSA 7.491) 
The ordinary world, or the ordinary language, is made of the metaphors 
which have been accepted and therefore turned into concepts.250 Knowledge 
gained from these ordinary metaphors is therefore a deception from which 
one should escape. Metaphors offer a way to do so, and even in the realm of 
science or philosophy. Nietzsche’s attempt to return to metaphors can thus 
be seen as a way of returning to a perspective which promotes life. In that 
sense, a philosophy based on such lively perspectives would be a ‘gay 
science,’ one which promotes life rather than a nihilistic form of scientism. 
To explore further this relation between metaphors and thinking, let us now 
turn to Wittgenstein’s views on metaphor. 
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Mark Johnson go further in studying how a whole metaphorical structure underlies 
our uses of language: ‘Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both 




2. Metaphor ‘Refreshes the Intellect’ 
If metaphors create new ways of seeing, as we have seen with Nietzsche, and 
if they are of use in the establishment of a ‘gay science,’ they might create 
new ways of thinking as well. In a remark, Wittgenstein notes that ‘a good 
simile refreshes the intellect’ (CV, p. 3) and this can be interpreted in the 
sense abovementioned according to which metaphors (if we take here simile 
to be related to metaphor) create ways of thinking which escape the 
traditional conceptual framework. Wittgenstein does not discuss the notion 
of ‘metaphor ‘much, but if we take it within the framework of his discussions 
of poetry, the question arises as whether metaphors can be paraphrased or 
not. We have already discussed this idea in Chapter Four, but it brings an 
interesting insight to the discussion of metaphor. 
In a remark regarding poetic language, Wittgenstein argues that poems 
cannot be paraphrased and that this has to do with the notion of ‘secondary 
meaning.’ Wittgenstein does not define what metaphors are, but 
distinguishes ‘metaphorical meaning’ from ‘secondary meaning.’ He 
discusses these kinds of meaning in commenting the sentence ‘e is yellow,’ 
and argues that in this sentence, ‘e’ is not used in a metaphorical way: ‘The 
secondary meaning is not a “metaphorical” meaning. If I say, “For me the 
vowel e is yellow”, I do not mean: “yellow” in a metaphorical meaning—for 
I could not express what I want to say in any other way than by means of the 
concept of yellow.’ (PPF 278) For him, ‘e is yellow’ does not use the word 
yellow in a metaphorical way, but in a secondary way which cannot be 
substituted by any other. Within the classical framework of metaphor as 
substitution, Wittgenstein’s sentence is indeed not metaphorical for we 
cannot find a term for which ‘yellow’ is the substitute. However, if we follow 
our discussion of metaphor above according to which metaphor is no longer 
related to the idea of a substitution but to a creation of perspective, the 
‘secondary meaning’ Wittgenstein discusses can be interpreted as use of 
language which creates a new perspective. 
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Whereas Nietzsche modifies and adapts the notion of metaphor to his 
thoughts, Wittgenstein keeps the classical definition of metaphor and uses 
another notion, that of secondary meaning, to account for what Nietzsche 
calls metaphors. Donald Davidson’s theory of metaphor and his 
interpretation of Wittgenstein can prove helpful in understanding this ‘e is 
yellow.’ Davidson argues: 
Metaphor makes us see one thing as another by making some literal 
statement that inspires or prompts the insight. Since in most cases 
what the metaphor prompts or inspires is not entirely, or even at all, 
recognition of some truth or fact, the attempt to give literal expression 
to the content of the metaphor is simply misguided.251 
Davidson’s theory of metaphor is interesting because it moves away from 
the idea that there is a message which the metaphor transmits. On the 
contrary, the meaning of the metaphor is its literal meaning and there is no 
specific metaphorical meaning. What the metaphor shows or reveals 
however is a certain way of seeing. We have noted that representational 
language fails to account for metaphor because there is no correspondence 
within metaphor. Davidson’s theory brings to the fore the idea that the 
representational conception of language works fine with metaphors, but that 
they are just presenting nonsense. This presentation of nonsense is a way of 
expressing something which could not be said in representational language. 
In other words, Davidson’s theory tries to balance between representation 
and expression within metaphor. The meaninglessness of metaphors 
understood from a representational perspective requires a shift to another 
conception of language, to an expressive conception of language. Metaphor 
express something, namely a point of view or perspective, and therefore 
reveal something from the world. In that understanding of metaphor, and 
inasmuch as the meaning is the literal one, metaphors cannot be 
paraphrased. Indeed, if the only meaning of a metaphorical statement is its 
literal meaning, it cannot be paraphrased: ‘e is yellow’ only means that ‘e is 
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yellow’ and this metaphor (in a Davidsonian sense) reveals something of the 
world. Following Davidson, this would mean that the literal meaning of 
yellow is always there, but it does not really make sense to consider a letter 
to have a colour. As it does not make sense, we cannot attribute to ‘yellow’ a 
metaphorical meaning which we could find by paraphrasing it. 
This impossibility of paraphrase brings to the fore the idea that metaphors 
(and poetry in general) are specific uses of language which rely more on 
expression than representation. As Richard Rorty argues, discussing 
Davidson’s theory of metaphor: 
The Davidsonian claim that metaphors do not have meanings may 
seem like a typical philosopher’s quibble, but it is not. It is part of an 
attempt to get us to stop thinking of language as a medium. This, in 
turn, is part of a larger attempt to get rid of the traditional 
philosophical picture of what it is to be human. The importance of 
Davidson’s point can perhaps best be seen by contrasting his 
treatment of metaphor with those of the Platonist and the positivist 
on the one hand and the Romantic on the other. The Platonist and the 
positivist share a reductionist view of metaphor: They think 
metaphors are either paraphrasable or useless for one serious 
purpose which language has, namely, representing reality. By 
contrast, the Romantic has an expansionist view: He thinks metaphor 
is strange, mystic, wonderful. Romantics attribute metaphor to a 
mysterious faculty called the ‘imagination,’ a faculty they suppose to 
be at the very center of the self, the deep heart’s core. Whereas the 
metaphorical looks irrelevant to Platonists and positivists, the literal 
looks irrelevant to Romantics. For the former think that the point of 
language is to represent a hidden reality which lies outside us, and 
the latter thinks its purpose is to express a hidden reality which lies 
within us.252 
This opposition between positivists or Platonists and Romantics can be 
coined in terms of representational and expressive language. One of the 
characteristics of Romantic theory of language is their rejection of 
representation and their conception of language as expression. We have 
discussed this matter extensively in Chapter Two, and this shift to expression 
leads to a new conception of metaphor. Davidson’s theory of metaphor 
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however manages to escape this opposition and allows for both conceptions 
of language to coexist. The importance of metaphor does not lie within 
language, but within the new points of views or perspectives it creates in and 
by language.  
Returning to Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘e is yellow,’ we can interpret this 
sentence as a specific use of language which brings us to see the world anew. 
Interestingly, Wittgenstein also links this idea of secondary meaning to the 
use of words such as ‘signification’ or ‘to mean,’ thus relating it to the 
language of philosophy. To what extent is philosophical language 
metaphorical (in a Davidsionian sense)? This is the question Wittgenstein 
raises: ‘Why shouldn't a particular technique of employment of the words 
“meaning”, “to mean” and others lead me to use these words in, so to speak, 
a picturesque, improper, sense? (As when I say that the sound e is yellow.)’ 
(RPP 1062, see also 1059-1061) What metaphors reveal is a tension created by 
the fact that seemingly meaningless statements can make sense. 
The meaninglessness of a literal reading of metaphors creates a tension 
which brings the reader’s attention to another way of seeing and Paul 
Ricoeur develops a similar conception of metaphor: 
The entire strategy of poetic discourse plays on this point: it seeks the 
abolition of the reference by means of self-destruction of the meaning 
of metaphorical statements, the self-destruction being made manifest 
by an impossible literal interpretation. But this is only the first phase, 
or rather the negative counterpart, of a positive strategy. Within the 
perspective of semantic impertinence, the self-destruction of 
meaning is merely the other side of an innovation in meaning at the 
level of the entire statement, an innovation obtained through the 
‘twist’ of the literal meaning of the words. It is this innovation in 
meaning that constitutes living metaphor.253 
If I read the metaphor literally, I do not understand it or, better, it makes no 
sense for me. This breaking down of meaning is the first step (or negative 
step) in metaphor. The ordinary meanings of the words are no longer helpful 
in understanding the metaphorical statement, but the tension thereby 
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created makes sense for the statement as a whole. Words do not acquire a 
specific, new meaning but the meaning of the metaphorical statement is not 
equal to the sum of the meanings of the words used in it. A metaphor is an 
innovation in meaning which covers the whole statement rather than the 
words themselves. The patent falsity of metaphors is a way of directing our 
attention to something else, namely the innovation of sense thereby 
established. 
The meaning of a metaphorical statement is therefore nothing more than its 
literal meaning, and this is what Davidson argues: 
Metaphor runs on the same familiar linguistic tracks that the plainest 
sentences do; this we saw from considering simile. What 
distinguishes metaphor is not meaning but use—in this it is like 
assertion, hinting, lying, promising, or criticizing. And the special use 
to which we put language in metaphor is not—cannot be—to “say 
something” special, no matter how indirectly. For a metaphor says 
only what shows on its face—usually patent falsehood or an absurd 
truth. And this plain truth or falsehood needs no paraphrase—its 
meaning is given in the literal meaning of the words.254 
However, this does not mean that the metaphorical statement is 
meaningless. It is meaningless within the framework of representational 
language, but it is meaningful in what it expresses of the world, in the 
perspective it offers on the world. Metaphors do therefore not transport a 
meaning or a content or a message, but rather only aim at disturbing the 
ordinary meaning and at bringing our attention to what can happen when 
ordinary language is disturbed in such a way. There is no idea of message in 
metaphor, just as there is no message in poetry. This idea of message still 
relies on the belief in a ‘magic’ language and as Samuel Wheeler argues: 
‘Finally, without the magic language, traditional accounts of metaphor must 
collapse, since there are no words that can be taken only literally. Derrida 
puts these points into an analysis of “binary oppositions” that connects his 
discussion of philosophical analysis with structuralism and complements 
                                                     




Quine’s and Davidson’s discussions of dogmas of empiricism.’255 What 
remains to be discussed is how the language of philosophy survives the 
death of ‘magic’ language. Before turning to the question of style in the next 
chapter, let us focus on the role of metaphor in philosophy.  
3. Metaphors in Philosophy 
We have seen that Nietzsche argues in The Birth of Tragedy that metaphors 
are what poets see in place of concepts and that science should open up to 
metaphors in order to counter its nihilistic tendencies and embrace the 
multiplicity of perspectives. However, science usually relies on concepts—
and we have seen that Nietzsche criticises science on these grounds in On 
Truth and Lie—and philosophy does too. Nietzsche suggests this in an 1872-
1873 note: ‘Great uncertainty as to whether philosophy is an art or a science. 
It is an art in its purposes and its production. But the means, i.e. 
representation in concepts, it has in common with science.’ (NF-1872-1873, 
19[62] / KSA 7.439) Similarly, Deleuze considers the task of the philosopher 
is that of creating concepts.256 We have however seen that Nietzsche is quite 
critical of concepts and that Wittgenstein rejects their ‘craving for generality.’ 
Nietzsche thus suggests going back to metaphors and thus brings 
philosophy closer to art and poetry. In a quote from the same period, 
Nietzsche claims that: ‘In the philosopher activities proceed through 
metaphors.’ (NF-1872-1873, 19[174] / KSA 7.473) Metaphor has therefore an 
important role to play for philosophers, and Nietzsche is not the only one to 
say so. Even Max Black, whose aims are probably very remote from 
Nietzsche’s, claims at the end of his article ‘On Metaphor’ that philosophy 
would be limited if not using metaphors.257 Although Black considers 
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metaphors as dangerous and as a tool rather than a central feature of 
philosophical writing, they are nevertheless useful, necessary, and, most 
importantly, cannot be replaced by anything else. This last idea goes in the 
sense that metaphors cannot be paraphrased, and that philosophy’s use of 
metaphor is therefore not ornamental. The philosophers’ metaphors might 
be explained and analysed but cannot be replaced. The philosophical 
language uses a poetic tool, and this reveals the literary dimension of 
philosophy. Derrida explores this dimension extensively and adopts a view 
much closer to Nietzsche’s. He considers, unlike Black, that metaphors are 
at the centre of philosophical writing, and that the task of philosophy is to 
deconstruct the concepts in order to uncover the metaphorical material from 
which it is built. Without entering the deconstructionist discourse, Hans-
Georg Gadamer also considers that metaphors show an incoherence between 
meaning and context of use: ‘[The descriptive precision of semantic analysis] 
points up the incoherence that results when a realm of words is carried over 
into new contexts—and such incongruity often indicates that something 
truly new has been discovered.’258 This carrying over of meaning into new 
contexts is precisely the task of metaphors and Gadamer thus suggests that 
metaphors are ways of discovering something new. These metaphors 
however settle down and become ordinary language, thus hiding the new it 
had uncovered: ‘Only when the word has taken root, as it were, in its 
metaphorical use and has lost its character of having been taken up and 
carried over does its meaning in the new context begin to become its 
“proper” meaning.’259 There is a metaphorical process which takes part in 
establishing meaning for Gadamer. This, as we will see, is not without 
impact on philosophical language. 
Metaphor, Derrida argues, is a central element of philosophical language: 
‘metaphor seems to involve the usage of philosophical discourse in its 
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entirety, nothing less than the usage of so-called natural language in 
philosophical discourse, that is, the usage of natural language as 
philosophical language.’260 Derrida is concerned with the relation between 
natural language and philosophical discourse. At the centre of philosophical 
language, and the reason why ordinary language can be philosophical, is the 
use of metaphor because, as Derrida argues in On Grammatology, metaphors 
take part in the process of meaning: 
Metaphor must therefore be understood as the process of the idea or 
meaning (of the signified, if one wishes) before being understood as 
the play of signifiers. The idea is the signified meaning, that which 
the word expresses. But it is also a sign of the thing, a representation 
of the object within my mind. Finally, this representation of the 
object, signifying the object and signified by the word or by the 
linguistic signifier in general, may also indirectly signify an affect or 
a passion. […] And it is the inadequation of the designation (metaphor) 
which properly expresses the passion.261 
Ordinary language has its limits and we have seen for instance that 
Nietzsche considers language to be incapable of accounting for inner states 
in Dawn 115. For Derrida, expressing passion requires metaphors because 
they bring into tension the signifier and the signified. In structuralist 
linguistics, following Saussure, the signifier represents the signified (and this 
representation is purely conventional and arbitrary). In this couple signifier-
signified, a metaphor is, according to Derrida, a process of the signified 
rather than a game of the signifiers. The signified normally only exists 
inasmuch as there is a signifier which brings it to existence, which represents 
it, and metaphor disturbs this relation. This disturbance of the relation 
between signifier and signified, the metaphor, can express passion. Whereas 
Nietzsche states that language is incapable of accounting for inner states 
such as passion, Derrida suggests that metaphors are the solution for this 
impossibility as they create a tension between the signifier and the signified 
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which expands the scope of ordinary language and gives it the nuances to 
account for passion. 
If philosophy is to be concerned with life and existence, it cannot forego the 
discussion of passions and this can only happen if philosophy uses 
metaphors, because concepts miss the point of passion. This relation between 
metaphor and passion is however also what has caused philosophers to be 
cautious with metaphors, as Derrida argues: 
Metaphor, therefore, is determined by philosophy as a provisional 
loss of meaning, an economy of the proper without irreparable 
damage, a certainly inevitable detour, but also a history with its 
sights set on, and within the horizon of, the circular reappropriation 
of literal, proper meaning. This is why the philosophical evaluation 
of metaphor always has been ambiguous: metaphor is dangerous and 
foreign as concerns intuition (vision or contact), concept (the grasping 
or proper presence of the signified), and consciousness (proximity or 
self-presence); but it is in complicity with what it endangers, is 
necessary to it in the extent to which the de-tour is a re-turn guided 
by the function of resemblance (mimesis or homoiosis), under the law 
of the same. The opposition of intuition, the concept, and 
consciousness at this point no longer has any pertinence. These three 
values belong to the order and to the movement of meaning. Like 
metaphor.262 
Philosophy usually regards metaphors with caution because they challenge 
intuition, concept, and consciousness. Against this negative characterisation, 
Derrida aims to show that metaphors also take part in establishing meaning. 
Intuition, concept, and consciousness belong to the process of meaning and 
metaphor should not be excluded from this process. Metaphor is on the 
contrary necessary to the process of meaning because the establishing of an 
‘other’ in place of the self (the idea of substitution) is a way of defining the 
self as the ‘other’ and therefore expanding its meaning. 
To return to Wittgenstein’s idea of a ‘secondary meaning,’ we might argue 
that metaphors are constitutive of meanings for they require the knowledge 
of the ordinary meaning: ‘Here one might speak of a “primary” and 
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“secondary” meaning of a word. Only someone for whom the word has the 
former meaning uses it in the latter.’ (PPF 276) As metaphors create a tension 
between the signifier and the signified, they also create a tension between 
the ordinary signifier and the metaphorical one, taking once again the ‘Juliet 
is the sun’ example, ‘sun’ in its ordinary use is in tension with ‘sun’ in a 
metaphorical use. This tension is similar to the one we encounter when an 
ordinary text appears within a poetic context: the grocery list as grocery list 
is in tension with the grocery list as a poem and, following Davidson, we 
could say that this tension is precisely that which brings us to see things 
differently. Philosophy can thus use metaphors in order to bring the reader 
to see things differently, but they are only one tool among many other 
stylistic possibilities. If philosophy shares a task with poetry, that of creating 
perspectives as we have seen in Chapter Five, it above all shares a similar 
concern with its own use of language, with its style. Both Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein engage in this broader reflection on philosophical style, and 




Style in Philosophy 
At the very end of The Claim of Reason, Stanley Cavell asks: ‘Can philosophy 
become literature and still know itself?’263 We have seen that the idea that 
philosophy should be made one with poetry is already a central topic for 
early German Romantics and that, with the criticism of metaphysical 
language, philosophy has to account for the poetics of language and thus for 
its own language. The notion of perspectival poetics elaborated in Chapter 
Five leads precisely to questioning the poetics of philosophy. Philosophical 
language is poetic in the sense that it poses itself both against and at the very 
heart of ordinary language. This concern with the poetics of philosophy, in 
other words with its style, can only arise in a framework rejecting 
metaphysical—or ‘magic’—conceptions of language. Within the framework 
of ‘magic language,’ either in the metaphysical tradition or in the anti-
metaphysical tradition of linguistic analysis, the language of philosophy 
sought to be transparent and self-interpreting, rejecting the question of style 
as non-pertinent to philosophical inquiry. In Roland Barthes’s words, we 
could say that philosophers of language after the linguistic turn, especially 
the logical positivists, sought to reach a ‘degree zero’ of language.264 This 
concern with the transparency of language does not only shape a certain 
conception of philosophical style, but also is one of the structural differences 
between analytic and continental philosophy, between their responses to the 
end of metaphysics and the linguistic turn: analytic philosophy would search 
for a ‘transparent’ style whereas continental philosophy would be obsessed 
with style. We have however seen that this view is too schematic as 
Wittgenstein for instance does not have an ‘analytic’ style. In both cases, 
however, there is a concern with style, either in rejecting or embracing it. 
Style is a concern for philosophy because it involves the ways in which 
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philosophy appears and can thus be understood and it is far from a new 
concern as Socrates already distrusted writing as an appropriate way to 
transmitting thought.265 
This apparent dichotomy reveals that style, whether rejected or embraced, 
represents an important concern of philosophical writing. This is because 
style has something to do with understanding: clarifying style eases 
understanding and reflecting upon it aims at understanding one’s own 
language. This search for a clear style is however not something essentially 
post-metaphysical and one can think of Descartes’s and other rationalists’ 
philosophies as a search for a clear and distinct language accounting for clear 
and distinct ideas. However, if style is related to understanding, and if 
philosophy aims at understanding what ‘understanding’ is and means, style 
becomes a central concern. As Manfred Frank argues: 
The language of philosophy belongs to traditions whose content can 
never be dissolved into transparent insight, and is influenced by a 
style in which ultimately a noninterchangeable individual manner of 
accessing the world demands a hearing. All understanding is based 
on this individual manner. Therefore, one does not get any closer to 
philosophy by extinguishing style; instead, by dispensing with style, 
one will be left without access to any understanding at all.266 
The risk in rejecting style from philosophical concerns is to impair the 
possibilities of understanding (or being understood). Style is thus a 
component of philosophical investigations and even more so once 
philosophy focuses on language as the problems encountered in 
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conceptualising language must reflect on the philosopher’s own use of 
language. This is something philosophy shares with poetry, as Donald 
Verene argues: ‘Philosophy shares with the poetic and rhetoric a dependence 
on the power of the word. Whatever philosophy does or can do is 
accomplished in language.’267 
Inasmuch as the language of the poet represents the limit of the 
philosopher’s language, it also represents the limit to which philosophy can 
account for language and, ultimately, the world. Once the privilege of 
representational language is abolished, because philosophy needs to account 
for what poetry and literature do, philosophy can no longer hide behind it. 
It must confront expressive language and therefore confront poetry as a limit 
for its own expression. This confrontation with poetry leads to a 
reconceptualisation of the notion of style in philosophy. According to Frank, 
the difference between philosophy and poetry is not between two genres 
(and therefore between two distinct styles), but between two different 
extents of use of the creative powers of language: ‘I contend that literary 
discourse does not differ in either principle or quality, but merely 
quantitatively, from other innovative uses of colloquial language. Creative 
literature is merely an extreme form of the innovative potential found in our 
everyday use of language.’268 Style is therefore a global category to describe 
the use of language. There is not one poetic style or one philosophical style 
but as many styles as uses of language. The difference between style in 
poetry and style in philosophy is therefore only a difference of degree and 
not of kind. But if poetic styles express to a greater degree the creative 
powers of language, what are these powers in philosophy? We have seen 
that poetry and philosophy aim at creating perspectives and use language in 
a creative way to do so. For instance, metaphors are ways to create new 
words or new meanings for words. As we have seen, the creating of new 
words is sufficient ‘in order to create in the long run new “things”’ (GS 58 / 
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KSA 3.422) and the creation of new words and things creates new ways of 
accounting for and grasping the world. Style, understood as the individual 
specific use of language, can be seen as accounting for new things by creating 
new ways of expressing and new ways of thinking and, to that extent, style 
is a poetic aspect of philosophy. 
In an early note from 1872, Nietzsche links philosophy not only to poetry but 
to art in general: ‘Great dilemma: is philosophy an art or a science? Both in 
its purposes and its results it is an art. But it uses the same means as science—
conceptual representation. Philosophy is a form of artistic invention. There 
is no appropriate category for philosophy; consequently, we must make up 
and characterize a species [for it].’ (NF-1872, 19[62] / KSA 7.439) Philosophy 
shares characteristics with science—the use of concepts—and with art. As 
we have seen, Nietzsche is however also quite critical of concepts, and 
conceptual representation might not the best means for philosophy. In 
reaction to the criticism of concepts, philosophy should maybe move 
towards poetry and the arts, and, as Wittgenstein says, there is a ‘queer 
resemblance between a philosophical investigation (perhaps especially in 
mathematics <)> and one in aesthetics. (E.g. what is bad about this garment, 
how it should be, etc..)’ (CV, p. 29) Philosophical and aesthetic investigations 
ask the same kind of questions. There is a similarity in how they present and 
approach a problem. Transposing Wittgenstein’s idea from aesthetics to 
poetics, we might say that philosophy and poetry do not only share a 
similarity in their modes of expression, but also in their modes of 
questioning. That means that aesthetics, rather than being only a subcategory 
of philosophy defined by its object of study, art or beauty, is an essential 
method in philosophical practice. Inasmuch as style is essential to 
philosophical writing, aesthetics is essential to philosophical investigations. 
The importance of aesthetics is related to the idea that philosophy ought to 
create perspectives. By using a perspectival vocabulary, by bringing to the 
fore the idea of perspective and creation thereof, aesthetics becomes a central 
concern as it has to do with the way of seeing things. As we have seen, 
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philosophy aims at changing the ways of seeing, and this can be translated 
in terms of style as a change in ways of thinking and writing. 
This notion of style can be likened to the notion of ‘vocabulary’ as developed 
by Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom after him. Brandom argues that ‘Poets 
and revolutionary scientists break out of their inherited vocabularies to 
create new ones, as yet undreamed by their fellows.’269 Rorty’s notion of 
vocabulary that Brandom uses here does not only concern the mere choice 
or range of words but involves a whole culture. Rorty develops a distinction 
between public and private vocabularies: public ones are shared and 
constitutive of a community (this goes in the sense of Nietzsche’s 
understanding of ‘what is common’ in Beyond Good and Evil) whereas private 
ones require an initiation and cannot be understood immediately. 
Elaborating on Wittgenstein, Rorty argues that ‘Every poem, to paraphrase 
Wittgenstein, presupposes a lot of stage-setting in the culture, for the same 
reason that every sparkling metaphor requires a lot of stodgy literal talk to 
serve as its foil.’270 As we have seen in Chapter Four, understanding a poem 
requires adopting or finding the right perspective, the right context in which 
it makes sense. Following this distinction between public and private 
vocabularies, Brandom argues: ‘public discourse corresponding to common 
purposes, and private discourse to novel purposes. The novel vocabularies 
forged by artists for private consumption make it possible to frame new 
purposes and plans that can be appreciated only by those initiated into these 
vocabularies.’271 Artists and poets—but also philosophers inasmuch as they 
resemble poets—create new vocabularies which require work from the 
reader. We could translate this notion of vocabulary in that of style: 
philosophers—Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are good examples—create new 
styles which can express something different from the common style but 
which also, in consequence, require work from the reader. The language of 
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270 Rorty (1989), p. 41. 
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the philosopher is no longer to be considered as transparent and 
immediately accessible, but is a use of language which requires 
interpretation, and therefore active work from the reader. 
The important point regarding style, as we will see, is that a new style—or a 
new use of language—is not only a new way of expressing a thought, but 
that style is intimately related to thought; new styles of expression are new 
styles of thinking. One way of relating style to thought is to consider the 
relation between style and method. According to Berel Lang, such a relation 
makes of style an important element one should analyse in philosophical 
works.272 Style becomes a concern because of its proximity to method: if we 
consider method to be a central philosophical element, its proximity to style 
makes it one of the central components of philosophy. There would therefore 
be a relation between style and thought in the sense that style is the order 
put into thought. Lang develops this relation between style and method 
especially in Descartes’s works, where method plays a prominent role. 
However, and Lang also analyses other philosophers whose styles are not 
necessarily linked to method as directly as Descartes’s, style in philosophy 
can take many forms. The focus on style reveals two aspects of philosophical 
writing: 1) there is a relation between style and thought, between ideas and 
their expression, and this relation is, following the end of the privilege of 
‘magic language,’ not only one of immediate representation; 2) related to the 
first point and as Lang argues, ‘the “literariness” of philosophical writing is 
not accidental or ornamental but unavoidable.’273 There is an essential 
connection between style and thought which makes style more than the mere 
clothing for thought. 
Both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein acknowledge this connection between style 
and thought and although they do not elaborate theories of style—and we 
have seen that they do not elaborates theories of anything—their reflections 
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lighten up interesting areas of style in philosophy. In this chapter, I will first 
focus on Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s reflections on the relation between 
style and thought in order to show why style matters in philosophy. In the 
second part I focus on their own style of writing: if style matters in 
philosophy, what is its impact on their own philosophies? To do so I focus 
on three specific aspects of their style and their reflections thereupon: the 
choice of words, the notion of aphorism, and rhythm or tempo. In the third 
part I bring the notion of style in relation to philosophical criticism: the 
specific styles Nietzsche and Wittgenstein adopt can be understood as an 
opposition to and a critique of other styles of philosophising and Nietzsche 
often uses style as grounds for criticising other philosophers. These 
reflections about style in philosophy lead me to reconsider the relation 
between philosophy and poetry by elaborating a poetics of philosophy in the 
concluding chapter. 
1. Style and Thought: Why Style Matters in Philosophy 
If you read German books you find not the faintest memory of the 
need for a technique, a teaching plan, a will to mastery in thinking—
of the fact that thinking needs to be learned just as dancing needs to 
be learned, as a kind of dancing. […] For you cannot subtract every 
form of dancing from a noble education, the ability to dance with the 
feet, with concepts, with words; do I still need to say that you must 
also be able to dance with the pen—that you must learn to write? (TI 
‘Germans’ 7 / KSA 6.109-10) 
According to Nietzsche, thinking needs to be learned in the same way 
writing needs to be learned and to master thinking and writing, one must 
learn how to dance. The metaphor of dance appears many times in 
Nietzsche’s works and does not only concern a ‘physical’ dance ‘with the 
feet,’ but also a metaphorical spiritual dance ‘with concepts, with words.’ For 
Nietzsche, there is a correlation between learning to think and learning to 
write: it is the learning of a style, and more precisely of a dancing style. 
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The metaphor of dance brings to the fore the idea that ‘style should live,’ as 
Nietzsche suggests in a letter to Lou Salomé.274 Thinking is a dance with 
concepts and words. In a poem from the first section of The Gay Science, 
Nietzsche expresses this idea as well: 
Not with my hand alone I write 
My foot wants to participate 
Firm and free and bold, my feet 
Run across the field and sheet 
(GS ‘Prelude’ 52 / KSA 3.365) 
The idea of dancing and writing with the feet brings to the fore the bodily 
dimension of thinking. Thinking should not be considered as part of the 
mind only, but as engaging the body as well. Inasmuch as Nietzsche 
attempts to overcome the metaphysical dualism between true and apparent 
world, he also tries to overcome the mind-body dualism through the 
embodiment of thought. The abolishing of the mind-body dichotomy 
through the idea of dancing reflects the idea that form and content should 
also not be considered as separate, or at least not in a metaphysical way. True 
and apparent worlds, mind and body, form and content, all the metaphysical 
dualisms should be brought to an end after the end of metaphysics. Style 
should therefore not be considered as a mere formal or ornamental feature 
but as encompassing both form and content. 
Continuing the bodily metaphor to characterise writing, Nietzsche links the 
notion of blood to writing and understanding: 
Of all that is written, I love only that which one writes with one’s own 
blood. Write with blood, and you will discover that blood is spirit. 
[…] Whoever writes in blood and aphorisms does not want to be 
read, but rather to be learned by heart. (Z I ‘Reading’ / KSA 4.48) 
The idea of understanding is central and Nietzsche often comments on it. In 
The Gay Science for instance, he claims: ‘One does not only wish to be 
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understood when one writes; one wishes just as surely not to be understood.’ 
(GS 381 / KSA 3.633) This could be related as well to the subtitle of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: ‘A book for all and none.’ These remarks on understanding show 
that there is an intimate relation between style and thought which Nietzsche 
expresses in terms of improvement: ‘Improving ideas.—Improving the style—
that means improving the ideas and nothing less!—Anyone who does not 
immediately concede this can also never be convinced of it.’ (WS 131 / KSA 
2.610) To establish a direct relationship between style and thought means 
that to improve one's style is to improve one's thought. Bad style leads to 
misunderstandings and thinkers often write badly because they put too 
much reflection in their writings according to Nietzsche: ‘Thinkers as 
stylists.—Most thinkers write badly because they communicate to us not only 
their thoughts, but also the thinking of their thoughts.’ (HH 188 / KSA 2.163) 
Interestingly, in a previous version of this aphorism, Nietzsche had made the 
exact mistake he condemns, developing the aphorism and explaining the 
thought rather than only expressing it.275 The earlier version of the aphorism 
therefore shared not only the thought, but also the thinking of the thought. 
Nietzsche’s rewriting of the aphorism shows that style is not only a matter 
of writing but also a matter of thinking: learning to think requires learning 
to write. Nietzsche comments this necessity of learning to write in a 
paragraph on the ‘good European:’ 
Learning to write well.—The time of speaking well is past, because the 
time of civic cultures is past. […] Therefore anyone who is European-
minded must now learn how to write well and to write better all the time: 
it is no use even if he was born in Germany, where writing badly is 
treated as a national prerogative. Writing better, however, also means 
thinking better; constantly discovering things that are more worth 
communicating and really being able to communicate them; it means 
being translatable into the languages of our neighbors, making 
                                                     
275 NF-1876, 19[22] / KSA 8.336: ‘Die meisenmeisten Schriftsteller Schreiber schlecht 
weil sie uns nicht ihre Gedanken sondern das Denken der Gedanken mittheilen. Oft 
ist es Eitelkeit was die Periode so voll macht, es ist das begleitende Gegacker der 
Henne, welche uns auf das Ei aufmerksam machen will, nämlich auf irgend einen 
inmitten der vollen Periode stehenden kleinen Gedanken.’ 
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ourselves accessible for the understanding of foreigners who learn 
our language, working toward making everything good into a 
common good and everything freely available to those who are free, 
and finally, preparing for that still far-distant state of things where 
their great task falls into the hands of good Europeans: the direction 
and oversight of the entirety of world-culture.—Anyone wo preaches 
the opposite, not concerning ourselves with writing well and reading 
well—both virtues grow along with each other—is in fact showing 
people a way in which they can become more and more nationalistic: 
he is increasing the sickness of this century and is an enemy of good 
Europeans, an enemy of free spirits. (WS 87 / KSA 2.592-3) 
Nietzsche develops the abovementioned idea according to which learning to 
write is learning to think and that, quite obviously, if one does not learn to 
write, one has no chance of being understood. He interestingly relates this to 
the politics of culture and we can interpret this relation through the idea of 
perspectivism developed in Chapter Five. A culture which is untranslatable, 
which is not understandable for others, isolates itself and therefore lacks the 
multiplicity of perspectives which makes the world richer. 
The lack of perspectives induced by the incapacity of thinking (and the 
rejection of style) represents the sickness of European culture for Nietzsche. 
Against this decadence, Nietzsche suggests that we should learn the best 
style. 
Instruction in the best style.—Instruction in style can, on the one hand, 
be instruction on how to find the expression that will let us convey 
any mood to the reader and hearer; or else instruction on how to find 
the expression for a human’s most desirable mood, the one that it is 
therefore most desirable to communicate and convey: the mood of a 
human who is moved from the depths of his heart, spiritually joyful, 
bright and sincere, someone who has overcome his passions. This 
will be instruction in the best style: it corresponds to the good human 
being. (WS 88 / KSA 2.593) 
Nietzsche distinguishes between two teachings of style: learning to express 
any style against learning to express a joyful style. If a teaching of style is 
supposed to bring life into writing and thought, as Nietzsche’s letter on style 
to Lou Salomé suggests, such a teaching can be a remedy against the illness 
and decadence of culture. The best style corresponds to a joyful style because 
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it represents a healthy culture and we have seen that, for Nietzsche, life and 
health are criteria to evaluate perspectives. This joyful style is related and 
works towards what Nietzsche calls a gay science. Nietzsche’s concern with 
style is therefore strongly related to his idea that philosophy should enhance 
and promote life. 
Even though the concept of life plays an important role in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy, especially in the notion of ‘form of life,’ he does not use this 
notion to characterise style. He however insists on the relation between style 
and thought and relates this, in various remarks, to a difficulty in expression: 
‘My difficulty is only an—enormous—difficulty of expression.’ (NB, 8.3.15) 
Wittgenstein often discusses the importance of expression in philosophy, 
especially of his own expression. The style of the Tractatus already indicates 
this concern with expression and Wittgenstein develops this question in his 
later works. The difficulty in philosophy is not only to find the right style of 
writing, but also the right style of thinking. 
The abandonment of the metaphysical conception of language relinquishes 
the idea that there is thought on the one hand and style or expression of 
thought on the other. One way to unite style and thought is through the 
idiom ‘style of thinking’ which is central to Wittgenstein’s way of doing 
philosophy: 
I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of thinking as 
opposed to another. (LA 37) 
How much we are doing this changing the style of thinking and how 
much I'm doing is changing the style of thinking and how much I'm 
doing is persuading people to change their style of thinking. (LA 40) 
(Much of what we are doing is a question of changing the style of 
thinking.) (LA 41)  
These three remarks from the Lectures on Aesthetics show the importance of 
this task in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. To do philosophy is to bring people 
to see things in the right perspective (or, to the extent that ‘right’ can be 
problematic, in a different perspective) and philosophy shares this task with 
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poetry as we have seen in previous chapters. More than new perspectives, 
the ideas from the Lectures on Aesthetics bring to the fore the notion of style: 
philosophy is not only a matter of changing our ways of seeing, but also our 
ways or styles of thinking. This new style of thinking calls, in turn, for a new 
style of expressing or writing: finding the right style is like searching for the 
right perspective. In discussing the notion of style in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy, Joachim Schulte acknowledges the importance of the dimension 
of Denkstil or style of thinking: ‘Under style of thinking, Wittgenstein does 
not only understand the way or the technique of thought, its form of 
expression, but also to a certain degree style as what can be found as a 
possible object of thought because this style marks the investigation and 
justification procedures.’276 The notion of style of thinking does not only 
denote the form or way the thought is presented, as we have seen that style 
is not only a formal feature and that the whole form-content dichotomy 
should be abandoned with the other metaphysical dualisms, but is at the core 
of the philosophical investigation. 
Style of thought is for Wittgenstein a central element in conducting 
philosophical research, and not only in presenting it. Wittgenstein discusses 
further this idea of style as a core element of philosophy with the carriage on 
tracks metaphor.  
Writing the right style means, setting the carriage precisely on the 
rails. (CV, p.44) 
We are only going to set you straight on the track, if your carriage 
stands on the rails crookedly; driving is something we shall leave you 
to do by yourself. (CV, p. 44) 
In these two remarks, Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of a carriage on tracks 
to express the idea of style of writing and thinking. Writing in the right style 
                                                     
276 Schulte (1990), pp. 60-61, my translation: ‘Unter dem Stil des Denkens versteht 
Wittgenstein nicht nur die Art und Weise oder die Technik der Überlegung bzw. die 
Form ihrer Darstellung, sondern der in diesem Sinne aufgefasste Stil bestimmt in 
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aims at setting the reader’s thought on the right tracks. This is the task of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy: to show a way or style of thought which then 
brings the reader to a better understanding. To use another of Wittgenstein’s 
metaphor describing the task of philosophy as aiming ‘To show the fly the 
way out of the fly-bottle’ (PI 309), we could say that the task is to set the fly 
on the right tracks, in the direction of the exit. It is important to note that 
Wittgenstein considers that his task is only to set someone on the right tracks, 
and not to guide her along these tracks because his philosophy does not aim 
at establishing doctrines or truths and therefore at bringing someone to a 
specific point, be it the world of ideas, the absolute spirit, or a logical 
certainty, but at showing someone a different way of thinking, at bringing 
her to change her way of thinking.277  
Judith Genova argues in this direction by considering that philosophical 
‘theories can not be construed as scientific hypotheses about the nature of 
the world, nor as explanations about why things are the way they are. 
Instead, they can only offer new ways of seeing, new songs.’278 Wittgenstein’s 
way to bring people to new perspectives is to set them on the right tracks. 
The ordinary track we follow in our everyday life and routine is not the only 
perspective; other tracks can bring interesting insights on the world, and the 
task of philosophy—to that extent similar to that of art—is to bring one to 
change tracks, to experience other perspectives. Once someone is set on the 
tracks, philosophy cannot do anything more, according to Wittgenstein. 
Genova considers that ‘Philosophers become not poets, critics, or therapists 
for the later Wittgenstein, but performance artists whose only aim is to effect 
change.’279 Even though Genova’s distinction between poets, critics, and 
therapists on the one hand and performance artists on the other is 
contestable—poetry, critique, and therapy are important dimensions of 
                                                     
277 To that extent, what Stegmaier says about Nietzsche’s philosophy as giving signs 
rather than doctrines could also be applied to Wittgenstein. See Stegmaier (2006). 
278 Genova (1995), p. 5. 
279 Genova (1995), p. 5. 
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Wittgenstein’s philosophy and they all possess a performative character—
the interesting point in this quote is the idea that philosophers aim to effect 
change. This change occurs by changing one’s way of seeing, by setting one 
on different tracks. To do so, the philosopher needs to find the right 
expression. If the task of philosophy is to set the reader on the right tracks, it 
must also set itself on the right tracks to achieve that. We can notice here, 
once again, the importance of the two faces of the philosopher—or the poet 
as we have seen—who must first find the right perspective in order to change 
other people’s perspective. This search for a right perspective can be 
construed in terms of style and expression. One of the ways to create 
perspectives is metaphor, a tool the poet and the philosopher both use as we 
have seen, but other aspects come into play regarding style and they can all 
be construed in relation to understanding—and we have already mentioned 
that understanding is at the centre of stylistic concerns.  
2. Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s styles 
If style is related to thinking and understanding, how should a philosopher 
write? Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are both critic of how philosophy as 
metaphysics has been written and many of Nietzsche’s criticisms of other 
philosophers occur on this ground. Before turning to the use of style as a 
means to criticism in Nietzsche’s works, I will focus in this section on the 
positive remarks regarding style: how do Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
consider philosophy should be written and how do they write? I will focus 
on three intertwined aspects of their styles: words, aphorisms, and rhythm. 
We have seen in Chapter Five that the poetic dimension of language uses 
words in a specific way in order to create and destroy meanings. The choice 
of words is therefore a central component of poetry, but also of philosophy. 
Aphorism is a form which has a long tradition in philosophy and both 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein follow it, thus inheriting, as we have seen, from 
Lichtenberg and the German Romantics. Rhythm is central to poetry—and 
to read poetry as poetry according to Wittgenstein’s reading of Klopstock in 
his Lectures on Aesthetics—and we will see that Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
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both give great importance to the notion of rhythm. These aspects all aim at 
one thing: being understood or not. 
Although Nietzsche and Wittgenstein inscribe themselves in a tradition 
which has a long history in philosophy, that of aphorisms and remarks, they 
both aim at bringing philosophy to a new expression, to a new language, one 
which is not metaphysical. This search for a different language is what 
Wittgenstein does when he says he aims ‘to bring words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use’ (PI 116). The rejection of metaphysical 
language is a way to reject the system of values based on this metaphysical 
ground for Nietzsche: his revaluation of values can only take place within 
the framework of a revaluation of language, and it is precisely this aspect 
which is the ‘strangest about [his] new language’ (BGE 4 / KSA 5.18) The 
elaboration of such a new language is not easy and Nietzsche criticises his 
own writing style in The Birth of Tragedy for instance because he considers to 
have borrowed the language of another rather than used or invented his 
own: 
How much I now regret that at that time I lacked sufficient courage 
(and arrogance?) to allow myself to express such personal and risky 
views throughout in my own personal language—that instead I 
laboured to express in the terms of Schopenhauer and Kant new and 
unfamiliar evaluations, which ran absolutely counter the spirit, as 
well as the taste, of Schopenhauer and Kant!’ (BT, ‘Attempt,’ 6) 
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche considers having used a language 
inappropriate to his thoughts by expressing them in the language of another. 
In his later works, Nietzsche overcomes this difficulty and expresses himself 
in a new language, the language of his thought. 
We have seen that Wittgenstein also considers having difficulties in 
expression and in a remark from Culture and Value he describes his style as 
‘bad musical composition.’ This remark however contains two statements, 
the first one evaluates his style as bad, the second compares his style to 
musical composition. This second aspect is interesting to the extent that it 
shows Wittgenstein’s intention not to conform to a metaphysical and 
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systematic style, but rather to bring philosophical expression close to art and 
music especially. This idea of composition is important in Wittgenstein’s 
conception of style and he also compares philosophical writing to poetic 
composition in a remark from Culture and Value (CV, p. 28). We have also 
seen that understanding a poem is similar to understanding a musical theme. 
The idea of composition operates at two levels of style: 1) in the choice of 
words and 2) in the arranging and rearranging of remarks. In Culture and 
Value, Wittgenstein contrasts three kinds of style: ‘It's possible to write in a 
style that is unoriginal in form—like mine—but with well chosen words; or 
on the other hand in one that is original in form, freshly grown from within 
oneself. (And also of course in one which is botched together just anyhow 
out of old furnishings.)’ (CV, p. 60) Within style, there are three possible 
points of focus: focus on words, focus on form, or, one that Wittgenstein 
seems to value negatively, using old words and forms together. Wittgenstein 
considers himself to have an unoriginal form. He does not consider his style 
to be original to the extent that remarks (or aphorisms, maxims, sentences, 
etc.) are a rather common form in philosophy. The focus of his style is not 
form, but the choice of words. This can be understood in terms of 
composition: Wittgenstein composes with words rather than forms. The 
specificity of his composition—to the extent that all texts are compositions of 
words—is, as we will see, that it can be characterised as musical or poetic. 
One important point to note is that style is not limited to form. In other 
words, style is not a formalist notion because with the end of metaphysical 
dualisms, the form-content distinction cannot be sustained. Style is therefore 
a notion that bridges over form and content, because form cannot be thought 
without content (and vice versa). 
A compositional style does not operate only in the choice of words, but also 
in the arranging of remarks. In the preface to The Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein describes his arrangement as an album: 
I have written down all these thoughts as remarks, short paragraphs, 
and sometimes in longer chains about the same subject, sometimes 
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jumping, in a sudden change, from one to another.—Originally it was 
my intention to bring all this together in a book whose form I thought 
of differently at different times. But it seemed to me essential that in 
the book the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in 
a natural, smooth sequence. After several unsuccessful attempts to 
weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should 
never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than 
philosophical remarks; my thoughts soon grew feeble if I tried to 
force them along a single track against their natural inclination.—
And this was, of course, connected to the very nature of the 
investigation. For it compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction 
over a wide field of thought.—The philosophical remarks in this book 
are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made 
in the course of these long and meandering journeys. The same or 
almost the same points were always being approached afresh from 
different directions, and new sketches made. Very many of these 
were badly drawn or lacking in character, marked by all the defects 
of a weak draughtsman. And when they were rejected, a number of 
half-way decent ones were left, which then had to be arranged and 
often cut down, in order to give the viewer an idea of the landscape. 
So this book is really just an album. (PI, Preface) 
Wittgenstein acknowledges his original intention of writing up the remarks 
in the form of a book, which he defines as thoughts proceeding ‘from one 
subject to another in a natural, smooth sequence.’ This is Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of what philosophical books traditionally are, and he claims 
to be incapable of writing in such a manner. Such an incapability is however 
not the consequence of an inability to write, but is ‘connected to the very 
nature of the investigation.’ If, as argued above, style and thought are closely 
related, thoughts cannot be expressed in any style, but style proceeds from 
the thoughts themselves. Edward Kanterian considers this dimension in 
Wittgenstein’s style an important one: 
The style answers in part to an aesthetic ideal, in part is justified by 
philosophical reasons pertaining to what is investigated, our 
conceptual scheme. This conceptual scheme is logically independent 
of the style and can be described in various other ways, but it lends 
itself in a natural way to an album-type investigation, just as much as 
a certain landscape can be captured by a series of loosely related 
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sketches. But also by a “linear” series of loosely connected sketches, 
or by a single wide-format panorama.280 
Style intertwines aesthetic and conceptual aspects, and what might appear 
as a formal or ornamental feature is in fact related to the investigation itself. 
Although there is an independence between the conceptual scheme and style 
for Kanterian, Wittgenstein’s conceptual scheme ‘lends itself in a natural 
way’ to his specific style. Bringing Wittgenstein’s conceptual scheme in 
another style would somehow go against its nature and force it into being 
something it is not. 
Wittgenstein’s description of his style (both of thinking and writing) as criss-
crossing in every direction reminds us of his understanding of family 
resemblance concepts as ‘similarities overlapping and criss-crossing.’ (PI 66) 
To that extent, the ‘book’ as whole can be seen as a family resemblance 
concept in which each remark is connected to another as family members, 
without necessarily having one essential and definitory feature in common. 
Wittgenstein’s remarks are sketches of a landscape approached from many 
points of view or perspectives and constitute an album. These notions of 
album and of landscape bring to the fore the compositional dimension of 
Wittgenstein’s style: he composes not only with words, but also with his 
remarks. In a sense, his style is similar to Montaigne’s who likes a writing ‘à 
sauts et à gambades.’ The idea of essay, as Montaigne considers it, resembles 
Wittgenstein’s remarks which jump from one subject to another. This idea of 
jumps brings back to the fore the idea of dance we have already discussed in 
Nietzsche’s works. Such a dance is not only a dance with words, but also a 
dance with remarks, essays, or aphorisms. 
Inasmuch as Wittgenstein’s style is compositional both in words and 
remarks, so is Nietzsche’s, and he acknowledges this double aspect in his 
writing of aphorisms. When describing his own style, Nietzsche considers 
words as central: 
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My feeling for style, for the epigram as style, was stirred almost the 
moment I came into contact with Sallust. […] One will recognize in 
me, even in my Zarathustra, a very serious ambition for Roman style, 
for the ‘aere perennius’ in style.—My first contact with Horace was 
no different. To this day I have never had the same artistic delight in 
any poet as I was given from the start by one of Horace’s odes. In 
certain languages, what is achieved here cannot even be desired. This 
mosaic of words, in which every word radiates its strength as sound, 
as place, as concept, to the right and to the left and over the whole, 
this minimum in the range and number of its signs, the maximum 
which this attains in the energy of the signs—all this is Roman and, if 
I am to be believed, noble par excellence. All the rest of poetry 
becomes, in comparison, something too popular—a mere emotional 
garrulousness. (TI ‘Ancients’ 1 / KSA 6.154-5) 
Nietzsche inscribes his style in the tradition of epigrams, and we will discuss 
the notion of aphorism later. Like Wittgenstein’s style, Nietzsche’s is not 
original in form inasmuch as it belongs to a long tradition, going back to the 
Romans and even before them. His style also focuses on words and his ideal 
of style, Horace, makes the words radiate in many ways. The words are 
central for they carry the possibility of radiating to the other words. The 
meaning of a word can affect another, radiate on another as it were, and 
therefore modify its meaning. The French philosopher Henri Maldiney 
elaborates on this use of words in poetry and how it functions differently 
from the ordinary use: ‘If words in language have no neighbours, if in 
discourse they are in mutual servitude along the co-ownership regime of the 
sentence, in the poetic sequence their relations are of pure neighbourhood.’281 
According to Maldiney, words in poetry are autonomous, they are not ruled 
by the grammatical necessity of syntax. In an everyday sentence, the relation 
between two words is defined by their grammatical functions: subject, 
object, verb, etc. In contrast, in poetry the relation between words is 
independent of grammar, it is a ‘relation of pure neighbourhood’ in the sense 
that it is the proximity between two words which creates an association, 
which makes sense, which creates meaning, rather than their grammatical 
                                                     
281 Maldiney (2012), p. 57, my translation: ‘Si les mots en langue sont sans voisinage, 
si dans le discours ils sont en servitude mutuelle selon le régime de la copropriété 
de la phrase, dans la séquence poétique leurs rapports sont de pur voisinage.’ 
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functions. Poetry brings to the fore this aspect of language, according to 
which there is a radiation of meaning from every word. A word in a poem 
radiates and, by doing so, irradiates its neighbours. 
This is what I would call a ‘semantic contamination:’ the meaning of a word 
in poetry contaminates its neighbours. Although Maldiney considers this 
contamination to be a feature specific to poetic language only, I would argue 
that ordinary language also presents such a contamination: puns, jokes, and 
many aspects of our everyday use of language are examples of it. It is a 
feature of language altogether which poets use to a wider extent, but which 
is at work in our everyday use of language. Inasmuch as poetic language is 
not separate from ordinary language, ‘semantic contamination’ belongs to 
both poetic and ordinary uses of language. Such a contamination is 
sometimes a ground for misunderstanding and it is also, I believe, what is at 
play in Max Black’s interactionist view of metaphor: in a metaphor words 
interact in such a way that one word’s meaning modifies the other, and his 
understanding of metaphor is not limited to poetic language but also 
appears in everyday idioms.282 The radiation of words in every direction 
makes us perceive the words differently, gives them a different meaning, 
brings us to another interpretation. Although Nietzsche is rather critical of 
words and concepts in On Truth and Lie, this does not mean that he cannot 
use words to overcome these critical aspects. On the contrary, Nietzsche—
and the poet of whom he attempts to recreate the style—uses words in order 
to create new meanings and values. Words are therefore not only considered 
negatively as they can be used in a creative way, but the blind following of 
the ordinary use of words—that is for Nietzsche the following of the 
established moral and social order—needs to be overcome. The creative use 
of words, like in poetry, is a way to contest the ordinary order. Many avant-
garde art movements for instance contest the established order by contesting 
the established language. Hugo Ball’s critique of the words in his Dada 
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Manifesto is a perfect example of it: ‘I don’t want words that other people 
have invented. All the words are other people’s inventions. I want my own 
stuff, my own rhythm, and vowels and consonants too, matching the rhythm 
and all my own.’283 Ball considers that the words have been contaminated 
because they help sustaining the bourgeois order, and thus the bourgeois 
definition of art he aims to disturb. The creation of new words and new uses 
for words is a way for him to overcome this established bourgeois order and 
its related definition of art. 
The creative use of words is poetic in the sense developed in Chapter Five 
and such a use overcomes the limitations of representational language. We 
have seen that Nietzsche considers language to be incapable of representing 
drives and, in Ecce Homo, he describes his style as aiming precisely at 
communicating these inner states: 
At the same time I’ll say something about my art of style in general. 
Communicating a state, an inner tension of pathos through signs, 
including the tempo of these signs—that is the point of every style; 
and considering that in my case the multiplicity of inner states is 
extraordinary, in my case there are many stylistic possibilities—
altogether the most multifarious art of style anyone has ever had at 
their disposal. (EH ‘Books’ 4 / KSA 6.304) 
A ‘multifarious art of style’ is necessary if one aims at communicating these 
inner states and all that representational language cannot communicate. 
Through his creative use of language, Nietzsche considers himself a poet: 
‘Before me, people did not know what can be done with the German 
language—what can be done with language tout court.—The art of grand 
rhythm, the grand style of the period expressing an immense rise and fall of 
sublime, superhuman passion was first discovered by me; with a dithyramb 
like the last in the Third Part of Zarathustra, entitled “The Seven Seals,” I 
flew a thousand miles beyond what had hitherto been called poetry.’ (EH 
‘Books’ 4 / KSA 6.304-5) Nietzsche claims to push the limits of poetry in his 
Zarathustra, that he created something not only in the philosophical realm 
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but in the poetic one as well. Without judging the quality of Nietzsche’s 
text—Nietzsche himself considers it as ‘the greatest gift to mankind’ whereas 
some commentators, Aaron Ridley for instance, consider it a failure284—
Zarathustra can be read as a parody, or at least an imitation of an older form. 
In this sense and as with Wittgenstein, Nietzsche’s style is not original in 
form but plays with established categories. Nietzsche uses existing forms in 
order to create something inasmuch as the poet uses existing words to create 
new meanings. This reflects the choice of Zarathustra as main character: 
Nietzsche chooses the founder of morality as the figure to overcome it. The 
poetic—in the sense of creative—dimension of Nietzsche’s text often appears 
in ‘The Seven Seals:’ ‘creative breath,’ ‘creative lightning,’ and ‘creative new 
words.’ This creative dimension is acquired through a creative use of 
language or, according to Nietzsche, ‘creative new words.’ Let us now turn 
to the form Nietzsche and Wittgenstein most often use in their writings: 
aphorisms and remarks. 
In a note from Culture and Value, Wittgenstein compares his remarks to 
Kraus’s aphorisms through a strange metaphor: ‘Raisins may be the best part 
of a cake; but a bag of raisins is not better than a cake; & someone who is in 
a position to give us a bag full of raisins still cannot bake a cake with them, 
let alone do something better. I am thinking of Kraus & his aphorisms, but 
of myself too & my philosophical remarks. A cake is not as it were: thinned 
out raisins.’ (CV, p. 76) For Wittgenstein, aphorisms and remarks are like 
raisins in a cake, and raisins alone are not sufficient to bake a cake. 
Wittgenstein expresses here the same problems of expression as those from 
the preface to the Philosophical Investigations: his incapability to write a book. 
The remarks he writes do not amount to a book in the sense already 
discussed of thoughts that ‘proceed from one subject to another in a natural, 
smooth sequence.’ This does not mean however that aphorisms and remarks 
cannot form a coherent whole. Wittgenstein spends quite some time 
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arranging and rearranging his remarks and Nietzsche has similar concerns 
with his collection of aphorisms. Collections of aphorisms are compositions 
in which the meaning of an aphorism will influence another. The same 
‘semantic contamination’ occurs between aphorisms as it does between 
words. Such a contamination occurs within Nietzsche’s collection of 
aphorisms, and Wittgenstein’s description of his remarks as ‘jumping’ from 
one another in the preface to the Philosophical Investigations is a way of saying 
that the organisation of the remarks functions by making meanings jump 
from one remark to another. However, as Wittgenstein did not publish any 
collection of remarks himself, it is difficult to apply such a conception to his 
works. 
That the meaning of aphorisms and remarks is related to the surrounding 
ones brings the notion of interpretation to the fore. Indeed, it is the 
interpretative task which reveals the connections between aphorisms. This 
notion of interpretation is central to Nietzsche’s understanding of the 
aphorism as he describes it in the preface to The Genealogy of Morals: 
In other cases, the aphoristic form presents problems: this stems from 
the fact that nowadays this form is not taken seriously enough. An 
aphorism, honestly cast and stamped, is still some way from being 
‘deciphered’ once it has been read; rather, it is only then that its 
interpretation can begin, and for this an art of interpretation is 
required. In the third essay of this book I have offered a model for 
what I mean by ‘interpretation’ in such a case—the essay opens with 
an aphorism and is itself a commentary upon it. Admittedly, to 
practise reading as an art in this way requires one thing above all, 
and it is something which today more than ever has been thoroughly 
unlearnt—a fact which explains why it will be some time before my 
writings are ‘readable’—it is something for which one must be 
practically bovine and certainly not a ‘modern man:’ that is to say, 
rumination… (GM Preface 8 / KSA 5.255-6) 
An aphorism cannot be read quickly, the reader needs to ‘decipher’ it, to 
interpret it, in order to understand it. A specific style, a specific writing calls 
for a specific reading. Similarly to what we have said about reading poetry 
as poetry in Chapter Four, aphorisms need to be read as aphorisms. One 
cannot run through the aphorism if one aims to understand it. Digesting 
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aphorisms takes time and this digesting process is one of interpretation. The 
right style calls for the right reader and the right reading. For Nietzsche, 
aphorisms require slow readers who are ready to actively engage with the 
text, interpreting it, rather than receiving it passively. Wittgenstein too asks 
for slow readers who do not rush through the text: ‘Really I want to slow 
down the speed of reading with continual punctuation marks. For I should 
like to be read slowly. (As I myself read.)’ (CV, p. 77) For Wittgenstein, the 
purpose of punctuation is to slow down the readers. The form he uses, that 
of remarks, could be seen as inviting a fast reading, jumping from one 
remark to another as the remarks themselves jump from one theme to 
another. If one did so, many of Wittgenstein’s remarks would appear rather 
trivial and uninteresting. Another aspect of careful reading is that it directs 
the reader’s attention to the words themselves, and we have already 
discussed this aspect of Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s styles. If the choice is 
important, this means that aphorisms cannot be paraphrased or, rather, that 
a paraphrase does not have the same value as the original. As already seen 
in a previous chapter, the impossibility of paraphrase is a characteristic of 
poetry, as Wittgenstein argues in Philosophical Grammar: ‘No one would 
believe that a poem remained essentially unaltered if its words were to be 
replaced by others in accordance with an appropriate convention.’ (PG 32) 
There is a correlation between the tempo of reading and possibility of 
understanding: ‘Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at 
the right tempo. My sentences are all to be read slowly.’ (CV, p. 65) If one 
reads a sentence too fast, one will pass over important information and not 
really understand the sentence, not noticing some aspects of it; at best, one 
would have a superficial understanding. The opposite is true as well: if one 
reads too slowly, one might attach too much importance to one word or 
another, block on it, and therefore fail to follow the flow of the 
argumentation. Too much flow might lead the reader to a superficial 
reading, not enough might lead her to over-interpret and therefore 
misinterpret the text. As the words must be stressed correctly in order to 
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understand a poem and as rhythm plays a central role in understanding a 
poem, so does rhythm in understanding philosophical aphorisms or 
remarks. Nietzsche adds: ‘How many Germans have the knowledge—and 
expect it of themselves—that there is an art in every good sentence—art that 
must be perceived if the sentence is to be understood! Misunderstand its 
tempo, for example, and the sentence itself is misunderstood.’ (BGE 246 / 
KSA 5.189) One must perceive the poetic in the sentence in order to 
understand it; understanding the tempo means understanding the rhythm 
with which the sentence must be read. 
Wittgenstein and Nietzsche both ask for slow readers and write in a slow 
tempo. Tempo is an important component of style, one which Nietzsche 
considers hard to translate: ‘The hardest thing to translate from one language 
to another is the tempo of its style; this style has its basis in the character of 
the race or to speak more physiologically, in the average tempo of the race’s 
“metabolism.”’ (BGE 28 / KSA 5.46) Although Nietzsche roots this difficulty 
in distinctions of race and metabolism, which can be problematic in some 
interpretations, what is at play here is, I believe, that tempo is related to style 
inasmuch as each language has its own tempo. Because a language is 
embedded in a cultural context, it is linked to a specific tempo which is 
difficult to translate. In Wittgenstein’s words, the tempo of a language is 
related to the metabolism of its form of life and one cannot so easily shift 
from one tempo to another. Reading is not only an intellectual act; it involves 
the body and the whole culture in which this body develops. This 
physiological aspect of reading—that Nietzsche for instance discusses with 
the metaphor of digestion—reflects the physiological aspects of writing we 
have discussed in considering dance as metaphor for style. Let us now turn 




3. Style as Critique 
Because of his ideal of style as lively or dancing, Nietzsche adopts a poetic 
style which relies on short forms of writing, thus following some of the 
German Romantics’ insights. For another reason, namely his difficulty of 
expression and his incapacity to write philosophy in the form of a book, 
Wittgenstein also adopts a short form of writing. We will see in the 
concluding chapter that this style might be related to his idea that ‘really one 
should write philosophy only as one writes a poem’ (CV, p. 28), but both 
Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s adoption of short form in philosophy also 
reveals a rejection of a certain style or way of doing philosophy. Inasmuch 
as they reject the metaphysical style of thinking, they also reject the 
metaphysical style of writing (for both are related once we step out of the 
metaphysical form-content dualism). This rejection of metaphysical style is 
related to the rejection of metaphysical language and insofar as the poetic 
turn in philosophy of language leads to rejecting the representational and 
metaphysical model of language as the only possible model, similarly, the 
stylistic turn in philosophy leads to rejecting metaphysical style as the only 
style in philosophy, and, ultimately, style becomes a ground for criticising 
metaphysics and metaphysical language. Nietzsche’s search for a new 
language and Wittgenstein’s return to ordinary language show that 
metaphysical language is inappropriate to their conceptions of philosophy 
and, because of that, the way philosophers write becomes a point of criticism. 
Nietzsche especially uses style as a ground for criticising many philosophers. 
As we will see, Nietzsche establishes a relation between style and the 
philosopher which is not without reminding us of the relation between style 
and the man that Buffon suggests in his famous sentence: ‘Style is the man.’ 
Although Wittgenstein does not criticise the style of other philosophers (and 
he does not criticise many philosophers directly), he considers that there is a 
relation between style and the man by commenting on Buffon’s sentence in  
Culture and Value: ‘“Le style c’est l'homme.” “Le style c’est l'homme même.” 
The first expression has a cheap epigrammatic brevity. The second, correct, 
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one opens a quite different perspective. It says that style is the picture of the 
man.’ (CV, p. 89) This relation between style and the man opens the 
possibility to criticise the man on stylistic grounds and Nietzsche does so 
with philosophers in many of his works, early and late.  
For instance, in Twilight of the Idols, he criticises Plato for stylistic reasons: 
Plato, it seems to me, mixes up all stylistic forms, which makes him a 
first stylistic decadent: he has on his conscience something similar to 
the Cynics who invented the satura Menippea. The Platonic dialogue, 
that dreadfully self-satisfied and childish kind of dialectics, can only 
have a stimulating effect if one has never read any good 
Frenchman—Fontenelle, for example. Plato is boring. (TI ‘Ancients’ 2 
/ KSA 6.155) 
From a stylistic perspective, Nietzsche considers Plato to be boring. Plato is 
the ‘first stylistic decadent,’ and this coincides with him being the first 
metaphysician. Nietzsche does not elaborate here on such a connection 
between decadent style and metaphysics, which would be a decadent 
philosophy, but other texts offer a critique of metaphysics through a critique 
of style. With Plato, according to Nietzsche, something happens to 
philosophy which leads it onto its decadent slope, a decadence Nietzsche 
tries to stop and reverse by showing what a ‘philosopher of the future’ 
should be. 
The stylistic criticism of philosophers is not specific to Nietzsche, for instance 
Aristotle criticises Heraclitus on these grounds,285 but Nietzsche uses it to a 
larger extent. Nietzsche’s critique of Spinoza pursues the same line of 
thought and establishes a relation between a critique of metaphysics and a 
stylistic critique: 
Or take that hocus-pocus of mathematical form in which Spinoza 
armoured and disguised his philosophy ('the love of his wisdom' 
ultimately, if we interpret the word correctly and fairly), to intimidate 
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at the outset the brave assailant who might dare to throw a glance at 
this invincible virgin and Pallas Athena—how this sickly hermit's 
masquerade betrays his own timidity and assailability! (BGE 5 / KSA 
5.19) 
Once again, Nietzsche criticises the form which disguises Spinoza’s ‘love of 
his wisdom.’ If we were still working within the metaphysical framework of 
the form-content dualism, Nietzsche’s critique would only have little impact 
as criticising the style would not necessarily criticise the content. However, 
as we have seen, Nietzsche is suspicious of such dualisms and precisely aims 
at abolishing them. One can therefore not separate form from content and 
Nietzsche uses style as a means to criticise not only the form, but also the 
content of Spinoza’s philosophy. The disguise is as important as the 
philosophy and Nietzsche further argues for such a relation when he says 
that ‘every philosophy also conceals a philosophy.’ (BGE 289 / KSA 5.234) 
Following this remark on Spinoza, Nietzsche states that ‘every philosophy is 
the unconscious memoir of its author.’ (BGE 6 / KSA 5.19) From this 
perspective, a stylistic critique of philosophy is also and above all a critique 
of the philosopher who elaborates it. This idea is not specific to Nietzsche’s 
later works, in the first of the Untimely Meditations he already criticises Hegel 
and his idea that ‘What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational’286 on 
stylistic grounds: 
A philosophy which chastely concealed behind arabesque flourishes 
the philistine confession of its author invented in addition a formula 
for the apotheosis of the commonplace: it spoke of the rationality of 
the real, and thus ingratiated itself with the cultural philistine, who 
also loves arabesque flourishes but above all conceives himself alone 
to be real and treats his reality as the standard of reason in the world. 
(DS 2 / KSA 169-70) 
The two ideas mentioned above—‘every philosophy also conceals a 
philosophy’ and every philosophy is ‘the unconscious memoir of its author’s 
love of his wisdom’—are combined in the idea that a philosophy is a 
concealed ‘philistine confession of its author.’ Nietzsche’s critique of Hegel 
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is based on the idea that his style conceals something and is therefore some 
kind of lie. Hegel’s style is closely related to an attitude towards the world, 
to a perspective according to which ‘his reality [is] the standard of reason in 
the world.’ The stylistic critique is a way of introducing a critique of the 
whole worldview to which it is related. 
In Dawn, Nietzsche pursues this critique of Hegel in stylistic terms:  
Of the celebrated Germans, none perhaps possessed more esprit than 
Hegel—but he also possessed so great a German fear of it that this 
fear was responsible for creating the bad style peculiar to him. For 
the essence of his style is that a kernel is wrapped round and 
wrapped round again until it can hardly peep through, bashfully and 
with inquisitive eyes as ‘young women peep through their veils,’ to 
quote the ancient misogynist Aeschylus—but this kernel is a witty, 
often indiscreet inspiration on the most intellectual subjects, a daring 
and subtle phrase-coinage such as is appropriate to the society of 
thinkers as a condiment to science–but swathed in its wrapping it 
presents itself as the abstrusest of sciences and altogether a piece of 
the highest moral boredom! (D 193 / KSA 3.166-7) 
The critique is similar to the one from the Untimely Meditations: Hegel’s style 
conceals something, wraps something up to make it look like something 
different. The core of his philosophy is so wrapped up in layers of style that 
it evades gaze. Inasmuch as the metaphysical ‘true world’ diverted the 
attention from the ‘apparent world’ (just like the Christian promoting of the 
afterlife hides the actual life in Nietzsche’s sense), style can be read as parallel 
to this critique of metaphysics: as metaphysics attempts to hide the ‘apparent 
world’ behind the ‘true world,’ metaphysics hides its emptiness behind 
stylistic features. Hegel’s style is, according to Nietzsche, a way of diverting 
the eye, of hiding something under layers of ‘subtle phrase-coinage.’ This is 
why Nietzsche considers systematists to lack integrity as he says in Twilight 
of the Idols: ‘I mistrust all systematists and avoid them. The will to system is 
a lack of integrity.’ (TI ‘Arrows’ 26 / KSA 6.63) 
Let us note that, as for Plato, Hegel’s style is boring. Although it might seem 
at first glance as a matter of personal taste, Nietzsche’s characterisation of 
Plato’s and Hegel’s styles as boring reveal something of the philosophical 
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project he has in mind. If creation if central to Nietzsche’s works, we can 
understand this idea of boredom as claiming that Hegel does not create 
anything, does not produce a philosophy, but rather only reproduces the 
dominant moral system. Hegel’s style and philosophy would therefore only 
be justifications for pursuing the normal moral order whereas Nietzsche 
promotes precisely the opposite. Plato and Hegel are boring in the sense that 
their philosophies only establish a metaphysical system which justifies the 
traditional moral order, without aiming at any change. We have however 
seen that to effect change is one of the tasks Nietzsche attributes to 
philosophy and in order to accomplish it, philosophers must create new 
perspectives rather than justifying the existing ones. This creation requires a 
new language and a new style. 
Nietzsche’s critique of Hegel’s and Spinoza’s styles serves as examples for 
his critique of systematic style in philosophy which, ultimately, amounts to 
a critique of metaphysics:  
In the desert of science.—To a scientist engaged in his modest and 
arduous travels, which often enough must involve journeys through 
the desert, there appear those gleaming mirages that we call 
‘philosophical systems:’ with the magical power of illusion, they 
show the solution to all riddles and the coolest drink of the true water 
of life to be near at hand; the heart revels in this and the weary 
traveller practically touches with his lips the goal of all scientific 
perseverance and peril, so that he involuntarily pushes onward. 
Admittedly, those of a different nature remain standing still, as if 
stunned by the beautiful illusion: the desert swallows them and they 
are dead for science. Those of yet another nature, who have often 
experienced those subjective consolations before, become extremely 
annoyed and curse the salty taste that those apparitions leave in their 
mouths, from which a raging thirst arises—without one having 
thereby come even a single step closer to any spring. (AOM 31 / KSA 
2.393) 
Philosophical systems are mirages and illusions of which we must be careful. 
They are a danger to the development of science (and human culture 
altogether) because they offer a fake solution. Nietzsche’s critique of the 
generality of concepts in On Truth and Lie is transposed here to philosophical 
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systems: they give an illusory general understanding of the world but are 
unable to account for individual events. If one pursues this mirage, one ends 
up dead. Inasmuch as the concepts are metaphors’ graveyards, philosophical 
systems are scientific graveyards. This quote shows Nietzsche’s ambiguous 
relation to science. Especially in Human, All Too Human, science seems to be 
an interesting solution for Nietzsche, but the danger of scientism lies within 
all sciences. If science considers itself as ‘the coolest drink of the true water 
of life,’ it becomes the end of science, the end of the search for an answer. In 
science and philosophy, the important element is the search, the process, 
because there is no absolute goal which can be reached. Philosophical 
systems like Hegel’s are illusions which we must avoid: they give a pretence 
of an answer but are in the end empty. For Nietzsche, the task of philosophy 
is not to justify the established order by elaborating a conceptual edifice, but 
to create new values. 
It is this aspect of creation of values which brings philosophy in close 
relationship to poetry and art. This closeness reflects on Nietzsche’s own 
style which he also criticises, for instance when looking back onto The Birth 
of Tragedy: ‘It should have sung, this “new soul”—rather than spoken! What 
a pity that I did not dare to say what I had to say then as a poet: I might have 
managed it!’ (BT ‘Attempt’ 3 / KSA 1.15) We have seen that Nietzsche already 
criticises his style in The Birth of Tragedy because he used the language of 
others (Kant and Schopenhauer) and he adds here a second aspect to his 
criticism: his language was not singing enough. In other words, Nietzsche 
criticises his failure to write as a poet, to make his words sing, and this, as 
we have seen, also suggests that he does not overcome the ‘spoken’ 
philosophical style in The Birth of Tragedy. To write philosophy as poetry is 
thus the task Nietzsche assigns himself in his retrospective look onto his 
early work and this is central to his later works, especially in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. This writing philosophy as poetry is, as we have argued, not 
only a matter of form but also of content or, better, a matter which overcomes 
the form-content dualism. Nietzsche thus aims at overcoming the 
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metaphysical dualisms inherited from Plato: between philosophy and 
poetry, form and content, mind and body, true and apparent worlds. If 
philosophy is a matter of creating perspectives and if style follows this task, 
philosophical stylistics studies the poetics of philosophy. This poetics of 
philosophy suggests a revaluation of the relations between philosophy and 




Poetics of Philosophy (Or Philosophy and Poetry 
reconsidered) 
The Gay Science, Prelude 56: ‘Poet’s Vanity’  
Give me glue and in good time 
I'll find wood myself. To crowd 
Sense into four silly rhymes 
Is enough to make one proud. 
The Gay Science, Prelude 59: ‘The Pen Is Stubborn’  
The pen is stubborn, sputters-hell! 
Am I condemned to scrawl 
Boldly I dip it in the well,  
My writing flows, and all 
I try succeeds. Of course the spatter 
Of tormented night 
Is quite illegible. No matter:  
Who reads the stuff I write? 
When philosophy encounters poetry, the latter appears both as a mirror and 
a limit. A mirror because both share a similar task and a limit because the 
language of philosophy seems at first to be incompatible with poetry. 
Connecting Nietzsche and Wittgenstein around the question of poetry has 
however given us elements for reconsidering the relations between 
philosophy and poetry, and thereby the creative dimension of philosophical 
investigations. Although Nietzsche and Wittgenstein seem to consider the 
poetics of philosophy in two different ways, Wittgenstein wants ‘to bring 
words back to the ordinary’ whereas Nietzsche is more openly poetic and 
criticises the ordinary as the common, and if we consider the poetic to arise 
from the ordinary, these two aspects might be less sharply opposed to one 
another. Another way to consider this opposition is to consider that the task 
of philosophy for Wittgenstein is description whereas it is creation for 
Nietzsche. However, as we have seen, Wittgenstein’s description and 
Nietzsche’s creation both aim at effecting change and it is this change which 
we consider to be the poetic aspect of their thoughts. As we have seen in 
Chapters Two and Three, to achieve this change, they need to reject the 
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representational use of language which usually prevails in metaphysics and 
suggest a different view of language, one which inherits from the expressive 
tradition of Herder, Hamann, Humboldt and others. If there is a poetics of 
philosophy and if philosophy and poetry therefore share a similar task as I 
have argued in Part Two, the notion of creation must play a central role. 
In this concluding chapter and in order to bring the various elements 
together, I focus on the notion of creation to reconsider the relations between 
philosophy and poetry. This focus on creation should however not hide that 
parts of Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies are opposed to this 
creative dimension, especially Nietzsche’s focus on fate with his notions of 
eternal recurrence and amor fati, and Wittgenstein’s focus on description, two 
aspects which I have only briefly discussed. My focus on poetry has led me 
to consider the creative side more than other aspects of their philosophies in 
relation to language, and especially their creation of language in their styles.  
Nietzsche often discusses his new language and describes it as strange: ‘We 
do not object to a judgment just because it is false; this is probably what is 
strangest about our new language.’ (BGE 4 / KSA 5.18) The new language is 
strange because it does not rely on the metaphysical dualisms and therefore 
accounts for the world in a new way, shifting from representation to 
expression. Truth as correspondence is no longer held as an absolute and 
therefore even a ‘false’ judgment might bring insights on the world. The 
creation of a new language is a way of creating new values and, to the extent 
that ‘we can only destroy as creators,’ a way of destroying old values and 
perspectives. Nietzsche suggests this idea of creation of a new language in 
Zarathustra: ‘New ways I walk now, a new talk comes to me: weary have I 
grown, like all creators, of the old tongues. No longer does my spirit want to 
wander on worn-out soles.’ (Z II ‘Child’ / KSA 4.106-7) This notion of 
creation is central to Nietzsche’s understanding of poetry and of a poetic 
language in philosophy. Although Nietzsche writes poems as well, he does 
not argue for an identification of philosophy with poetry. Rather than 
identifying or categorising philosophy as poetry, Nietzsche’s claim shows 
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that philosophy can be enriched from poetry. This goes against the idea of a 
generic difference between philosophy and poetry and following this line of 
thought, Manfred Frank ‘contends that literary discourse does not differ in 
either principle or quality, but merely quantitatively, from other innovative 
uses of colloquial language. Creative literature (Dichtung) is merely the 
extreme form of the innovative potential found in our everyday use of 
language.’287 Poetry uses the innovative possibilities of our language to its 
maximal capacity according to Frank, but philosophy can use them as well. 
By accepting poetry within the philosophical realm—thus making the 
opposite move to Plato’s banishing of poetry from his ideal city—Nietzsche 
attempts to create a philosophy of the future. By turning to a poetic style, a 
creative style in the sense of poiesis, philosophy can acquire a creative 
dimension. 
An important aspect of this creative use of language in philosophy is its focus 
on expression, in contrast to representation. Nietzsche’s metaphors of 
laughter and dance which appear often in Zarathustra for instance are good 
examples of this shift to expression. As we have seen, dance is a metaphor 
for an expressive language and brings to the fore the bodily dimension of 
writing and reading. Similarly, laughter has a bodily dimension and 
represents an expressive burst. Dance and laughter are two modes of 
expression Nietzsche uses as metaphors. A third one appears quite often as 
well: singing. As we have seen, in his ‘Attempt at self-criticism,’ Nietzsche 
criticises his own style, considering that ‘It should have sung, this “new 
soul”—rather than spoken!’ (BT ‘Attempt’ 3 / KSA 1.15) In the shorter 
version from Zarathustra: ‘Sing! Speak no more!’ (Z III ‘Seals’ 7 / KSA 4.291) 
This opposition between speaking and singing reflects the opposition 
between prose and poetry. Songs would belong to the realm of poetry, and 
let us not forget for instance that Nietzsche’s Gay Science is subtitled with a 
Provençal translation: ‘la gaya scienza’ which refers to the art of 
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troubadours. Moreover, The Gay Science is followed by an appendix of songs. 
One of the aspects which unites poetry and music is the idea of rhythm. We 
have seen that rhythm is an essential component of both Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s styles and that it is related to the possibility of understanding. 
In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche claims: ‘Thoughts in poems.—The poet 
leads his thoughts along festively, upon the chariot of rhythm: usually 
because they cannot walk on their own feet.’ (HH 189 / KSA 2.164) If 
thoughts in poetry cannot walk, does this mean they can dance? The idea of 
a bodily expression comes back as a metaphor for the poetics of philosophy.  
This idea of expression, especially in relation to music, can also be found in 
Wittgenstein who, as said before, considers his style to be ‘bad musical 
composition’ (CV, p. 45). Even though it is bad musical composition, it is 
musical nonetheless and Wittgenstein acknowledges the importance of the 
expressive dimension in the writing of philosophy. According to Marjorie 
Perloff, his attention to the choice of words make him some kind of poet: ‘Or 
perhaps the “uniqueness” in our postromantic age is less a matter of 
authenticity of individual expression than of sensitivity to the language pool 
on which the poet draws in re-creating and redefining the world as he or she 
has found it. It is in this context that Wittgenstein himself can be considered 
a poet.’288 
In a famous remark from Culture and Value, Wittgenstein compares 
philosophy to poetic composition: 
I believe I summed up where I stand in relation to philosophy when 
I said: really one should write philosophy only as one writes a poem. 
That, it seems to me, must reveal how far my thinking belongs to the 
present, the future, or the past. For I was acknowledging myself, with 
these words, to be someone who cannot quite do what he would like 
to be able to do. (CV, p. 28) 
Wittgenstein introduces a direct relation between philosophy and poetry: 
philosophy should be written as poetry. Whereas the first sentence of this 
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remark is often quoted and has been commented rather intensively, most 
commentators do not discuss the rest of the remark. The last sentence can be 
linked to Nietzsche’s self-criticism in The Birth of Tragedy: like Nietzsche, 
Wittgenstein was unable to express his thought in the right way. This failure 
to write philosophy as it should be written reveals all that still needs to be 
done. A philosophy written as poetry would be, taking Nietzsche’s words, a 
‘philosophy of the future.’ We can therefore understand the middle sentence: 
if philosophy can be written as poetry, it can look towards the future. Poetry 
points out what still needs to be done, what still needs to be created. Poetry 
appears as representing the future, as an aim towards which Wittgenstein—
and philosophy—strives. Philosophy should be like poetry in the sense that 
it should always look forward, look towards using the creative powers at its 
disposal. 
The idea of creation is one of the main features of a philosophy of the future, 
but what should such a philosophy create? Philosophy considered as poetry 
aims at creating new perspectives, but these new perspectives, according to 
Nietzsche, amount more precisely to create new values: 
I must insist that we finally stop mistaking philosophical workers or 
learned people in general for philosophers—in this regard especially, 
we should give strictly ‘to each his own,’ and not too much to the 
former or too little to the latter. The education of the true philosopher 
may require that he himself once pass through all the stages at which 
his servants, the learned workers of philosophy, remain—must 
remain. Perhaps he even needs to have been a critic and a sceptic and 
a dogmatic and an historian, and in addition a poet and collector and 
traveller and puzzle-solver and moralist and seer and ‘free spirit’ and 
nearly all things, so that he can traverse the range of human values 
and value-feelings and be able to look with many kinds of eyes and 
consciences from the corners into every wide expanse. But all these 
are only the preconditions for his task: the task itself calls for 
something else—it calls for him to create values. It is the task of those 
philosophical workers in the noble mould of Kant and Hegel to 
establish and press into formulae some large body of value 
judgments (that is, previous value-assumptions, value-creations that 
have become dominant and are for a time called ‘truths’), whether in 
the realm of logic or of politics (morals) or of aesthetics. […] But true 
philosophers are commanders and lawgivers. They say, ‘This is the way it 
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should be!’ Only they decide about mankind’s Where to? and What 
for? and to do so they employ the preparatory work of all 
philosophical workers, all subduers of the past. With creative hands 
they reach towards the future, and everything that is or has existed 
becomes their means, their tool, their hammer. Their ‘knowing’ is 
creating, their creating is law-giving, their will to truth is—will to 
power. (BGE 211 / KSA 5.144-5) 
This quote from Beyond Good and Evil contains many elements and I will 
point a few ideas, always keeping in mind the poetics of philosophy, that is 
its creative dimension. 
1. The task of the philosopher is once again compared to that of the 
poet, although not exclusively. The philosopher needs to have been a 
poet among many other things, ‘nearly all things’ Nietzsche says. To 
become a philosopher of the future, one must go through many 
stages and one of them is the poetic stage. We can translate this idea 
of stages in terms of perspectives and the poetic perspective precisely 
shows the creation that is at play in accounting for the world.  
2. Related to the first point, the necessity to go through many stages 
parallels the idea that one should experience as many perspectives as 
possible in order to reach a better and more ‘objective’ understanding 
of a thing, to reach what Wittgenstein calls a ‘surveyable 
representation [übersichtliche Darstellung].’ (PI 122) The philosopher 
must ‘traverse the range of human values and value-feelings and be 
able to look with many kinds of eyes and consciences from the corners 
into every wide expanse.’ The philosopher must, one could say, have 
a perspectivist education and multiply the directions in which she 
looks. Similarly, if the philosopher is to teach something, it is this 
perspectivism that the poet shows. 
3. This multiplicity of perspectives and stages are preliminary steps 
for the philosopher’s real task which ‘calls for him to create values.’ 
This creation of values is the necessary stage for the philosopher to 
endorse her role, that of a commander and a lawgiver. This aspect is 
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central for it introduces the importance of creation within the 
philosopher’s task. To create new perspectives on the world, the 
philosopher follows the poet in creating a new language which, in 
turn, creates new things. These new things, that is this new 
conception of the world, leads the philosopher to create new values. 
4. The task of the philosopher is to use her creative hands in order to 
build something with ‘the preparatory works of all philosophical 
workers, subduers of the past.’ Nietzsche uses time notions to classify 
philosophers: philosophical workers are concerned with the past 
whereas creative philosophers are philosophers of the future. This 
can be linked to Wittgenstein’s concern with his own philosophy: 
when discussing the idea that philosophy should be written as poetic 
composition, Wittgenstein considers: ‘That, it seems to me, must 
reveal how far my thinking belongs to the present, the future, or the 
past.’ We have interpreted this by affirming that the task of poetry 
within philosophy or, better, the impact of poetry on philosophy, is 
to make philosophy look towards the future. The same goes for 
Nietzsche who considers that it is the philosopher’s creative—or 
poetic—powers that characterise the philosopher of the future. 
5. The philosopher of the future’s ‘knowing is creating.’ All that has 
been called truths are, ultimately, creations, fictions, inventions 
which have become dominant: the fictions upon which the people 
have agreed. However, the philosopher of the future’s task is to 
overcome these dominant truths (and that is the step Nietzsche 
attempts to make by showing that these truths are constructions) and 
to propose new ones. This proposing of new truths is a creating of 
new values which, in turn, become new truths. For Nietzsche, 
metaphysics can be criticised from the standpoint that it establishes a 
system of values which consider truth as valuable. On the contrary, 
his perspectival vocabulary suggests that one should not remain 
enclosed within one system of values, but rather acknowledge the 
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perspectival and thus relative dimension of our values. The task of 
the philosopher of the future is thus to uncover the perspectival 
dimension of values and undermine the metaphysical system. Hence 
Nietzsche’s use of the hammer as the philosophical tool: it can break, 
build, and, as in Twilight of the Idols, sound out the idols. The 
sounding out of the idols reveals that they are empty and this breaks 
down the metaphysical system. The task then remains of rebuilding, 
of creating. For Nietzsche, the value we give to truth is related to a 
question of power and hierarchy. The revaluation of values aims at 
revaluating this hierarchy without establishing a new system, 
because this would just be repeating what Nietzsche criticises. The 
revaluation of values has no end, it is a never-ending process, and 
this might be one way of reading the eternal recurrence. The last 
sentence from the quote suggests a process: knowing is creating, 
creating is law-giving, will to truth is will to power. The passage from 
law-giving to will to truth can be understood in the sense that truth 
justifies the law and this in turn must be seen as a power justification. 
This process must however not have an end and the philosopher of 
the future always engages in this process of creating. 
The philosopher, once she has encountered and experienced the poetic 
perspective, becomes not only a knower but a creator and a law-giver whose 
creations become new perspectives from which to look at the world. 
Inasmuch as the philosopher has to create these perspectives, she must also 
create herself. The idea of style does not only describe the creation of the 
philosopher’s text and how her philosophy is expressed, it does not only 
describe the style of thinking as Wittgenstein says, it also concerns the 
philosopher’s own style, her own character, as Nietzsche argues: ‘One thing 
is needful.—To ‘give style’ to one’s character.’ (GS 290 / KSA 3.350) Nietzsche 
thus embraces poetry and its creative powers in order to expand the scope 
both of his philosophy and of his worldview. But how does Wittgenstein fit 
in this picture? A straightforward interpretation would see him as quite 
263 
 
opposed to Nietzsche’s ideal of a creating philosopher. Isn’t Wittgenstein’s 
idea that the task of philosophy is to ‘leave everything as it is?’ (PI 124) On 
the contrary, I believe that Wittgenstein’s philosophy can also be interpreted 
in creative ways: he does not only describe uses of language but invents 
some, as he argues in the Blue Book; ‘That is also why our method is not 
merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but rather deliberately to invent 
new ones, some of them because of their absurd appearance.’ (BB, p. 28) We 
also have seen that imagination plays an important role in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and this can be related to the idea of fiction. 
This opposition between creation and description brings us back to the 
analytic-continental divide. Confronting poetry forces philosophy to rethink 
its task at the end of metaphysics and, rather than embracing science as the 
new absolute, to engage into metaphilosophical reflections about the task of 
philosophy, whether it is descriptive or creative. We have seen that the ideas 
of perspectivism and of creation of perspectives bring to the fore the 
transformative dimension of philosophy. This dimension is, according to 
Simon Critchley, a specific feature of continental philosophy: 
In other words, the touchstone of philosophy in the Continental 
tradition might be said to be practice; that is to say, our historically 
and culturally embedded life in the world as finite selves. It is this 
touchstone of practice that leads philosophy towards a critique of 
present conditions, as conditions not amenable to freedom, and to the 
Utopian demand that things be otherwise, the demand for a 
transformative practice of philosophy, art, poetry or thinking.289 
We have however seen with Wittgenstein that even a description can have a 
therapeutic—and thus transformative—dimension. Like the other criteria 
described in Chapter One, the transformative dimension cannot serve as 
dividing between two sides but, to the contrary, functions as a bridging 
notion. Similarly, and we have seen it with our study of Nietzsche’s and 
Wittgenstein’s styles in Chapter Seven, the notion of style cannot divide 
between analytic and continental. On the contrary, and inasmuch as analytic 
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or continental philosophy are family resemblance concepts, there can be no 
one defining trait. 
Despite seemingly stark differences—and we have seen the oppositions 
between Carnap and Heidegger or Derrida and Austin in Chapter One—
which could suggest that analytic and continental philosophy would be two 
rather distinct styles or ways of philosophising, they share some concerns, 
especially with language. Once analytic philosophers take into account the 
poetic aspects of language, as Wittgenstein for instance does, and continental 
philosopher the necessary communicative and normative aspects of 
language, as Nietzsche suggests it already, the differences seem to vanish. 
The confrontation with poetry brings Nietzsche and Wittgenstein not only 
to elaborate views on language which combine aspects from representational 
and expressive conceptions of language, but also to adopt a specific style 
which can be characterised as poetic. Rather than considering analytic and 
continental philosophy as two traditions which are completely distinct from 
one another—and we have seen that neither can be ultimately defined—they 
can be considered as perspectives or sets of perspectives, which, as with all 
perspectives, require work to shift from one to another. 
Confronting Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s perspectives shows that the 
seemingly stark contrast between transformative and descriptive 
philosophy, between the creative aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy and 
Wittgenstein’s considering of philosophy as ‘leaving things as they are,’ is 
much weaker than one might initially think. As I hope to have shown, any 
description involves a creation and any creation requires a description. In 
this sense, the task of philosophy for Nietzsche and Wittgenstein aims at a 
redescription of the world and our traditional relation to it. This focus on 
redescription reveals the poetic dimension of philosophy and how 
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